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Abstract
There is a lack of knowledge regarding how public safety organizations communicate
threat-related information at the local level. The purpose of this qualitative exploratory
case study was to explore the benefits and challenges of sharing threat-related information between public safety agencies (law enforcement, fire services, emergency medical services, and public health) in Honolulu, Hawaii. The conceptual framework for the
study was general systems theory. The sample for this study was a subset of 13 individuals from the larger population of approximately 50 subject matter experts who worked
within four public safety agencies and had extensive experience analyzing and sharing
threat-related information. Purposeful sampling was utilized for the study. Data were collected through in-depth interviews. The findings of this study clearly identified several
important themes related to sharing threat-related information between local public safety
organizations: information flow, collaboration, participation with the state fusion center,
and the complexity of sharing confidential information. I found that Honolulu public
safety agencies are currently communicating through information flow within and between organizations; however, this flow of information is intermittent. I also found that
threat-related information often contains highly protected, or law enforcement sensitive
information, and is difficult to share between agencies. Inadequate threat-related information sharing and poor collaboration among local public safety agencies may put the
public at increased risk from violent attacks. The results of this study contribute to positive social change by identifying the benefits and challenges of sharing threat-related information between local public safety agencies.
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study
Terrorism and violent extremism continue to dominate the 24-hour news cycle.
One needs only to review the 2015 Paris attacks that had 130 fatalities (“BBC News,”
2015), the 2017 assault at the Las Vegas Harvest Music Festival that had 58 fatalities
(Bui, Zapotosky, Barrett, & Berman, 2017), or numerous mall and school shootings
across the United States (“Worst Mass Shootings,” 2019) to recognize that terrorism and
violent extremism are on the rise globally (Husain, 2015). Concurrently, the information
revolution is evolving at an exponential rate with more and more activity of daily life
conducted online (Huda et al., 2018). With violent extremist organizations now able to
communicate and recruit followers via the Internet, it is critical that public safety
organizations analyze information from all available sources and share threat-related
information between agencies (“Public Safety,” 2011).
After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks
Upon the United States, commonly known as the 9/11 Commission, developed
suggestions to protect the nation from another assault (“National Commission,” 2004).
Several of the recommendations focused on sharing information between public safety
agencies (“State and Major Urban,” 2014). Federal, state, and local governments have
invested billions of dollars to protect the American public from terrorist and violent
extremist attacks (Hesterman, 2019). A primary role of public safety departments is
“prevention and protection of the public from dangers affecting safety” (“Public Safety
Law,” 2014, para. 1).
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The benefits of monitoring and analyzing threat-related information are
numerous. A 2012 White House publication entitled, National Strategy for Information
Sharing and Safeguarding, acknowledged that information sharing between public safety
organizations increases their ability to prevent threats to the public. Public safety
organizations across the United States have developed methods to monitor threat-related
information from the Internet and other openly available sources. The challenge is how to
effectively share this information between public safety agencies (Carter & Rip, 2013).
Before 2001, the nation’s public safety organizations worked together when necessary,
but rarely shared information. It took several years for public safety agencies to develop
relationships, policies, and interoperable communications equipment to facilitate
effective information sharing (Carter et al., 2017). Organizational cultures within
agencies had to adapt to a new philosophy of interagency cooperation (“Better
information sharing,” 2015).
Currently, there is not a clear understanding of the benefits and challenges of
information sharing between local public safety agencies. Although there is much data
about how federal agencies exchange threat-related information (Carter et al., 2017;
Bharosa, Lee, & Janssen, 2010; Vacca, 2019), there is a lack of information on how local
public safety agencies share this same type of data. Over the last decade, challenges to
information sharing between local public safety organizations have emerged, but only a
small number of these challenges have been documented in the literature. Information
sharing between local agencies is proving to be much more difficult than it once
appeared. It is well known that the organizational and political culture of agencies can
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impede the process of information sharing (Mah, 2014). Communication equipment
technology differences may also limit information exchange but are easier to resolve than
cultural issues (Allen, Karanasios, & Norman, 2014). What is not known are the
challenges local public safety agencies face when sharing threat-related information
between one another for the purpose of promoting public safety. Researchers do not fully
understand the benefits and challenges of collaboration among these agencies, due to
limited research on this issue (Carter et al., 2017). This lack of knowledge is problematic
because local agencies hold the primary responsibility of responding to public safety
threats.
In reviewing the literature, I found no studies that focused on the specific benefits
and challenges of sharing information between local public safety organizations in
Honolulu, Hawaii. Hawaii presents a unique case because unlike the contiguous 48 states
and Alaska, should something happen, mobilizing help from the mainland is logistically
more complicated. Understanding how threat information is shared in Hawaii is thus
critical because of its isolation. The findings of this study may help to fill this gap in
knowledge.
All modes of communication between agencies must be utilized to provide for a
collaborative approach to preparing for and responding to events that affect public safety.
A unique and evolving information resource used by public safety organizations (law
enforcement, fire services, emergency medical services [EMS], and public health) is
known as open source information. It is essentially any information that is openly
available to the public (“Intelligence,” 2013). Public safety organizations in most U.S.
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metropolitan areas are now equipped to monitor open source information on the Internet
and analyze it for potential threats to the public. If impending threats are discovered, it is
important that the information is effectively shared with other public safety organizations
in the region. The benefits and challenges that these organizations face when sharing
threat-related information between agencies was the topic of this study.
Chapter 1 will include a discussion of the background and the need for
information sharing and collaboration between agencies and the rationale to public safety.
I will discuss the problem for the study and the purpose and provide a brief overview of
the benefits and challenges that public safety agencies face. The chapter also includes an
overview of general systems theory (“General Systems Theory,” 2014), which served as
the conceptual framework for the study, and how it relates to sharing of information and
collaboration. The nature of the study is also discussed. Limitations, delimitations, and
assumptions are presented. Chapter 1 concludes with a rationale for performing the study
and an introduction to the literature review in Chapter 2.
Background of the Study
Valuable threat-related information can be obtained from analyzing publicly
available information on the Internet. There is often information uncovered in an initial
attack that may have the potential of stopping more attacks when effective collaboration
occurs with the appropriate public safety agencies (Chermak et al., 2013). The rapid
communication of threat-related information is vital immediately following an attack, but
it comes with challenges.
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After the San Bernardino (Schmidt & Masood, 2015) and Orlando attacks (Ellis et
al., 2016), the connections between these two terrorist plots, occurring in vastly different
areas of the United States, became evident to law enforcement agencies. This knowledge
reinforced why it is so important to analyze threat-related information before and after an
attack. The benefits of monitoring and analyzing open source information are immense
but are still not completely known (Carter et al., 2017). Much work still needs to be done
to meet the challenges involved in collaboration among public safety agencies (Carter et
al., 2017). Public safety agencies across the nation must adapt to a new asymmetrical
threat environment and elevate threat-related information sharing to a high priority within
their organizations.
Before 2001, U.S. public safety organizations worked together when necessary,
but rarely shared information. Shortly after the September 11th attacks, the 9/11
Commission pointed to a series of suggestions, that if implemented, would better protect
the nation. Many of the recommendations pertained to increased “sharing of threatrelated information between federal, state, local, tribal, and private partners” (“State and
Major Urban,” 2014, para. 1). The 9/11 Commission acknowledged that it was vitally
important that this information sharing occur between all agencies that are responsible for
the public’s safety, not only law enforcement organizations (“National Commission,”
2004). A 2012 White House Publication entitled, National Strategy for Information
Sharing and Safeguarding, affirms that the nation’s security “depends on our ability to
share the right information, with the right people, at the right time” (p. 1). Chermak,
Carter, Carter, McGarrell, and Drew (2013) argue that the use of intelligence methods has

6
enhanced law enforcement agencies ability to prevent threats to the public throughout the
U.S.
Hu, Knox, and Kapucu (2014) explained that it took nearly a decade for public
safety organizations to see the benefits of exchanging threat-related information and
“shift from a centralized command and control system to a more collaborative approach”
(p. 699). New policies had to be developed and implemented, communications equipment
had to be purchased or retrofitted with interoperable capabilities, and organizational
cultures had to adapt to a philosophy of information sharing (Hu et al., 2014). Although
there are a multitude of social media communication platforms that are consistently used
by the public, there continues to be increased scrutiny of public safety organizations’
sharing of threat-related open source information due to privacy concerns (Carter et al.,
2017). Public safety organizations monitoring of social media has raised privacy concerns
throughout the nation. Therefore, it is important that agencies develop privacy policies
and make them available on their websites notifying the public of how they plan to
monitor social media data.
Benefits of Collaboration
What is known and documented from a thorough review of the current literature
are the benefits of sharing threat-related information between public safety agencies, but
little is known of the challenges that are faced (Carter et al., 2016). The sharing of
information between public safety organizations can increase the agency leaders’ ability
to identify and prevent threats to the public (“National Strategy for Information Sharing,”
2012). The November 2015 Paris attacks involved trained attackers targeting numerous
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locations throughout the city. The attackers used high-powered automatic weapons and
suicide vests making the attack a complex and well executed operation that took weeks if
not months of planning (Witte & Morris, 2015). Following the attack, European security
experts pointed out that “poor information-sharing among intelligence agencies, a
threadbare system for tracking suspects across open borders and an unmanageably long
list of homegrown extremists to monitor” (para. 2) were factors contributing to the deadly
attack (Witte & Morris, 2015). French officials maintain that information sharing
between public safety agencies may prevent, or at least reduce, the impact of future
attacks.
Huyck (2015) pointed out that the specifics of information sharing between public
safety agencies have not yet been adequately defined. Information sharing occurs in
various forms and at different levels depending on the specific organizations involved
(Huyck, 2015). Whenever an attack on the public takes place, the need for the
coordination of information sharing across all first responder agencies rapidly increases
(“Orlando Terror Attack,” 2015). To facilitate the stream of information that is monitored
and shared between public safety agencies, coordination has to be facilitated from the top
down.
Information exchange at the operational level requires a well-designed
communication system that has been developed specifically for the sharing of real-time
actionable information between public safety agencies (Huyck, 2015). Also, in order for
first responders to share information effectively, they must have rehearsed the procedures
multiple times during realistic training scenarios.
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Challenges to Collaboration
The challenges of utilizing and sharing threat-related information have also come
into play over the last decade, but little is known of these challenges in the literature.
Information sharing between local, state, and federal partners is much more difficult than
it appears. Agencies organizational culture and political posture often come into play,
which can slow down the flow of information between entities (Mah, 2014). Technology
differences between organizations can also limit information flow.
A common thread between many of the recent terror attacks is that government
agencies had threat-related information linked to the suspects before the attack, but the
information was not initially recognized as critical and was not effectively shared to local
public safety officials (Ellis et al., 2016). Law enforcement officials are now aggressively
identifying potential threats through monitoring open source and social media sources.
However, if the information is not shared with other public safety organizations, critical
threat information that may be necessary to avert a future attack may remain undeveloped
and therefor unusable.
There is significant literature on information sharing between federal and local
agencies throughout the U.S., but I found no studies that focus on the specific benefits
and challenges of sharing threat-related information between public safety organizations
in Honolulu, Hawaii. Hawaii presents a unique case because unlike the contiguous 48
states and Alaska, should something happen, mobilizing help from the mainland is
logistically more complicated. Understanding how threat information is shared in Hawaii
is critical because of the state’s isolation from the rest of the nation. The findings of this
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study will help to fill this gap in literature by determining the benefits and challenges of
sharing threat-related information between public safety agencies in Honolulu, Hawaii.
The participants for this study will be current, or former, subject matter experts (SMEs)
experts who have extensive experience working in an information-sharing role in
Honolulu public safety organizations. A presentation of the findings of this study will
extend the existing literature on the benefits and challenges of information sharing
between public safety organizations. It will be interesting to see the challenges and
benefits that each report, and how these SMEs believe that the process of sharing
information between public safety organizations can be improved.
Problem Statement
The overarching problem addressed in this study is the importance of
communication between public safety agencies as they manage serious emerging threatrelated issues such as terrorism. After the 9/11 attacks on the United States, the federal
government established guidelines to improve the communication and coordination
between public safety organizations in order to prevent future terrorist attacks
(“Homeland Security,” 2016). Public safety organizations throughout the nation have
used these guidelines to establish policies in an effort to improve information sharing
between agencies.
There is reliable information in the literature about the sharing of information
between federal and local agencies (e.g., Carter et al., 2017; Bharosa, Lee, & Janssen,
2010) but there is a lack of knowledge on information sharing between local agencies.
This is problematic because local agencies are on the front lines of the struggle against
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terrorism and are the nation’s first layer of defense. Researchers and policy makers do not
understand the benefits and challenges of collaboration among these agencies (Carter et
al., 2017), which, given their unique threat setting, should be working closely together. It
is not just communication between law enforcement agencies that is important but
communication across all public safety agencies, including EMS, fire services, and public
health. In an ideal world, local public agencies would have excellent interagency
communication, and everyone would respond effectively when a public safety event
happens. In reality, policy makers do not know if this is the case because research has not
been done in this area.
Research involving terrorist and violent extremist activity has demonstrated a lack
of communication and coordination of efforts to thwart attacks (“National Commission,”
2004). Examples of this lack of communication are the Boston Marathon (Hu et al.,
2014), the San Bernardino (Schmidt & Masood, 2015), and the Orlando terror attacks
(Ellis et al., 2016), all of which shared similarities among the attackers. Threat-related
information sharing between local, state, and federal partners is often difficult, but could
have prevented some of these events from occurring at the outset, according to experts
(Chermak et al., 2013).
The benefits are more obvious when terror attacks are thwarted, such as the
unsuccessful 2015 Joshua Ryne Goldberg attack on a 9/11 Memorial event in Kansas
City, Missouri (Ellis & Botelho, 2015). But more terror attacks can be prevented if all
agencies cooperate and coordinate their efforts. Loss of life may be prevented if
challenges to threat-related information sharing between local public safety organizations
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are identified and eliminated (Chermak et al., 2013). The steady increase in violent
attacks and other threat-related public safety issues is the reason this research is so
important.
The gap in the literature is that researchers do not know how public safety
organizations communicate threat-related information at the local level. Therefore, it is
unknown whether there are challenges or benefits to sharing threat-related information
between local public safety agencies in the United States. The findings of this study may
help to fill this gap in the literature by providing insight on the perceived benefits and
challenges of sharing threat-related information between public safety agencies in
Honolulu, Hawaii.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this qualitative exploratory case study was to explore the benefits
and challenges of sharing threat-related information between public safety agencies (law
enforcement, fire services, EMS, and public health) in Honolulu, Hawaii. I focused on
Honolulu for several reasons. Honolulu is a moderate sized city and faces many of the
same challenges as other cities in the continental United States, including the need to
share information across agencies in order to manage emerging threat-related issues.
However, Honolulu is unique because unlike other cities it is remote and isolated, being
approximately 2,500 miles from the mainland. Assistance from other states may not be
available for several days due to shipping transit time (“Pasha Hawaii,” 2019). As a
result, there is an increased need to ensure interagency information sharing is occurring to
facilitate the region’s ability to manage an attack.
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The gap in the current literature is that researchers do not know how public safety
organizations communicate threat-related information at the local level. It is essential that
agencies communicate threat-related information effectively, according to Chermak et al.,
2013. Due to their unique situation, Honolulu public safety agencies provide an excellent
opportunity for this research. The participants for this study were individuals who had at
least 15 years’ experience sharing threat-related information between public safety
organizations in Honolulu. The findings should provide a unique understanding of how
public safety organizations currently share threat-related information encounter
challenges, and how these challenges differ between organizations.
Research Questions
I sought to answer three research questions (RQs) for this qualitative exploratory
case study. The questions were aimed at exploring the benefits and challenges that exist
in sharing threat-related information between public safety organizations in Honolulu,
Hawaii.
RQ1. How are public safety agencies communicating threat-related information
between one another in Honolulu, Hawaii?
RQ2. What are the benefits and challenges of sharing threat-related information
between public safety agencies in Honolulu, Hawaii?
RQ3. What can be done to improve the sharing of threat-related information
between public safety agencies in Honolulu, Hawaii?
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Conceptual Framework
This research was a phenomenological study. I used general systems theory as the
conceptual framework because it effectively describes how information is exchanged
between public safety organizations to protect the population from attacks. The theory
also provided a conceptual platform to explore the specific research questions of this
study. The goal of the research was to explore how agencies within the Honolulu public
safety system are communicating with one another. I explored how public safety systems
are interacting to create a cohesive response when needed.
Systems are essentially a set of objects, or variables “that affect one another
within an environment and form a larger pattern that is different from any of the parts”
(“Communication Theories,” 2019, p. 32). In 1936 Ludwig von Bertalanffy first
proposed general systems theory and the theory was expanded upon in the 1960s by Ross
Ashby (“General Systems Theory,” 2014). Von Bertalanffy (1968) stated that systems
were comprised of a series of components that are in constant interaction with their
environment.
General system theory can be defined as “the transdisciplinary study of the
abstract organization of phenomena, independent of their substance, type, or spatial or
temporal scale of existence” (“Communication Theories,” 2019, p. 32). A system is often
described as consisting of four things. The first are objects, the second attributes, the third
is a relationship between those attributes, and the fourth is that the systems exist within a
setting, or environment (“Communication Theories,” 2019). Systems are essentially a set
of objects, or variables “that affect one another within an environment and form a larger
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pattern that is different from any of the parts” (“Communication Theories,” 2019, p. 32).
Because elements in systems are constantly interacting with one another, when one part
of a system changes it results in a change somewhere else within the system
(“Communication Theories,” 2019).
General systems theory will best guide the research to answer this study’s
research questions. The theory has been used for several decades to study federal, state,
and local government organizations. General systems theory is useful when studying the
organizational changes and development of a community’s public safety system because
it allows the researcher to explore the interconnection between individual agencies, or
subsystems. When public safety organizations within the same region share relevant
threat information with one another, it prompts other agencies within that region to
prepare for, or possibly counter the threat. Government public safety agencies work
together as a system to protect the public. Therefore, if miscommunication of threatrelated information occurs in one agency within a system, it can lead to poor operational
decisions being made in another agency within the system, and potentially lead to a
failure of the system to protect the public.
Because public safety systems are constantly interacting with one another, when
one part of a system changes, it will result in a change somewhere else within the
structure (“Communication Theories,” 2019). As public safety analysts monitor the
Internet and social media for terms, phrases, and threat-related indicators, they identify
risks and then notify other public safety organizations within their regional network to
effectively address the threat (“Public Safety,” 2011).
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The sharing of threat-related information between public safety organizations is
vital to improving law enforcement’s ability to uncover and stop violent attacks before
they occur. Analysts at public safety organizations throughout the U.S. have the
capability to research and analyze multiple forms of information from all regions of the
nation, fusing local, regional, and national threat information together to uncover possible
threats (“Public Safety,” 2011).
State and local fusion centers are helping to integrate public safety organizations
into an information-sharing environment. As public safety analysts collect and analyze
information from multiple sources, they pass threat-related information to state fusion
centers and then up to the federal government. Federal agencies share the information
with their intelligence apparatus, add additional analysis, pass it back to state fusion
centers and then finally back to the local public safety agencies. This circular information
sharing, and collaboration process helps to protect the public from potential attacks.
As geopolitical situations evolve and develop, organizations with the
responsibility for guarding the public’s safety must adapt to a new asymmetrical threat
environment through improved domestic intelligence (Rosenbach & Peritz, 2009). Fusion
centers, which are strategically located throughout all 50 states, are currently in a position
to take on an expanding role in our nation’s domestic security by helping to protect the
public. A more thorough explanation of the conceptual framework will be presented in
Chapter 2.
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Nature of the Study
A qualitative design was determined the best method to analyze this study’s
research information. Data was collected through interviews with SMEs, either current or
recently retired, from four fields of public safety in Honolulu, Hawaii. The primary
source of data was derived from in-depth interviews through conversational style
discussions with the participants utilizing open-ended questions.
To ensure the interview questions were suitable to explore the research questions
for this study, I performed a field test of the questions prior to the actual interviews. I
went into the field and interviewed three individuals who had “expert knowledge about
the population and research topic to provide feedback on the appropriateness of the
questions being asked and how the questions are being asked in relation to the study
focus” (“Field Testing,” 2016). These experts helped me refine the interview questions
and develop appropriate follow up questions, inviting more conversation along a similar
line of thought (“Field Testing,” 2016). The interview questions are closely linked to this
study’s research questions.
Purposeful sampling was utilized for this study. Individuals that had the depth of
knowledge necessary to clearly articulate how threat-related information is analyzed and
shared between public safety agencies in Honolulu, Hawaii, were selected. All of the
participants had at least 15 years of experience sharing information between public safety
organizations. Individuals who had recently retired were also included in the study, if
they met the selection criteria. There were three primary reasons to include this group in
the sampling criterion. First, all of the participants had extensive experience in their

17
respective fields of public safety. Second, because they were no longer associated with
the organizations there was no political pressure on them to answer the questions in a
politically sensitive manor. Third, this research was an opportunity to capture extensive
institutional knowledge from retired public safety SMEs before the knowledge was lost
forever.
The primary purpose was to explore communication across agencies and examine
the benefits and challenges of sharing threat related information between public safety
agencies in Hawaii. The individuals selected were a part of the culture of these
organizations and knew the social dynamics of each agency. Patton (2002) points out,
“qualitative inquiry typically focuses in depth on relatively small samples, even single
cases (N=1), selected purposely” (p.230). It was important to select participants that had a
rich knowledge of their environment in order to build a quality research data set. Patton
explained, “The logic and power of purposeful sampling lie in selecting information-rich
cases for study in depth” (p.230). This process allows a thorough understanding of the
information in context.
The sample for this study was a subset of SMEs from the larger population within
four fields of public safety that had extensive experience analyzing and sharing threatrelated information between agencies. One gap that we see in sharing of threat-related
information is who is included and how do we involve public health (Hospitals, CDC,
etc.) in the process. I included agencies that had representatives assigned to the Hawaii
State Fusion Center, because these are the organizations that are active during an event.
The larger population currently consists of less than 50 SME’s, who work within the
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local public safety organizations and actively share threat-related information between
agencies. For purposes of anonymity, three SMEs were selected from each of four fields.
All individuals had at least 15 years’ experience. It would not have been feasible to
interview every member of the entire population for this study.
Purposeful sampling was utilized for this study. I identified SMEs in each of the
four fields of public safety in Honolulu. Participants for the study were determined based
on whether or not they met the inclusion criteria. Approximately three individuals from
each field of public safety were interviewed, resulting in 13 cases, which was adequate
for the study. This number of case interviews provided a clear understanding of the
benefits and challenges associated with sharing threat-related information.
Each SME was contacted one month prior to the interview and the purpose of the
study was explained. An email inviting them to participate in the study was mailed along
with a consent form which was completed and returned to the researcher via email. The
participants were contacted again by email prior to the interview to confirm a mutually
agreed upon interview date and time. Each participant was given the choice to be
interviewed via teleconference, the participants private residence, or a private meeting
room at the Hawaii Public Library. The interviews were conducted outside of regular
work hours. The researcher was the only person who knew the identity of the participants
and did not disclose their names. Demographic details and site descriptions that might
permit a reader to deduce the identity of a participant were withheld. Participants names
and/or contact info was not recorded in the research records. During the interview phase
of data collection, a review of the consent form was offered to ensure that the participants

19
were aware of the entire interview procedure. Consent forms did not require signatures if
the participant indicated consent by returning a completed form via email with an
identifying number.
In order to capture accurate information for a qualitative data set, I utilized voice
recordings along with field notes. The answers were transcribed into written text and
NVivo qualitative analysis software was used for data coding. The purpose of coding was
to allow themes to emerge from the data that made sense to the researcher. I used a
coding strategy that consisted of reading through all of the transcripts to gain a deep
understanding of what took place during the interviews, while simultaneously reviewing
my written notes. I then classified the data by “aggregating text into small categories of
information” and then assigning an appropriate label (Creswell, 2013, p.184). Lastly, I
separated all of the codes into four or five overarching themes that I referenced while
writing my discussion of the data. A more thorough explanation of the methodology is
presented in Chapter 3.
Operational Definitions
Centers of Excellence: “A team, a shared facility or an entity that provides
leadership, evangelization, best practices, research, support and/or training for a focus
area” (“Inquvent,” 2013, para. 1).
Counterintelligence: An “organized activity of an intelligence service designed to
block an enemy’s sources of information, to deceive the enemy, to prevent sabotage, and
to gather political and military information” (“Counterintelligence,” n.d., para. 1).
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Fusion center: Units that are located in every state in the nation and that “serve as
focal points within the state and local environment for the receipt, analysis, gathering,
and sharing of threat-related information between the federal government and state, local,
tribal, territorial (SLTT) and private sector partners” (“Homeland Security,” 2014, para.
1).
General systems theory: “Systems theory was proposed in the 1936 by the
biologist Ludwig von Bertalanffy, and further developed by Ross Ashby. Von
Bertalanffy emphasized that real systems are open to, and interact with, their
environments, and that they can acquire qualitatively new properties through emergence,
resulting in continual evolution” (“General Systems Theory,” 2014, para. 5).
Intelligence analyst: An analyst whose primary role is “intelligence collecting,
evaluating and processing personnel” (“Federal Bureau of Investigation,” 2015, para. 1).
These positions “may involve gathering information from a variety of channels, including
human intelligence, other intelligence agencies, electronic and Internet surveillance,
interrogations, and criminal investigations” (“Federal Bureau of Investigation,” 2015,
para. 1).
Intelligence Community: “A group of government agencies and organizations that
carry out intelligence activities for the United States government; headed by the Director
of Central Intelligence” (“United States Intelligence,” 2015, para. 1).
Open source intelligence (OSINT): Information utilized by the military, public
safety, or the nation’s intelligence community that is publicly available to anyone. This
important data source “plays an essential role in giving the national security community
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as a whole insight and context at a relatively low cost” (“Intelligence: Open Source,”
2013, para.1).
Open Source Center: A government unit, operated by the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence (ODNI), that is the “focal point for the intelligence community’s
exploitation of open source material. It also aims to promote the acquisition,
procurement, analysis, and dissemination of open source information, products and
services throughout the U.S. Government” (“Aftergood,” 2014, para. 1).
Public safety: The primary responsibility is to protect the public from harm. It is
often used in the context of a government organization that has a mission to provide
protection to the general public from dangerous natural and/or manmade events.
Organizations such as law enforcement, fire services, EMS, and public health agencies
fall into this category (“Public Safety,” 2016, para. 1).
Situational awareness: As defined by the United States Coast Guard, “the ability
to identify, process, and comprehend the critical elements of information about what is
happening to the team with regards to the mission. More simply, it is the practice of
knowing what is going on around you” (“United States Coast Guard,” 1998, para. 1).
Threat-related information: Information that indicates a potential risk related to
“an approaching or imminent menace; [a] negative event that can cause a risk to become
a loss; … [or] a natural phenomenon such as an earthquake, flood, storm, or a man-made
incident such as fire, power failure, sabotage, etc.” (“Threat,” 2017, para. 1).
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Assumptions
For this academic research study, the following assumptions were made. It was
assumed that the individuals from four fields of public safety in Honolulu had been
appropriately trained in analyzing and sharing threat-related information. It was also
assumed that each respondent would answer the questions to the best of their ability. It is
important that the participants relay their personal experience working with threat-related
information within the standard operating procedures established by their organization. It
was assumed that the interviews followed the guidelines of Walden University and that
the recordings made during the interview accurately represented the interview session.
Scope and Delimitations
The sample selection for this study focused on four fields of public safety in
Honolulu, Hawaii. This study purposely did not collect information from across the entire
nation, as the enormous dataset would be unmanageable. Fugard & Potts, (2015), point
out that qualitative research sample size should be “small enough to manage the material
and large enough” to allow a thorough understanding of the participants experience
(p.670; Sandelowski, 1995).
The intent and design were to capture the experiences of SMEs in public safety
within a particular region. Individuals who had at least 15 years’ experience sharing
threat-related information between public safety organizations in Honolulu were the
participants. Individuals recently retired were selected if they met the research study
selection criteria. Because these individuals were no longer associated with their
organizations there was no political pressure on them to answer the questions in a
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politically sensitive manor. This research was also an opportunity to capture extensive
institutional knowledge from retired public safety SMEs before the knowledge was lost.
This study will help fill a gap in the literature by determining the perceived benefits and
challenges of sharing of threat-related information between public safety organizations in
Honolulu, Hawaii.
Limitations
Limitations were present during the data collection process. Because the SMEs
often worked with sensitive information, they were asked to keep the content of their
conversations at the non-sensitive level. They were asked to speak openly and candidly,
while at the same time not disclosing confidential material. During the interviews, the
participants were very cautious when discussing internal agency issues and did not to
disclose sensitive or otherwise confidential information.
Significance
The significance of this study was to determine the benefits and challenges of
sharing threat-related information between public safety organizations in order to better
protect the population. The research will advance the knowledge of prior published
literature on information sharing between public safety organizations.
Some of the most successful defense organizations utilize information sharing as
a key tactical component. Modern security practices “are built around the concept of
fusion,” or sharing of information (Kalu, 2009, p.34). A continuous learning strategy
combined with effective information flow between security agencies can significantly
reduce the odds of an attack (Kalu, 2009).
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It is inevitable that public safety officials will increasingly become more involved
in open source and social media data analysis processes. This study will shed light on
how effective information exchange can assist public safety agencies with future
terrorism challenges.
Implications for Social Change
Sharing the results of this study will create positive social change by identifying
the benefits and challenges of sharing threat-related information between local public
safety agencies. As public safety organizations throughout the nation develop their ability
to share threat-related information, they should review lessons learned from organizations
examined in this study that have faced this important and complex undertaking.
Horrific events such as the Boston marathon bombing (Hu et al., 2014), the Paris attacks
(“BBC News,” 2105), and the assault on an Orlando, Florida nightclub (Ellis, Fantz,
Karimi, & McLaughlin, 2016), are a stark reminder that individuals with aspirations of
domestic terrorism can be readily recruited and trained to carryout violent acts. Organizations with the responsibility for public safety must adapt to a new asymmetrical threat environment through improved domestic intelligence. With violent extremist organizations
now able to communicate and recruit followers via the Internet, it is even more critical to
monitor all available communication sources and share threat-related information between public safety organizations.
Summary
Public safety organizations are forming relationships and working in a
collaborative manor to address the social phenomenon of terrorism and violent
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extremism. However, more work needs to be done to ensure that threat-related
information is shared seamlessly between all organizations that have a responsibility to
keep the public safe.
The findings of this study will help to fill a gap in literature by determining the
benefits and challenges of information sharing between public safety organizations. The
purpose of this research was to explore the benefits and challenges of sharing threatrelated information between public safety organizations (law enforcement, fire services,
EMS, and public health) in Honolulu, Hawaii. The proliferation of the Internet and global
communication along with the rise of violent extremism has brought together a new and
dangerous phenomenon. This research will help to identify benefits and challenges of
sharing threat-related information between public safety agencies in a mid-sized
metropolitan city and what can be done to improve this information exchange.
Qualitative design was determined appropriate to explore the responses to the
unique set of research questions for this study. General systems theory was utilized as the
conceptual framework for the study. The findings of this research may assist other
agencies across the nation share threat-related information in a more effective manner.
Chapter 2 will review the pertinent literature related to the topic.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
Public safety organizations across the United States are engaged in the process of
enhancing their open source information collection capabilities. At the same time the
information revolution is growing at a rapid pace. It is crucial that public safety
organizations keep up with the current pace of technology. Local public safety agencies
often face challenges in using technology to share threat-related information that are
specific to their individual organizations. Information sharing in today’s environment is
complex and dynamic and public safety organizations must employ individuals who
understand the latest communication technology (Kozuch & Sienkiewicz-Malyjurek,
2015). The primary purpose of this research was to examine the benefits and challenges
of sharing threat-related information between public safety organizations in Honolulu,
Hawaii.
Individuals throughout the world now have the ability to communicate on multiple platforms in real-time. Complex media such as high-resolution video and images can
be sent instantly around the globe. Communication techniques that were once expensive
and complex are now available to anyone with a smart phone. According to Boczkowski,
Matassi, and Mitchelstein (2018), a recent survey indicated that “98% of those between
18- and 29-years-old used social media and accessed 3.5 platforms on average” (p. 250)
Terrorist organizations exploit these technology innovations to expand their global footprint (Cohn, 2013).
Pivotal information relating to situational awareness and threat identification resides in open source information and social media. Recent geopolitical events across the
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world have been shaped in part through social media. In the recent political unrest exhibited during the 2010-2011 Arab spring, for instance, major protests in the streets were often proceeded by heated conversations of political unrest online (Howard et al., 2011, p.
3). In Egypt and Tunisia, protest organizers used social media extensively to connect with
activists. Frequently, these online political conversations were picked up by news media
outlets which spread the information regionally (Howard et al., 2011, p.3).
In the 21st century, not only are digital technologies evolving at an accelerated
rate, but historical evidence also illustrates “a larger trend of ever-more-rapid adoption of
new technologies” (Desilver, 2014, p. 2). These global events illustrate why it is important that domestic public safety organizations monitor and share open source information. A thorough review of the literature on the topic helps to better define the problem
and the purpose of this research. By carefully reviewing the available information, I was
able to determine the current relevance of the research problem. Reviewing the literature
also helped to bring into context the importance of monitoring and sharing threat-related
information between public safety organizations. The first major theme in the literature
was benefits of sharing threat-related information, the second was fusion center facilitation of information sharing between public safety agencies, the third was challenges of
sharing threat-related information, and the fourth was social media use between public
safety agencies. I also discuss the Literature Search Strategy and Conceptual Framework
in this chapter.
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Literature Search Strategy
Library databases and search engines used in this research study included
Homeland Security Digital Library, Sage Journals, EBSCOhost, Taylor Francis Online,
PubMed, ProQuest Central. Database searches were conducted in the Walden University
online library. Key information sharing websites were also used in this study including
the Justice Information Sharing, and International Relations and Security Networks. Key
search terms used in the research process included policy, open source, open source
center, social media, fusion centers, national security, network fusion, counterterrorism,
interoperability, intelligence, counterintelligence, intelligence community, national
intelligence, homeland security, information sharing, law enforcement, public safety, and
public health. I placed date restrictions on the database searches to ensure that the
majority of the information had been published within the past 5 years. I also restricted
the language to documents published in English.
The reference lists of the articles I selected were reviewed in order to locate other
sources of data pertaining to my topic. I reviewed over 200 documents during the literature review process including books, peer reviewed journal articles, official government
publications and websites, trade publications, and media sources that I deemed credible. I
found over 80 documents that were relevant for this research. The major themes in the literature were benefits of sharing threat-related information, fusion centers facilitation of
information sharing between public safety agencies, challenges of sharing threat-related
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information, and social media use between public safety agencies. The results of the literature review are discussed in more detail in the “Literature Review” section later in this
chapter.
Conceptual Framework
I used general systems theory (“General Systems Theory,” 2014) as the
conceptual framework for this research. I selected this theory because it offered the best
description of how public safety organizations share threat-related information to protect
the population from terrorist attacks. General systems theory also provided the best
framework for responding to the research questions for this study. Researchers have used
general systems theory for several decades to study both domestic and international
politics (Tierney, 1972). General systems theory is useful when studying the
organizational changes and development of a community’s public safety system by
analyzing the interconnection between individual agencies or subsystems. Elements in
systems are consistently interacting with one another. A change in one area of a system
results in changes in another area of the system (“Communication Theories,” 2019).
In the article entitled, “Surveillance and Resilience in Theory and Practice,” Raab,
Jones, and SzJones (2015), pointed out that “a system may not only react to
environmental effects by changing its internal properties or organization, but also act on
and change its environment, bringing about a new relationship or a new equilibrium” (p.
26). General systems framework is effective in illuminating complex collaborative
relationships between public safety organizations in dynamic, rapidly changing
environments. Systems are essentially a set of objects, or variables “that affect one
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another within an environment and form a larger pattern that is different from any of the
parts” (“Communication Theories,” 2019, p. 32). William et al., (2006) pointed out that
within the U.S. public health industry there is growing awareness and acceptance of
systems thinking.
In conducting this research, I sought to build upon the knowledge base of research
regarding how general systems theory is currently utilized within modern government
organizations. Von Bertalanffy first proposed general systems theory in the 1930s and the
theory was furthered by Ross Ashby in the mid 1960s (“General Systems Theory,” 2014).
Von Bertalanffy stated that systems are “a set of things that affect one another within an
environment and form a larger pattern that is different from any of the parts”
(“Communication Theories,” 2019, p. 32). Because elements in systems are constantly
interacting with one another, when one area of a system undergoes change it
subsequently results in change somewhere else in the system (“Communication
Theories,” 2019). Thus, as public safety organizations within the same region share
relevant threat-related information with one another, other agencies within that region are
prompted to prepare for or counter the possible threat. When public safety analysts are
able to monitor the Internet and social media for terms, phrases, and threat-related
situations, they are able better identify and prevent threats to the community (Chermak et
al., 2013).
The sharing of threat-related information between public safety organizations is
vital to improving law enforcement’s ability to uncover and stop violent attacks before
they occur. Analysts at public safety organizations throughout the U.S. have the
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capability to research and analyze multiple forms of information from all regions of the
nation, fusing local and national threat information together to uncover possible threats.
As public safety analysts collect and analyze information from multiple sources, they
pass threat-related information to local fusion centers. The information is then passed up
to the federal government which in turn shares it at the top level of the nation’s
intelligence structure, adds additional threat data from federal sources, and then passes
the information to local fusion centers and then finally back to local public safety
organizations. This circular information sharing, and collaboration process helps to make
the nation safer overall.
Systems are essentially a set of objects, or variables “that affect one another
within an environment and form a larger pattern that is different from any of the parts”
(“Communication Theories,” 2019, p. 32). When public safety organizations within the
same region share relevant threat information with one another, it prompts other agencies
within that region to prepare for, or possibly counter the threat. As geopolitical situations
evolve and develop, organizations with the responsibility for public safety must adapt to a
new asymmetrical threat environment through improved domestic intelligence. State and
local fusion centers are currently in a position to take on an expanding role in the nation’s
domestic security by helping to protect the public from violent attacks.
Literature Review
Threat-related open source information is a key resource for public safety
organizations. Therefore, it is important that SMEs from multiple fields, including law
enforcement, public health, EMS, and fire services work together toward the common
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goal of sharing threat-related information between agencies. Lenart, Albanese, Halstead,
Schlegelmilch, and Paturas (2012) explain, “fusion centers must employ people with the
necessary competencies to understand the nature of the threat facing a community,
discriminate between important information and irrelevant or merely interesting facts and
apply domain knowledge to interpret the results to obviate or reduce the existing danger”
(p. 174). The overarching goal of fusion centers is to share information between local
public safety organizations, as well as ensure that vital threat-related information
uncovered at the local level is passed up to federal government officials (Stone, 2015).
The studies and articles chosen for this literature review are within the scope of
the research study. They represent the knowledge currently available on how public
safety organizations across the nation analyze and share threat-related information. The
literature was reviewed and then synthesized to bring to light observable trends in threatrelated information sharing across multiple public safety organizations. The phenomena
were described from the unique viewpoints of the individual organizations. This approach
to the literature review process related back to the research questions posed for this study.
The major themes in the literature were benefits of sharing threat-related information,
fusion centers facilitation of information sharing between public safety agencies,
challenges of sharing threat-related information, and social media use between public
safety agencies.
Benefits of Sharing Threat-Related Information
Public safety systems are large and complex, involving large numbers of highly
trained professionals interacting with members of multiple organizations and the general
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public on a continual basis. Kozuch and Sienkiewicz-Malyjurek (2015) pointed out, “The
process of information sharing in complex systems is multi-dimensional, asymmetrical
and dynamic” (p.727). It involves numerous organizations within local public safety
systems communicating effectively on multiple levels to deliver accurate information to
first responders when needed. Currently, law enforcement, fire services, and emergency
medical organizations communicate with one another effectively via 911 emergency
dispatch centers to route needed resources where they are needed during emergencies.
Many public safety organizations across the nation also share information through
fusion centers, emergency management agencies, and other associations developed
specifically to improve coordination and information exchange. This information
exchange occurs in various forms depending on the organizations involved and the
interagency communication structure of the local municipalities. Coordination must be
facilitated from the leadership level of the organization down through the chain of
command to generate an ongoing exchange of useful information.
Health and medical integration into an information sharing environment.
Health and medical issues are extremely important to the safety of the public, and many
public safety organizations integrate medical analysts into their analytical staff (Carter &
Rip, 2013). A primary responsibility of health analysts is to build relationships among
medical partners to quickly identify dangerous substances such as chemical or biological
agents. This capability relies not only on highly trained technicians in the field with the
proper equipment, but also the reach-back capability to certified health laboratories
within the region. These unique health laboratories can make an affirmative identification

34
of dangerous biological or chemical substances. Whether the threats are natural or manmade this important aspect of surveillance must not be overlooked.
Highly trained medical professionals can quickly determine which important
health information should be disseminated to the public in an emergency (Carter & Rip,
2013). Utilizing medical analysts is an effective way of validating and correctly
determining true medical threats in an emergency. Lenart et al., (2012) pointed out the
“ability to respond effectively to threats or events that place the country at risk is greatly
enhanced when collection, analysis, synthesis and dissemination of public health and
medical information and intelligence are included in the national network of antiterrorism fusion centers” (p. 175).
Information sharing between the health community and law enforcement
organizations is a complex undertaking. As public safety information sharing evolves
through the utilization of state fusion centers, public health and medical support is
becoming a necessity. Lenart et al., (2012) explained, the process of “conferring
appropriate security clearances to public health and medical personnel, as well as policies
for ensuring patient confidentiality” are extremely important issues that must be
addressed as information sharing between public safety organizations increases (p. 175).
Carter and Rip (2012) pointed out that the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) work
collaboratively facilitating important public health information into fusion center
operations. Multiple grants have been awarded through the National Institute of Justice to
ensure that public health analysts work side-by-side first responders to protect the
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nation's population. As fusion centers find their footing as an important addition to the
nation’s intelligence community, public health may be the next logical edition to this
public safety effort.
The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the DHS are
currently developing policy to work more closely together. Sharing of information
throughout law-enforcement, public safety, and public health are a primary reason for the
facilitation of fusion centers nationwide. Carter and Rip (2012) explained, “Since
September 11, 2011, a significant amount of progress has been made to improve
information collection and sharing in both the public health and homeland security
sectors in their own rights” (p.574).
Carter and Rip (2012) argued that although significant efforts have been initiated,
federal, state, and local environments still do not effectively share information nationally.
One problem, which has been highlighted nationally is that public health has not typically
been a part of law enforcement activities. Carter and Rip contend, with the development
of threat-related information sharing on a national scale, public health should be
integrated into the collaborative. Fusion centers were developed to share information
between all levels of public safety sectors, so integrating public health into the public
safety matrix is an important national agenda item.
National security and public health integration have had a long history. Since the
creation of chemical weapons in World War I, there has been a need for medical
personnel trained and capable of effectively detecting these dangerous weapons, both in
military and civilian operating environments. After the attacks of 9/11, there was
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considerable concern that terrorist organizations around the globe could launch a
chemical or biological attack on an American city. Therefore, public health SMEs were
recruited into the security apparatus of the nation, as equal partners in the fight against
terrorism. As more research has been completed on exotic weapons that could affect our
nation’s bio surveillance of both human and animal disease, threat identification has
become extremely valuable. A terrorist attack on the nation’s agriculture or livestock
could be devastating to the U.S. economy.
In order to keep a robust situational awareness, intelligence personnel have
consistently welcomed the participation of highly trained medical staff. After the attacks
of 9/11, a significant national security priority was placed upon identifying chemical and
biological attacks. Within Homeland Security, the Office of Health Affairs (OHA) holds
the principal responsibility for health issues, while the National Biosurveillance
Integration Center (NBIC) has the primary responsibility to monitor heath related threats
to the population (Carter & Rip, 2012).
Carter and Rip (2012) pointed out that the DHS is responsible for responding to
chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive (CBRNE) events. However,
HHS coordinates all health emergency response activities. Carter and Rip explained, “the
CDC within USDHHS created a surveillance mechanism known as BioSense 2.0, which
is currently the only nation-wide all-hazards emergency public health surveillance
system” (p. 577). With these efforts, first responders must responsible for isolating and
identifying not only man-made bioterrorism, but also natural disease epidemics that occur
throughout the world which have the capability to threaten the U.S. population.
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Involvement of private organizations in an information sharing environment.
Taylor and Russell (2011) argued since the attacks of 911 there are now hundreds of government and private organizations involved in homeland security and intelligence collection activities. They pointed out, before the attacks sharing of intelligence between police
departments and public safety agencies was severely lacking (Taylor & Russell, 2011, p.
184). Currently however, public safety agencies throughout the nation are beginning to
participate in the nationwide network of fusion centers in an effort to better protect the
public.
The DHS has invested millions of dollars toward improving the coordination of
police departments to share criminal and threat related information (Jackson & Brown,
2007). A mix of crime analysis, intelligence, and open source information may finally be
a formula for fusion centers success. Taylor and Russell (2011) explained, “The strategic
integration of intelligence, with an emphasis on predictive analysis derived from the
discovery of hard facts, information, patterns, and good crime analysis defines
intelligence led policing (ILP)” (p. 185). Relying solidly on information technology,
intelligence led policing may help combat crime by significantly increasing intelligence
decision making (Bharosa, Lee, & Janssen, 2010).
Taylor and Russell (2011) explained that sophisticated computer programs and
competent analysis align hand-in-hand with grassroots relationships with the public. As
this wealth of information is derived from on-going police operations it is compiled into
fusion databases, which “serve as hubs for information on crime and terrorist operations
in a specific region focusing on the recognition of patterns, indications and warnings,
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source development, interdiction, and coordination of critical criminal justice resources”
(Taylor & Russell, 2011, p. 185). All of this collective analysis and processing of
important data focuses on the ability of analysts to help uncover terrorist plots in the early
stages of development before they become deadly terrorist attacks.
Vital information that is collected and processed on the streets of the nation’s
cities is now passed up to the “National Counter Terrorism Center in Washington, DC for
a coordinated response to potential threats” (Taylor & Russell, 2011, p.85). However,
problems inherent in local police departments and other public safety agencies may
plague the effectiveness of this fusion process. Taylor and Russell (2011) argued, “The
structure and mission of law enforcement agencies undermines the very essence of fusion
centers as well as what they are intended to do and who they are intended to protect”
(p.185).
Shepherd (2011) explained that although our world is inundated with
communication platforms that the public uses every day, there continues to be a
disconnect between public and private sharing of information when it pertains to
terrorism surveillance. Shortly after the attacks of September 11th, the 9/11 Commission
pointed to a series of suggestions that if implemented would better protect the nation.
Shepherd indicated that incentives should be cultivated to bring about a fundamental
public and private cooperation toward national security issues. He explained that fusion
centers can be the conduit that effectively moves information simultaneously between
public and private organizations.
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The federal government has long maintained that the private sector owns or
operates most of the key resources within the nation; therefore, it is crucial that
government security organizations actively engage the private sector in security
operations. Shepherd (2011) pointed out “The U.S. Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) maintains the Commercial Facilities Sector Coordinating Council (CFSCC),”
which represents “more than 100 different associations across an open access market” (p.
36). Because all of these organizations come from different backgrounds and have
different business models, the information provided by the CFSCC can be used
differently by each organization.
Shepherd (2011) explained that the benefits of fusion centers extend far beyond
law-enforcement and security concerns into public safety, public health, and emergency
management. A few of the benefits of this information sharing include terrorism and
public safety training in a modern technologically advanced fusion center facility. An
increased situational awareness during any type of hazard, whether it be man-made or
natural, as well as an increased partnership with private organizations better protects the
population from a wide spectrum of threats.
One area of the nation that has succeeded in expanding the fusion center’s role
within the public sector is the Southern Nevada Counterterrorism Center (SNCTC)
located within the greater Las Vegas area. Sheppard (2011) explained, “blending data
from different sources, including law enforcement, public safety, and the private sector,
with analysis, can result in meaningful and actionable intelligence and information that
goes a long way in protecting a community against acts of terrorism” (p. 36). The
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SNCTC management understands that the “private sector is a valuable asset to the fusion
center and is a legitimate recipient of law enforcement intelligence due to their national
and international operations, and the preponderance of private sector ownership of critical
infrastructure and key resources of the United States” (Sheppard, 2011, p.37).
Centers such as the SNCTC can possibly fill a gap in the nation’s security and
emergency preparedness. They have the ability to augment law enforcement, private
security, and public safety all from a within one consolidated facility. Innovative fusion
center directors can also expand their information exchange value by creating public
safety training facilities. Additionally, integrating public/private cooperation into fusion
center operations will create one facility that can provide multiple layers of protection for
large urban areas.
Integration of public safety organizations into an information sharing environment. The DHS works with local public safety organizations to establish fusion liaison officer (FLO) programs, which allow fusion centers to recruit and train individuals
from various public safety organizations to act as extensions of the fusion program. FLOs
work with police departments, fire departments, and EMS organizations to report important threat information back to fusion center analysts as needed. They are not assigned
full-time to fusion centers but work as a supportive counterpart of the fusion center process.
According to the DHS, fusion center initiatives include three interrelated critical
focus areas, “better understand the phenomenon of violent extremism, and assess the
threat it poses to the nation as a whole and within specific communities; Bolster efforts to
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address the dynamics of violent extremism, and strengthen relationships with communities as they play a vital role in countering violent extremism; Expand support for information-driven, community-oriented policing efforts that have proved effective in preventing violent crime across the nation” (“The Role of Fusion Centers,” 2012, para. 10). Public safety officials rely on various types of public engagement. Primarily, analysts encourage an open discussion of violent extremism in communities and promptly address any
questions concerning extremist actions (“The Role of Fusion Centers,” 2012). Analysts
also work closely with first responders to identify “behaviors that are potentially indicative of terrorist or other criminal activity, raise public awareness of indicators of terrorism
and violent crime, and emphasize the importance of reporting suspicious activity to the
proper law enforcement authorities” (“The Role of Fusion Centers,” 2012, para. 10). This
particular initiative builds a cooperative trust between the public safety responders and
fusion center analysts. An important and unique component of the public safety community also includes various health and medical organizations.
Fusion Center Facilitation of Information Sharing
State and local fusion centers are staffed primarily with representatives from
federal, state, local, tribal, and private partners (“State and Major Urban,” 2014).
According to the DHS, the government has invested significant federal funding to ensure
that fusion centers are engaged in national security (“State and Major Urban,” 2014).
With international terrorism threatening our nation’s security, public safety professionals
will increasingly engage in the fight against terrorism. By integrating fusion centers into
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the government's intelligence community, DHS hopes to identify terrorist threats at the
earliest opportunity rather than waiting until terrorist cells become operational.
The focus of this process relies on collaboration with local public safety organizations. It is a slow process of building relationships so that terrorist activity information
can begin flowing from the field operations level up. DHS officials believe that this direct
contribution of information from local communities throughout the country will lead to a
series of successes in the future. The current U.S. National Security Strategy states, “the
federal government must continue to integrate and leverage fusion centers to enlist all of
our intelligence, law enforcement, and homeland security capabilities to prevent acts of
terrorism on American soil” (“State and Major Urban,” 2014, para. 5).
The federal government published guidance in 2003 that was designed to help
fusion centers develop their capabilities to a baseline functional level across the nation.
These baseline proficiencies are designed to ensure that all fusion centers nationwide can
operate in an effective information sharing environment. The capabilities are built upon
tested methodologies, such as the intelligence cycle used in the nation’s IC. The FBI
points out, “the intelligence cycle is the process of developing unrefined data into
polished intelligence for the use of policymakers” (“Intelligence Cycle,” 2010, para. 1).
Using these standard methodologies allows state and local public safety analysts to
communicate effectively with analysts within all levels of the federal government. This
nationwide “strategic vision can be realized only when fusion centers demonstrate
institutionalized levels of capability that enable efficient and effective information
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sharing and analysis across the national network” (“State and Major Urban,” 2014, para.
6).
Baseline of common information analysis competencies. The DHS believes
that a baseline of information analysis competencies will improve the nation's ability to
take on the threat of asymmetrical terrorist activity. In an effort to expedite this process,
DHS has initiated an expansive set of technical training courses for local public safety analysts. DHS states, “through its long-standing partnership with the Department of Justice
(DOJ), the Department has conducted more than 300 training and technical assistance deliveries, workshops, and exchanges on topics including risk analysis, security, and privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties since 2007” (“State and Major Urban,” 2014, para.
7).
The DHS has also established a nationwide yearly assessment of fusion centers
throughout the nation in an effort to ensure that public safety personnel are performing at
excepted levels. Four critical operational capabilities (COCs) are tracked including the
fusion centers ability to “receive, analyze, disseminate, and gather” information (“State
and Major Urban,” 2014, para. 11). Several capabilities including “privacy/civil rights
and civil liberties protections, sustainment strategy, communications and outreach, and
security” are tracked in the assessment (“State and Major Urban,” 2014, para. 11).
Through this ongoing evaluation process, gaps are identified and corrected in a timely
manner. The overarching goal of the program is to develop analytical centers of
excellence throughout the nation that are effective at sharing threat-related information.
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Increasing analytical standards. State fusion centers that achieve a high level of
analysis competence are proudly acknowledged as centers of analytic excellence. These
organizations have made great strides towards analytical excellence. Abold, Guidetti, and
Keyer (2012) pointed out, “This is a significant departure from the sense in which this
term has been used previously and provides a next state for individual fusion centers that
aspire to share their analytic competencies across a national network” (p.1).
Public safety analysts working in fusion centers across the nation are finally
reaching their goal of becoming true analytical centers. Just as in the nation's intelligence
community different agencies perform different functions, which helps to significantly
strengthen the collective. Abold et al. (2012), explained that this push toward specialized
expertise that will help to build a larger more reliable network. Over the last decade
public safety analysts assigned to state fusion centers have worked diligently to increase
collaboration, as well as a sense of comradely between centers.
In 2008, DHS in collaboration with the FBI developed a document entitled,
Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers. A portion of the
document highlighted “capabilities determined necessary to achieve a national, integrated
network of fusion centers and detailed the standards necessary for a fusion center to be
considered capable of performing basic functions by the fusion center community”
(“Information Sharing,” 2014, p.8). Since that time, many fusion centers across the nation
have worked vehemently to not only meet those standards, but to surpass them. As noted
earlier, “With the best practices of the IC (Intelligence Community) as a model for
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success, one could argue that the same attribute of specialization should be extended to
the network of fusion centers” (Abold et al., 2012, p.2).
This focused development of fusion centers of analytical excellence would help to
increase the nation's ability to counter domestic threats. These locally owned and
operated multi-agency organizations’ primary responsibility is to receive, analyze, and
disseminate information from multiple sources. Regardless of where the information
originates, the primary function should be to assist in the coordinated situational
awareness of public safety response agencies.
The idea of this information-sharing network originated from the horrific events
of 9/11. Soon after the infamous disaster, it was determined that information sharing
between state and local public safety organizations was severely lacking (“National
Commission,” 2004). Consequently, fusion centers were tasked to develop vital
communication links between public safety organizations throughout the nation. The 9/11
tragedies rallied a “diverse group of centers not only around a common cause of securing
the homeland but also around a common framework for communicating and doing
business” (Abold et al., 2012, p.2). The development of fusion centers of excellence is an
effort by the government to better protect the nation from both domestic and international
threats. Abold et al., stress that it is imperative that individual fusion centers continue to
develop their unique set of analytical expertise as this rigor and precision will “greatly
benefit the overall capability of the national network” (p.15).
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Protecting the public from terrorism. An atmosphere of effective information
exchange is essential in the current asymmetrical threat environment. The DHS emphasizes that “fusion centers are uniquely situated to empower front-line law enforcement,
public safety, fire service, emergency response, public health, critical infrastructure protection, and private sector security personnel to understand local implications of national
intelligence, thus enabling local officials to better protect their communities” (“State and
Major,” 2014, para. 2). Effective information sharing can provide situational awareness
to decision makers at the state level through collaboration with their federal partners. Although federal agencies support the centers, they are operated solely by the states in which
they reside. Federal entities primary focus is to support operations and assist when
needed. Federal funding is also available to support infrastructure and personnel costs
(“Federal Emergency Management Agency,” 2015). Security clearances and a full range
of security issues have been initiated to train local public safety analysts to operate in an
information sharing environment. The DHS clearly states that threats to our nation have
changed dramatically since enemies abroad transitioned to asymmetrical tactics. Therefore, the nation’s defensive capabilities must change to meet the threat.
It is highly anticipated that threat-related information sharing will assist both local
and federal law enforcement by uncovering terrorist plots across the nation (“State and
Major,” 2014). The DHS projects, through federal, state, local and private partner
collaboration that public safety analysts will have the capability to “gather and share the
information necessary to pursue and disrupt activities that may be indicators of, or
potential precursors to, terrorist activity” (“State and Major,” 2014, para. 4). The attacks
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of 9/11 marked a turning point in national security and many policy makers began
stressing the importance of sharing threat-related information between all government
agencies to protect the nation abroad and at home. As terrorism grows globally it also
initiates incidents of homegrown violent extremism.
Countering domestic violent extremism. In a government publication entitled
The Role of Fusion Centers in Countering Violent Extremism DHS states, “as analytic
hubs, fusion centers are uniquely situated to empower frontline personnel to understand
the local implications of national intelligence by tailoring national threat information into
a local context and helping frontline personnel understand terrorist and criminal threats
they could encounter in the field, while also protecting the privacy, civil rights, and civil
liberties of individuals in their communities” (“The Role of Fusion Centers,” 2012,
para.1).
Public safety analysts across the nation work with federal agencies in a collaborative information-sharing environment to ensure that local public officials are aware of
any terrorist activities, violent extremism, or organized crime in the area. The DHS has
invested a significant amount of funding to ensure that public safety analysts are trained
to meet predetermined analytic guidelines. This assists in “building grassroots intelligence and analytic capabilities within the state and local environment so state and local
partners can understand the local implications of national intelligence by tailoring national threat information into a local context” (“The Role of Fusion Centers,” 2012, para.
2). In order to achieve effective situational awareness, all components of the public safety
community must be involved in the information sharing process. The sharing of threat-
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related information between public safety organizations also involves many challenges.
The following chapters will highlight many of these challenges, as well as touch upon
lessons learned from sharing information throughout the intelligence community.
Challenges of Sharing Threat-Related Information
Throughout history great military leaders, including Civil War commander
Ulysses S. Grant, realized that publicly available open source information was extremely
valuable and should be collected and analyzed order to better understand the enemy
(Steele, 2008). During the Cold War, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)
was America’s primary adversary. As a result, the U.S. military relied on classified
intelligence collection methods to monitor the soviets. It is now evident that classified
collection capabilities may not be the most effective means to gather information on the
nation’s enemies. Many government reviews of our nation's intelligence community (IC)
have experienced “America’s deficiencies in foreign languages and, to one extent or
another, the open sources they represent; and every single President, Secretary, and
Director of Central Intelligence has seen fit to ignore these concerns, persisting with the
understandable but necessarily erroneous view that the U.S. Intelligence Community is in
the business of finding and delivering secrets for the President” (Steele, 2008, p. 610).
Open source information. Steele (2008) explained that CIA officials believe that
open source intelligence (OSINT) provides approximately 80 percent of the useful information utilized by the IC. The U.S. spends a significant amount of resources on classified
information and only a small percentage of that on OSINT. Steele argued, “the return on
investment (RoI) implications—of spending next to nothing on that 80 percent, while
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spending tens of billions of dollars on secret collection, most of it technological, yet not
having any single place where both secrets and non-secrets could be processed coherently
and with all available automated tools” (Steele, 2008, p. 610). During the 1990s, there
were several instances where proponents for OSINT lobbied Congress to approve funding for a robust OSINT program. However, in all instances funding for open source information never became a priority. Steele declared the consequences for the lack of funding
for OSINT “including our lack of awareness of the open spread of virulent Islam, in radicalized schoolhouses funded by Saudi Arabia from 1988 to 2001, continue to cost the
United States blood, treasure, and spirit” (p.612).
Steele (2008) went on to explain that open source information is not something
that can be controlled by the intelligence community. It is something that flows freely
from the Internet and social communication. He indicated that no one source can control
its dissemination; therefore, because of its distributive nature, it must be shared between
government and private organizations. In 2005 the federal government developed a
national center devoted predominantly to processing open source information.
United States national intelligence. This U.S. government’s primary source of
open source information is the Open Source Center (OSC) located just outside of Washington, DC. This modern facility, established in 2005 by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), helped to transform the nation’s IC toward accepting open
source information as a legitimate intelligence resource. The acceptance of OSINT was
accelerated by the rapid rise of radical Islamist attacks throughout the world. These
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emerging new paramilitary organizations had become adept at using the Internet and social media to rally followers and plan attacks. With a single act of Congress entitled the
“Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA), which President
Bush signed into law on December 17,” the 16 agencies that made up the nation’s IC became 17 (“Office of the Director of National Intelligence,” 2004).
For decades, the IC struggled with how to effectively utilize open source
information. This distinctive information did not quite fit within the well-structured
boundaries of classified information. Even though OSINT made up a large portion of the
nation’s intelligence, it had long been neglected as an integral source of intelligence data.
Bean (2007) pointed out, “The professional literature typically points to the benefits and
limitations of OSINT in meeting intelligence requirements, but larger investigations of
how the concept of OSINT functions as an organizational symbol and site of contestation
in the intelligence reform debate are absent” (p. 241).
Some analysts in the nation’s IC do not consider OSINT a true form of
intelligence. For decades it was considered unreliable, as most intelligence analyst’s
preferred classified information gathered through covert or technological methods. It was
not until the events of 9/11 that OSINT was elevated to a prominent status. Asymmetrical
terrorist attacks throughout the Middle East and the world have added to the popularity of
OSINT as a valuable source of intelligence. Bean (2007) explained, “Discrepancies about
OSINT’s status as an intelligence discipline signify differences among stakeholders that
lead to problems for OSINT’s status as a special type of knowledge” (p. 241).
Nevertheless, the reliance on OSINT by the IC over the last decade has been surprising; it
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is now considered vital in the ongoing struggle against global terrorism. The Defense
Intelligence Agency (DIA) 2012-2017 Strategic Plan states, “given the expansive, opensource environment—combined with social media, rapidly developing new technologies,
and growing mission partnerships in an era of diminishing resources—DIA will become
increasingly dependent on outside sources of knowledge to succeed in its mission”
(“Defense Intelligence Agency,” p. 10).
One important fact about open source information is that the government and
private industry access its value from different perspectives (Bean, 2007). Open source
information is a huge revenue generator for the private sector. Large corporations
throughout the world pull in substantial amounts of open source information, process and
analyze it, and then sell it to multiple customers around the world. This generates large
sums of revenue for their customers. The government collects large amounts of open
source information and distills it down into actionable intelligence in order to better
secure the nation. Therefore, some officials within the government believe that the
private sector is actually much better at collecting, collating, and analyzing huge amounts
of open source data than the government (Bean, 2007).
The government and private industry interpret open source information in
significantly different ways. The government states that it should pay for open source
information once and only once, yet the open source community proposes that they
should collect information once and then sell it multiple times (Bean, 2007). The
utilization of OSINT by the United States government is currently on the rise. Many
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OSINT reports are making their way to the president’s daily briefing, which is one of the
most important intelligence products in the nation (Bean, 2007).
The OSC is consistently producing a large volume of open source material for
government use. Bean (2007) explained, “The OSC houses and builds upon the work of
the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), which was established in 1941 to
monitor and translate foreign media” (p.250). The FBIS has been around for decades
providing “translation, monitoring, and analysis of foreign Internet, print, radio,
television, and other sources” (Bean, 2007, p.250). This consolidation of the FBIS into
the OSC is a signal that the government is taking open source information very seriously.
Bean explained “Transforming FBIS into the DNI Open Source Center implies a
significant change; in order to prevent bureaucratic disruption, however, no consolidation
of resources or operational authority under the DNI seems to have occurred” (p.250).
Hulnick (2002) explained, OSINT makes up a large portion of the ICs actionable
data. It is the mix of classified information and OSINT, which work in concert to build a
better intelligence product. In the competitive private business environment “the use of
anything other than OSINT, such as industrial espionage or electronic intercepts, has
become a federal crime” (Hulnick, 2002, p. 566). Hulnick explained that some
organizations, “have actually settled potential lawsuits at great cost because their
intelligence professionals strayed beyond the use of OSINT into such classic illegal
activities as dumpster-diving and trying to trick sources into revealing trade secrets”
(p.566).
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Most analysts, public and private agree that open source information contains a
vast amount of valuable information on a myriad of topics. The biggest problem with this
key source of information is that there is so much of it that it is difficult to distill down
into useable data. The sheer volume of open source information available has literally
become overwhelming. The accuracy of the information collected is also a significant
issue. The raw information “needs to be constantly checked and validated which is very
difficult given the amount of data” available (Yates & Paquette, 2011, p. 12). The
National Security Agency (NSA) “resorted to sampling and keyword techniques to sort
the information, but some raw material allegedly remains untapped because there aren’t
enough people to deal with all of it” (Hulnick, 2002, p.567). One dynamic solution to this
problem involves initiatives that “are designed for ‘data mining’ and ‘knowledge
management’ to detect patterns or anomalies in vast streams of raw data” (Hulnick, 2002,
p. 567).
Hulnick (2002) explained, the CIA has developed solutions to deal with the
overwhelming amount of open source data. Recently, they have “turned to the private
sector to develop techniques to sort, order, and deliver raw intelligence so that analysts
are not overwhelmed” (p.567). Hulnick also pointed to the fact that open source
information is riddled with reliability issues. There is so much information on the web
that it is challenging to sort out which information is reliable, and which is not. Hulnick
argued, “The world wide web has led to the proliferation of individual sites that produce
propaganda, misinformation, or disinformation. But professional intelligence analysts
should have no trouble sorting wheat from chaff in web databases” (p.568).

54
Language is an extremely important component of OSINT, and it is critical that
analysts to be fluent in the language of the countries in which they study. Because we
now live in a true global society, OSINT is intertwined into every language on the planet.
Significant U.S. interests now focus on countries such as China and Iran where it is vital
that analysts understand the culture intimately and speak the language fluently. Hulnick
(2002) explained, “In the aftermath of the September 2001 events, the language problem
has again led the CIA to turn to the private sector for technological help” (p. 572).
Another form of OSINT that is often overlooked is referred to as grey
intelligence. Hulnick (2002) explained, “Grey intelligence, a category coined by Jon
Sigurdson, who teaches business intelligence, refers to materials that are not classified
but have to be obtained by digging” (p.573). Financial transactions generate a huge
amount of data that can be exploited by intelligence analysts. Hulnick stated, “Real estate
transactions, environmental impact statements, uniform commercial code, for example,
fit this category and are particularly useful for the private sector intelligence operative”
(p.573).
Several important successes have come from the OSC over the last decade. Much
of the information that is gathered through the OSC is now filtered into intelligence
reports giving analysts a better idea of how terrorist organizations operate and
communicate throughout the world. Bean (2013) pointed out that the U. S. President’s
daily intelligence briefing regularly includes information provided by the OSC. Most
analysts understand that although open source information contains a wealth of valuable
knowledge; it is often buried in volumes of data. Finding those golden nuggets of
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valuable intelligence is truly a challenge. After the attacks of 9/11 the nation’s IC was
forced to undergo an extensive organizational change. The looming threat to the nation is
now from organizations that communicate, organize, and plan their attacks through social
media and the Internet. However, Congressional funding for open source information
collection is still deficient. The lack of significant financial support is truly a roadblock to
the OSCs ability to fully engage the problem (Bean, 2013).
Bean (2013) explained “the nature of bureaucratic organizations, the ability of
bureaucrats to protect their turf, and the fragmented structure of the U.S. federal
government tend to stymie significant IC reform” (p. 43). Because officials within the IC
are reluctant to fully embrace OSINT’s elevation to a primary intelligence source, the
discipline continues to suffer from that neglect (Bean, 2013). However, things are
beginning to change, the sheer existence of the OSC “represents the institutionalization of
open source in the IC” (Bean, 2013, p. 43). There are several major tensions that inhibit
the OSCs ability to dominate the nation’s IC. Bean explained, “tensions between and
among materiality/symbolism, structure/agency, message processing/human context,
exceptionalism/integration, and internal/external production characterize the post-9/11
open source debate” (p. 43). As the IC continues to adapt to global terrorism, analysts
reflect on lessons learned.
Lessons learned from the intelligence community. Stephen Marrin (2004) explained that the primary focus of intelligence is its ability to prevent future terrorist attacks (p.656). He acknowledged that there are many imperfections in the nation’s IC.
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Some of those imperfections led to the IC’s inability to identify Osama bin Laden’s terrorist organization planning of the September 11th attacks. However, even with these imperfections the IC can learn from their mistakes and refocus their energy towards two
basic principles. These include “the use of rigor and tradecraft in the production of intelligence analysis, and the integration of analysis into the policymaking process” (Marrin,
2004, p.656). One of the primary reasons for having an intelligence apparatus is to prevent surprise attacks like the one that occurred on 9/11. Years of intelligence production
can ultimately lead to failure if the “information is not collected or integrated effectively,
and policy failure can lead to surprise if actions were not taken despite intelligence warnings” (Marrin, 2004, p.656).
One of the biggest takeaways from intelligence failure is to learn from mistakes
and reshape the IC to combat new and unique threats. Marin (2004) explained that
evolving international relations and the rise of a global society create conditions where
surprise is ever present. It is important to remember that “intelligence agencies may be
responsible for the prevention of surprise, but not all surprises can be prevented by
uncovering secrets” (Marrin, 2004, p.656). Even though some failures are inevitable, it is
important to continually refine and improve our analytical standards. Marrin goes on to
explain that many failures in intelligence throughout the last century, including the attack
on Pearl Harbor, the 1950 North Korean invasion and other catastrophic failures of both
intelligence and foreign policy, had a significant impact on geopolitics (p.659). As
demonstrated in these examples, it is important to review the strategic failures of foreign
policy, so that they will not be repeated in the future. Marrin explained, “Failure, though
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perhaps inevitable, can be made less frequent through the implementation of a number of
reforms that improve the quality of intelligence analysis” (p.662). The focus in the future
will be learning from past mistakes and attempting to limit the amount of intelligence
failures moving forward. Marrin pointed out, “this will require a two-pronged approach:
more rigorous tradecraft to minimize faulty or incomplete analysis, combined with better
customer service” (p.662).
Many experts in the IC believe that the free flow of information has been significantly restricted by a series of classification barriers (“New Information and Intelligence,” 2008). This lack of organization prevents the analyst from viewing all of the information necessary to take effective action. Marrin (2004) argued, the “removal of organizational controls on certain types of information, and the relaxation of the need-toknow principle and other security devices responsible for informational ‘stovepipes,’
would allow for more horizontal distribution of information throughout the intelligence
and policy communities” (p.662). It is actions such as these that reduce the chances of
surprise to the intelligence community. Intelligence failures, which often lead to devastating circumstances, can be “related to flaws in the delivery of the more conceptual rather
than merely the informational product” (Marrin, 2004, p.663).
Inevitably, there is a significant amount of political pressure on the IC to develop
intelligence analysis products that support policy maker agendas. It is this conforming
posture that significantly threatens clear and unbiased intelligence analysis. Therefore,
there a strong focus in the IC to develop methods that increase the accuracy of the overall
intelligence product. Marrin (2004) explained, “an additional method for increasing the
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accuracy of a conceptual model is to ensure that the analyst possesses in-depth
knowledge of the account to include, as necessary, context, history, or language” (p.
665). As the IC continues its adaptation to current threats, situational awareness of realtime events in remote locations around the world is a high priority. Social media
monitoring is proving to be a useful activity to establish situational awareness of
emergent events around the globe. Public safety organizations are beginning to embrace
the use of social media during large public events to enhance situational awareness.
Social Media Use Between Public Safety Agencies
Currently, the ardent use of social media enables information to be rapidly shared
between individuals throughout the world. Whether emails, photos, videos, or text messages, these digital information sources are commonly utilized in both personal and private endeavors. Government organizations are also utilizing social media sites to disseminate important information on everything from public events to public safety. However,
law enforcement officials have been warning for some time that these digital tools are being utilized for unlawful purposes. Tech savvy criminal use the internet to “coordinate a
criminal-related flash mob, or plan a robbery, or terrorist groups may use social media
sites to recruit new members and espouse their criminal intentions” (“Developing a Policy,” 2013, p.1).
To combat these illegal activities law enforcement agencies have been developing
their ability to monitor open source information on the Internet. One of the most effective
ways to monitor social media within legal boundaries is to develop an effective social
media policy (“Developing a Policy,” 2013). These policies allow intelligence and law
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enforcement analysts’ gradient levels of authority when monitoring social media outlets.
Activities may range from “viewing information that is publicly available on social media
sites to the creation of an undercover profile to directly interacting with an identified
criminal subject online” (“Developing a Policy,” 2013, p.2)
As analysts move along the continuum from least invasive to most invasive
monitoring activities, they must secure multiple layers of authorization from supervisory
personnel. Just as other covert actions are authorized in police investigations, social
media monitoring should be well within legal authority. Fusion center “personnel must
have a defined objective and a valid law enforcement purpose for gathering, maintaining,
or sharing personally identifiable information” (“Developing a Policy,” 2013, p.2). As in
most law enforcement activities, fusion center analysts should not maintain “political,
religious, or social views, associations, or activities of any individual or group,
association, corporation, business, partnership, or organization unless there is a legitimate
public safety purpose” (“Developing a Policy,” 2013, p.2).
The Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA), working with law-enforcement agencies
nationwide has developed policies regarding social media. These policies not only protect
the public's civil rights, but also help to protect law enforcement agencies from civil litigation. All policies should be developed in close cooperation with local legal counsel to
ensure that local, state, and federal laws are followed in the development of these important guidelines (“Developing a Policy,” 2013). It is also important than law enforcement agencies update their privacy policies to include public notice of how they plan to
monitor social media related data. Just as a police officer is compelled to search a home
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or vehicle, criminal investigative regulations must be followed, and the public’s civil
rights must always be held in the highest regard. As public safety agencies develop internal policies for social media, they must also incorporate social media connectivity between organizations.
Social media as an information sharing platform. Pfeifer (2012) explained that
information fusion between public safety agencies is not only a process of communicating between different disciplines, but also leveraging technology to connect databases
between different agencies. In order to give first responders, the ability to anticipate
threats, they must have an effective situational awareness of an event as it unfolds (Carter
& Rip, 2013). Pfeifer explained, it is the process of actual network fusion, tying together
not only intelligence community officials with local law-enforcement officials, but also
reaching out to fire departments, emergency medical service organizations, and public
health officials to collaborate before an emergency occurs. In fact, “finding new approaches for collaboration may be less a matter of innovation and more a matter of discovering what is already done by organizations” (Pfeifer, 2012, p.2). In the current digital
environment, public safety organizations throughout the nation are increasingly becoming
integrated into larger and larger digital networks. Therefore, it is likely that computer
connectivity between these organizations is more achievable than ever before. Pfeifer
pointed out, “Network fusion is an information sharing system that fuses information and
intelligence from multiple sources to allow decision makers to better adapt to a changing
threat environment” (p.2).
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Linking public safety data systems can enhance the actual preparedness
capabilities of public safety organizations to share information. Pfeifer (2012) explained
that to truly have an integrated system, public safety organizations must do more than
simply place individuals in a fusion center facility where they can share information faceto-face. Pfeifer argued that the “future of fusion centers will depend on their ability to
collaborate with other organizations for prevention and response as well as their capacity
for information to be pushed and pulled in real time through networking” (p.2). The
process of network fusion has several advantages over building brick and mortar fusion
centers. In a true virtual network, representatives of different organizations can
communicate with colleagues faster online than they can in person. It is much cheaper to
collaborate with public safety officials in a virtual meeting, than it is to co-locate them
together over a period of time in a brick and mortar facility (Pfeifer, 2012). Pfeifer stated,
“Network fusion exploits technology to quickly connect various organizations that
participate in homeland security to exchange critical information, insights into potential
attacks, and real-time situational awareness reports” (p.3).
Utilizing this process, decision-makers can also be drawn into the conversation
when the need arises through security video conferencing. Virtual conferences can be organized within moments, much faster than physical meetings can be called together.
Pfeifer (2012) argued that the nation’s refusal to include collaboration technology in
counterterrorism activities will severely reduce the ability to disrupt or respond to terrorist attacks. It is this data linking innovation that will provide public safety agencies the
image of a terrorist suspect that may be progressing toward an imminent attack. Terrorist
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organizations are already quickly adapting to new technology at a much faster rate than
law enforcement organizations.
As fusion centers increase in size and scope throughout the nation in-person
communication and collaboration will be a significant prohibitive factor. Collocating
individuals from every organization that should be present within these centers will
become more and more difficult to achieve. Using data networking as a leveraging factor
will help government organizations achieve needed results without incurring prohibitive
costs. Pfeifer (2012) explained, “The development of network fusion for faster, smarter,
and cheaper information sharing and collaboration will require a socio technical approach
that makes use of hard and soft systems” (p.3). In various areas of the nation public safety
organizations are beginning to utilize social media in tactical operations during public
safety emergencies.
Social media use during public safety emergencies. In the last several years,
social media has been taking on a new role in threat related emergencies. Nearly every
facet of modern society now utilizes social media. Government agencies are increasingly
using this communications platform to relay vital information to the public during crisis
situations. Emergency responders as well as public and private organizations can deliver
and receive important information instantly during an event. When major hazardous
events occur, public safety organizations are beginning to depend upon social media
tools. During the 2013 attack on the Westgate Mall in Kenya, Africa, authorities assisting
with emergency management activities used Twitter. This simple form of communication
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allowed government agencies to deliver public information from multiple locations
simultaneously, which proved to be a valuable source of situational awareness.
Simon, Goldberg, Aharonson-Daniel, Leykin, and Adini (2014) explained that
during the mall attack, “all emergency responders used and leveraged social media
networks for communicating both with the public and among themselves” (p.1).
However, although extremely useful during emergency events, social media public
postings also risk misinformation as well as vast amounts of irrelevant information.
Simon et al., pointed out, “emergency managers should utilize filtering and pattern
recognition algorithms on the data streams, in order to access important and meaningful
information in real-time” (p.1). Utilization of this software can be invaluable to public
safety and law enforcement organizations. Social media communication during
emergency events has steadily risen over the last several years. However, because social
media is a relatively new form of communication “there is not enough evidence for best
practice when incorporating social media in emergency response” (Simon et al., 2014,
p.2).
In a case study of the Westgate Mall attack Simon et al., (2014) utilized
specialized computer software to collect the posts from Twitter and analyze various
attributes of the data. The findings demonstrated that social media “served as an integral
tool for emergency management in Kenya” particularly during this event (p.7). The
information ranged from the location and number of injured individuals to actual photos
of the attackers as they entered the mall. Much of the information was instrumental in
public safety and law enforcement activities. During these types of rapidly unfolding
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events, public safety organizations across the globe are slowly beginning to utilize social
media (Simon et al., 2014).
Use of social media by terrorist organizations. Advancing technology in mobile
communications has unfortunately proven to be an asset to terrorist organizations
throughout the world. Cohn (2013) pointed out that complex web-based communication
applications allow extremist groups to communicate with their followers in real-time. He
explained, “the ability to immediately notify all of one's collaborators, simultaneously, of
sudden and spontaneous tactical changes is a tremendous leap in the terrorists' ability to
evade law enforcement personnel” (Cohn, 2013, p.64). This incredible change in the
communication capabilities inside terrorist organizations over the last decade has counterterrorism officials throughout the world scrambling to keep up. Cohen (2004) stated
that the ability to carry out a successful terrorist attack is a very complex and dynamic
task. It is extremely difficult to carry out military tactical operations in a rapidly changing
asymmetrical environment. Cohen explained, the “insertion, actualization, evasion, and
finally extraction of the terrorists are far more difficult to achieve than a fantastical Hollywood story would have us believe” (p.64).
The ability to effectively communicate in real-time through all of the phases of a
combat operation is a strategic advantage. The attacks of 9/11 forced the FBI and CIA to
expand security measures domestically and globally (“Federal Bureau of Investigations,”
2015). It also set into motion collaborative agreements between organizations that had
never existed before. Public safety organizations throughout the nation were forced to operate in a much more collaborative environment.
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In 2008 a “commando styled terrorist raid in Mumbai, India,” again shook the
world’s consciousness (Cohn, 2013, p.64). In this instance, a terrorist organization
modified their attack strategy to the increased security environment. This indicated that
terrorist organizations learned and adapted in order to succeed in a unique type of brutal
attack on a major city. In the attack they utilized “elusive communication techniques to
outwit dated counterterrorism defensive techniques” (Cohn, 2013, p.64). Cohn went on to
explain how a 10-man squad was able to make their way into the city of Mumbai and
carry out the catastrophic attack. Real-time communications were a significant factor in
the attack. He explained, “the deep and comprehensive mobile communicative
coordination amongst both the terrorists on site and their controllers proved to be the
cornerstone of the operation's triumph” (Cohn, 2013, p.64). The coordinator of the
terrorist operation was able to use common mobile cellular devices to orchestrate several
teams of highly trained commandos from a secure location outside of the country. The
coordinator watched live news feeds of the attack and then readjusted his commandos as
needed. Cohen (2013) explained, “while these terrorists relied primarily on walkie-talkies
and not social media per se, we may consider this communicative tool a predecessor to
the ubiquitous mobile social media applications, which mark 2012, and beyond” (p.64).
What is important to glean from this article is that there are terrorist organizations
around the globe that study these attacks and others like them and concentrate on what
worked, and what did not. It is plausible that social media communication, location, and
mapping tools can be readily used to orchestrate future terrorist’s attacks. Law
enforcement organizations around the world are now spending considerable time and
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effort studying a number of social media applications, so that they may avoid being
blindsided by the next innovative terrorist attack.
Summary and Conclusions
The major themes in the literature were benefits of sharing threat-related
information, fusion centers facilitation of information sharing between public safety
agencies, challenges of sharing threat-related information, and social media use between
public safety agencies. The findings of this study will help to fill the gap in literature by
determining the benefits and challenges of sharing threat-related information between
public safety agencies in Honolulu, Hawaii, and what can be done to improve
information exchange between these agencies. The findings will extend knowledge in the
discipline surrounding the ability of public safety organizations to effectively share
threat-related information.
The first major theme in the literature review focused on the benefits of sharing
threat-related information. Soon after the 9/11 terror attacks, it became clear to the
nation’s leaders that information sharing between federal, state, and local public safety
organizations must be improved. Fusion centers were tasked with developing a vital
information-sharing link between public safety organizations throughout the nation.
Although the goal is slowly being achieved, fully integrated information sharing between
public safety organizations has not yet become a reality. The federal government has
been aggressively assisting the development analytic capabilities by assigning highly
trained analysts to public safety organizations throughout the nation. This is done with
the hope of increasing collaboration and intelligence sharing capabilities.
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The second major theme in the literature was fusion centers facilitation of information sharing between public safety agencies. State and local fusion centers are staffed
primarily with representatives from federal, state, local, tribal, and private partners
(“State and Major Urban,” 2014). By integrating public safety analysts into the government's intelligence community, the DHS hopes to identify terrorist threats early and intervene before violent extremists become operational. The focus of this process relies on
collaboration with local public safety organizations. It also depends on building interagency relationships, so that terrorist activity information can begin flowing from the
field operations level up to the federal government.
The third major theme in the literature review was challenges of sharing threatrelated information. Until the rise of global terrorism in the 21st century, freely available
open source information had long been one of the least valued forms of information
collected by the IC. It had been considered unreliable and very difficult to validate.
During the Cold War, classified information gathered through covert or technical
methods was the preferred intelligence asset. The attacks of 9/11 and the rise of
asymmetrical terrorist warfare across the globe have proven otherwise. Currently, the
nation’s IC estimates that OSINT provides approximately 80% of the useful information
utilized by the IC (Steele, 2008).
As a result, the nation’s IC invested millions of dollars in the development of the
OSC in McLean, Virginia. The establishment of this modern research facility will help to
counter terrorist activity throughout the world. The fusion of information collected from
the OSC and analytic reports from intelligence agencies from around the world allow

68
members of the IC an enhanced perspective on terrorist organizations that threaten the
United States. Many components of the IC are becoming increasingly dependent on open
source of information to fulfill their mission, both domestically and abroad.
The fourth major theme in the literature review was social media and the
information sharing process. Because terrorist groups develop and plan attacks via the
Internet, social media has become a valuable tool for threat analysis. Public safety
organizations also use social media communication capabilities to collaborate between
law enforcement, EMS, and public health officials during large-scale emergency events.
The use of social media by public safety agencies will continue to develop and evolve
into the foreseeable future.
Local public safety agencies throughout the nation are working to improve their
threat-related information sharing capabilities. At the same time digital technologies are
evolving at a rapidly escalating pace. Therefore, it is crucial that local public safety
organizations keep up with the rapid pace of technology. After a thorough review of the
literature, it was apparent that a gap exists in clearly identifying the benefits and
challenges of sharing threat-related information between local public safety agencies in
Honolulu, Hawaii. Chapter 3 will describe the methodology utilized to conduct the
research for this study.
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Chapter 3: Research Method
This chapter consists of an overview of the research design, rationale, and
methodology of the study. It also includes a discussion of the role of the researcher and
issues of trustworthiness. The findings of this study may help to fill a gap in literature on
the perceived benefits and challenges of sharing threat-related information between
public safety agencies. The purpose of the research was to explore the benefits and
challenges of sharing threat-related information between public safety agencies (law
enforcement, fire services, EMS, and public health) in Honolulu, Hawaii, a midsized
metropolitan city. I sought to identify how these organizations can improve interagency
information exchange. I determined that qualitative design was appropriate to explore the
responses to the research questions for this exploratory case study. General systems
theory (“General Systems Theory,” 2014) was the conceptual framework.
Research Design and Rationale
I developed the following RQs for this qualitative exploratory case study:
RQ1. How are public safety agencies communicating threat-related information
between one another in Honolulu, Hawaii?
RQ2. What are the benefits and challenges of sharing threat-related information
between public safety agencies in Honolulu, Hawaii?
RQ3. What can be done to improve the sharing of threat-related information between public safety agencies in Honolulu, Hawaii?
To ensure that an appropriate design was selected for this study, I considered
various quantitative, qualitative, and mixed methods approaches. A qualitative
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exploratory case study was selected to effectively answer the specific research questions.
In a case study, “the researcher explores in depth a program, event, activity, process, of
one or more individuals” (Creswell, 2009, p. 13). I collected data from several
individuals. The data were then thoroughly reviewed and analyzed to identify the benefits
and challenges of sharing threat-related information between public safety agencies in
Honolulu.
Researchers typically use quantitative methods to “examine the relationships
between and among variables” utilizing surveys and experiments to test hypotheses
(Creswell, 2009, p. 145). The quantitative process includes “a parsimonious set of
variables, tightly controlled through design or statistical analysis” to test a theory or
assumption (Creswell, 2009, p. 145). I opted against using a quantitative design because
the rigid methodology would not allow adequate investigation of the information sharing
process between public safety agencies. The deductive manner of quantitative analysis
was not well suited, I concluded, for this particular research.
I opted against using a mixed methods design, which involves use of both
quantitative and qualitative methodology (Creswell & Clark, 2017), because the
quantitative aspect was not adequately suited to answer the research questions. My
research relied on inductive open-ended questions rather than deductive closed-ended
questions. The primary focus was to interpret the meaning inductively, within a flexible
environment. The inclusion of quantitative data at this phase of an exploratory case study
would require a research process that was preplanned and structured (Creswell, 2009).
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Qualitative research differs from quantitative in that researchers become fully
involved in the process of collecting data. Patton (2002) argued qualitative researchers
are “interested in investigating a phenomenon to get at the nature of reality with regard to
that phenomenon” (p. 215). The researcher seeks to thoroughly understand a particular
phenomenon or event and then explain it to others. Analysis of qualitative data “requires
reflection on the part of researchers, both before and during the research process, as a
way of providing context and understanding for readers” (Sutton, & Austin, 2015, p.226).
Researchers go through painstaking measures to interview participants, examine
documents related to the topic, and collect other important information that will be
utilized in the analysis portion the project (Patton, 2002). Qualitative researchers rarely
utilize prepared instruments to collect their data (Creswell, 2009) and in qualitative
research “there is no attempt to generalize the findings to a wider population” (Sutton, &
Austin, 2015, p. 226). Themes should be allowed to develop naturally from the data,
without the restrictive control deductive inquiry often requires (Creswell, 2009). The
process depends on the researcher’s skill in analyzing multiple sources of information.
Creswell (2009) pointed out that “qualitative research builds patterns, categories, and
themes from the bottom up, by organizing the data into increasingly more abstract units
of information” (p. 175).
The data collection method for qualitative research evolves and develops as
information rich cases allow the researcher to uncover unique data for the study (Palinkas
et al., 2015). Qualitative researchers ensure that they capture the data in the context of
which was observed by working closely with the participants (Creswell, 2009). Unlike
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quantitative research, the process is not preplanned or tightly scripted, but emerges as the
researcher becomes more familiar with the participants and how they interact in the
context of their environment (Creswell, 2009). Palinkas et al., (2015) point out,
“qualitative methods are, for the most part, intended to achieve depth of understanding”
(p.534). Creswell (2009) explained, “the key idea behind qualitative research is to learn
about the problem or issue from participants and to address the research to obtain that
information” (p. 176).
A sincere interpretation of what is observed is woven into the fabric of the
qualitative process. The researcher attempts to determine why individuals behave in a
particular manner and what are the thoughts and feelings associated with those behaviors
(Sutton, & Austin, 2015). Regardless of the process of qualitative data collection, there
will be some researcher clarification involved, as this is a key difference between
qualitative and quantitative processes. Creswell (2009) explained that “qualitative
research is a form of interpretive inquiry in which researchers make an interpretation of
what they see, hear, and understand” (p. 176). Qualitative researchers often interpret a
particular issue by utilizing multiple perspectives to present a complex image that has
developed through consistent qualitative processes (Creswell, 2009). Research for this
study was intentionally designed to allow me to thoroughly understand the phenomenon,
interpret it after thoughtful reflection and then explain it to the reader in a clear and
concise manner.
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Mode of Qualitative Analysis
I explored several forms of qualitative analysis to determine which type would
best answer the research question. These included grounded theory, ethnography,
narrative, phenomenological research, and case studies. After considering these designs, I
selected a case-study approach for the study. In Ethnography, the researcher focuses on
specific groups acting within their natural settings over a period of time and attempts to
describe the culture of the group (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007). In grounded theory,
the researcher “derives a general, abstract theory of a process, action, or interaction
grounded in the views of participants” (Creswell, 2009, p. 13). Developing patterns and
relationships of significance within a limited number of participants is the objective of
phenomenological research (Moustakas, 1994). Narrative research involves having
individuals provide detailed narratives about life experiences. The researcher goes
through a process combining detailed narratives from both the participant and the
researcher into a rich collaborative blend (Clandinin & Connelly, 2009; Creswell, 2009).
After reviewing multiple forms of qualitative analysis, I confirmed that an
exploratory case study would best answer the research questions for this study. I
thoroughly reviewed the influences that helped shape the current state of threat-related
analysis and information exchange between local public safety organizations. After
careful examination I determined qualitative analysis would best explore the benefits and
challenges of sharing threat-related information between public safety agencies in
Honolulu, Hawaii.
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Role of the Researcher
As a researcher, my role in this study was to ensure that I provided an accurate
account of information I collected throughout the research process. The topic of
investigation was selected through my exposure to threat-related information exchange
between public safety agencies in Hawaii. I was employed as a health and medical
analyst at the Hawaii State Fusion Center for approximately five years. It was only
natural that I decided to focus my PhD dissertation on an information sharing related
topic, as I was immersed in this intriguing field of work for several years.
Academic researchers often select topics that are related to their personal or
professional interests. Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias (2008) explained that research
topics are often “related to the researcher’s job, personal relationships, family history,
social class, or ethnic background” (p.260). It is also important to select a topic of
research that the researcher finds interesting and engaging at a personal level. FrankfortNachmias and Nachmias pointed out that researchers “emotional involvement in their
work provides a meaningful link between the personal and emotional lives of the
researchers and the rigorous requirement of the social scientific endeavor” (p. 261).
Some of the study participants were individuals that I worked alongside in public
safety organizations. Others were analysts and administrators from various public safety
organizations in Hawaii. An advantage to the selection of this topic was that I was
familiar with the inner workings of public safety organizations in Hawaii. I understood
the social dynamics of the work environment as well as the professional terminology
used in the profession.
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Methodology
Participant Selection Logic
Patton (2002) pointed out, “Sample size depends on what you want to know, the
purpose of the inquiry, what is at stake, what will be useful, what will have credibility,
and what can be done with available time and resources” (p. 244). A qualitative design
was utilized for this research. This project included data collection from interviews with
SMEs from four different fields of public safety in Honolulu, Hawaii (law enforcement,
fire services, EMS, and public health). In-depth interviews were the primary source of
data collected and was gathered from conversational style discussions with the
participants utilizing open-ended questions.
The organizational culture of each agency was an important topic during the conversation. The interviews lasted 60 to 90 minutes and were recorded for reference. I took
notes during the conversations. All interviews took place via a teleconference or in-person meetings. Approval to conduct the study was confirmed through Walden’s institutional review board. Each SME was contacted one month prior to the interviews and the
purpose of the study was described. An email inviting them to participate in the study
was mailed along with an informed consent form. The participants were also contacted by
email prior to the interview to confirm a mutually agreed upon interview date and time.
The interviews took place via teleconference, in person at the participants private residence, or a private meeting room at the Hawaii Public Library. The interviews were conducted outside of regular work hours and were kept confidential. I was the only person
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who knew the identity of the participants and did not disclose their identities to anyone.
Participants names and/or contact info was not recorded in the research records.
Approximately three individuals from four different public safety organizations
were interviewed, resulting in 13 cases. This number of case interviews provided a clear
understanding of the benefits and challenges within public safety organizations of sharing
threat-related information. Individuals who had at least 15 years’ experience sharing
threat-related information between public safety organizations in Honolulu were
participants. Individuals recently retired were selected if they met the research study
selection criteria. Because these individuals were no longer associated with their
organizations there was no pressure on them to answer the questions in a politically
sensitive manor. This research was also an opportunity to capture extensive institutional
knowledge from retired public safety SMEs before the knowledge was lost forever.
During the interview phase of data collection, a review of the consent form was
offered to ensure that the participants were aware of the entire interview procedure. The
participants received a detailed description of the purpose of the research and an
invitation to participate. The participants were asked to read and sign an Informed
Consent form with a nameless identifying number in order to keep their identity
confidential. Consent Forms did not require signatures if the participant could indicate
consent by returning a completed form with an identifying number. While conducting the
interviews, I followed all of the steps outlined in the research Interview Protocol
(Appendix B). I explained that their contribution would provide valuable information to
the study. The interviews were structured in a manner allowing a smooth transition
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through the various steps of the interview. Open-ended questions also permitted the
participant to expand upon any of their answers, as time allowed.
Instrumentation
When a researcher collects qualitative data using open-ended questions, “the
searcher cannot statistically test the validity and reliability of questions” (“Field Testing,”
2016). To ensure the interview questions were suitable to explore the research questions
for this study, I performed a field test of the interview questions prior to the actual interviews. To accomplish this, I went into the field and interviewed three individuals which
had “expert knowledge about the population and research topic to provide feedback on
the appropriateness of the questions being asked and how the questions are being asked in
relation to the study focus” (“Field Testing,” para. 4, 2016). These experts helped me to
refine the interview questions and develop appropriate follow up prompts, inviting more
conversation along a similar line of thought (“Field Testing,” 2016). The interview questions were closely linked to the research topic. A detailed chart showing the linkage between the research questions and the interview questions is available in Appendix C.
An interview guide was utilized. Patton (2002) explained, “An interview guide is
prepared to ensure that the same basic lines of inquiry are pursued with each person interviewed” (p. 343). The interview guide also ensured that the interview followed a relaxed
agenda in order to utilize the time allotted for each interview effectively (Patton, 2002). A
loose framework of the interview was predetermined ensuring questions were presented
to each participant in roughly the same sequence and style. The data was recorded by
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hand in a field notebook and simultaneously electronically recorded using a portable
voice recorder.
Procedures for Recruitment, Participation, and Data Collection
Purposeful sampling was utilized. Subject matter experts that had extensive
knowledge of sharing threat-related information between public safety agencies in
Honolulu, Hawaii, were be selected for this study. These individuals had the depth of
knowledge necessary to clearly articulate how threat-related information is analyzed and
shared between organizations. The primary purpose was to explore communication
across agencies and examine the benefits and challenges of sharing threat-related
information between public safety organizations in Honolulu. Individuals selected were a
part of the culture of these organizations and knew the social dynamics of each agency.
Patton (2002) pointed out, “qualitative inquiry typically focuses in depth on relatively
small samples, even single cases (N=1), selected purposely” (p.230). It is important to
select participants that have a rich knowledge of their environment in order to build a
quality research data set. Patton explained, “The logic and power of purposeful sampling
lie in selecting information-rich cases for study in depth” (p.230). This process allows a
thorough understanding of the information in context.
The sample for this study was a subset of SME’s from the larger population
within four fields of public safety that had extensive experience analyzing and sharing
threat-related information between agencies. One gap that we often see in sharing of
threat-related information is who is included, and how do we include public health
(Hospitals, CDC, etc.). The study participants mirrored the population of the state fusion
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center. Agencies that currently have representatives at the state fusion center were
included because these are the organizations that will be active during an event. The
larger population currently consists of less than 50 SME’s, who work within four fields
of public safety in Honolulu. For this research, approximately three SME’s were selected
from each field, which resulted in 13 participants. All individuals had at least 15 years of
experience in public safety. It would not have been feasible to interview every member of
the entire population for this study.
Purposeful sampling was utilized for this study. I identified subject matter experts
from each of the four fields of public safety. Participants for the study were determined
based on whether or not they met the inclusion criteria. Research study inclusion criteria
included: Individuals who worked for a public safety organization in Honolulu, Hawaii;
They had 15 or more years of experience in information sharing between public safety
organizations in Honolulu; If retired, within the last 10 years. For this research, the data
collected from 13 interviews provided a clear understanding of the benefits and
challenges of sharing threat-related information between public safety agencies.
Qualitative analysis is different than quantitative in the fact that there is no
optimal number for sample size. It is important to recognize while performing qualitative
analysis, it is the richness of the cases that are of primary importance. Many highly
regarded qualitative studies have been accomplished using very small sample sizes.
Patton (2002) explained, “the validity, meaningfulness, and insights generated from
qualitative inquiry have more to do with the information richness of the cases selected
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and the observational/analytical capabilities of the researcher than with the sample size”
(p.245).
Interviews were arranged with the participants and conducted once, via
teleconference, the participant’s private residence, or a private meeting room at the
Hawaii Public Library. The interviews took place outside of regular work hours.
Questions were asked in a semi-structured, open-ended format. It was anticipated that
each participant would provide a substantial quantity of information. Patton (2002)
explained, “the conversational interview offers maximum flexibility to pursue
information in whatever direction appears to be appropriate, depending on what ever
emerges from observing a particular setting or from talking with one or more individuals
in that setting” (p. 342).
An interview of this type is often described as ethnographic in nature (Patton,
2002). Because the conversation was allowed to flow in any direction the participant
preferred, it was not appropriate to offer prepared follow-up questions before hand.
Therefore, the answers from each individual were unique in nature (Patton, 2002). It was
extremely important that the participants were allowed to answer in their own distinct
manner, as this is where significant knowledge was derived from the data. The interviews
were scheduled several weeks in advance and I personally performed the interviews and
collected the data for the study. The interview sessions lasted 60 to 90 minutes.
Data Analysis Plan
In order to capture accurate information for a qualitative data set, the voice
recordings along with the field notes were transferred to a laptop computer. The
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participant responses were then transcribed into written text. Once a draft transcript was
transposed it was e-mailed to each participant to review to ensure that their responses
were captured accurately. After the draft transcripts were returned with revisions they
were entered into NVivo qualitative analysis software for data coding. All of the data
collected from the participants was considered highly confidential and maintained in an
encrypted format on a password protected laptop computer that will be held for one year
and then permanently deleted. The process consisted of identifying key themes in the
data, while continually reviewing my field notes to ensure that I was capturing the
participants responses accurately. Maxwell (2013) explained, the key to data analysis is
ensuring that all transcripts from the participant interviews are reviewed thoroughly and
accurately. All of the information was organized, scanned, and prepared so that it could
be analyzed and coded at a later date.
A process of coding was utilized to assist with the process of analyzing the data.
The key to coding is to allow themes to emerge from the data that makes sense to the
researcher. Creswell (2013) stated that researchers should develop a codebook for each
research study. To ensure that I captured the essence of the of the interviews I used a
coding strategy that consisted of reading through all of the transcripts several times to get
a deep understanding of what took place during the interviews. I also reviewed my
written notes, making memos of important facts and details. The next step involved
classifying the data. Creswell (2013) pointed out “coding involves aggregating text into
small categories of information” and then assigning an appropriate label (p.184). I then
developed a short list of codes, or a codebook, which was expanded upon as I continued
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processing the data (Creswell, 2013). Lastly, I separated all the codes into four or five
overarching themes that assisted me while writing my discussion and narrative of the
data. I utilized NVivo computer software throughout the coding process.
Issues of Trustworthiness
Credibility
Validity and reliability of quantitative data were established for this study through
credibility, transferability, dependability, and conformability. Creswell (2009) pointed
out that the trustworthiness and validity of qualitative analysis is extremely important in
academic research. In order to ensure the credibility of the study several strategies were
utilized. Creswell explained, “They should answer the reader’s ability to assess the
accuracy of findings as well as convince readers of that accuracy” (p.191). Multiple data
sources were analyzed in this research to triangulate the information and better develop
the themes (Silverman, 2014).
Transferability
The process of data gathering was described in detail, utilizing a rich and thick
descriptive technique, so that the reader will receive a full and detailed account of each
participant’s experiences (Creswell, 2009). I attempted to bring insights to the topic and
enrich the understanding of the phenomenon that was being investigated (Maxwell,
2013). The process of member checking was utilized in the analysis of the data. This
allowed the participants the opportunity to comment on, add to, and even change any
portion of the data they provided during the interviews.
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Dependability
To ensure the validity of the study, I also included information uncovered that did
not support the developed themes. This ensured that different perspectives were captured
when they were presented in the research data. Most themes were built upon evidence
found in the data collected for the study. Creswell (2009) pointed out that researchers
“can also present information that contradicts the general perspective of the theme”
(p.192). This process allows any counter perspectives encountered to also be considered
by the reader (Creswell, 2009). Peer debriefing was utilized as another validity check for
the study. Creswell (2009) explained, “This process involves locating a person (a peer
debriefer) who reviews and asks questions about the qualitative study so that the account
will resonate with people other than the researcher” (p.192).
Confirmability
Confirmability was established by practicing reflexivity throughout the project.
Hsiung (2010) defined reflexivity as the ability of the researcher to reflect on him or
herself and examine the relationship between the researcher and the individual being
interviewed. An integral part of reflexivity is devoted to “examining one’s ‘conceptual
baggage,’ one’s assumptions and preconceptions, and how these affect research
decisions, particularly, the selection and wording of questions” (Hsiung, 2010, para. 1). I
also utilized my experiential knowledge, consisting of “technical knowledge, research
background, and personal experiences” to help uncover rich information revealed through
a thoughtful in-depth interview process (Strauss, 1987; Maxwell, 2013, p. 45).
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Ethical Procedures
In developing a research project there are many ethical issues that must be
anticipated to protect the integrity of the project. Professional conduct was observed at all
stages of the research. This included following rigorous guidelines that have been put into
place by Walden University. Creswell (2009) stated that researchers must go beyond
what is expected of them ethically. He explained, “Ethical practices involve much more
than merely following a set of standard guidelines such as those provided by professional
associations” (p.88). The researcher should be aware of the possibility of ethical issues
occurring during the research process. Significant problems can occur if ethical
procedures are not followed from the beginning. Creswell explained, “Deception occurs
when participants understand one purpose, but the researcher has a different purpose in
mind” (p.89). This is why researchers should thoroughly explain to the participants how
the research will be accomplished and what the research will be used for.
An air of credibility and trust must be established early on to ensure that the
information is gathered freely and openly in a safe environment. Walden Internal Review
Board (IRB) monitors research conducted at the university to ensure that studies do not
infringe upon the participants civil rights or civil liberties. Confidentiality must be
discussed, if statements made by the participants are confidential in nature. Creswell
(2009) explained that federal regulations have been established to ensure IRB committees
oversee academic research studies and protect the research participants. I ensured that
Walden IRB approval had been granted before any research was conducted for this study.
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The study data will be kept in an encrypted password-protected data file on my
computer for one year, and then it will be permanently deleted. During the study I was
careful to anticipate any situation that could bring harm to the participant. Patton (2002)
explained that this process should be well thought out from the beginning, because
attempts to reduce the impact or damage after the study is completed often leads to
disaster. During the study I ensured that no language was used that could be considered
biased or discriminative against anyone.
Summary
In summary, this chapter described a process in which I used in a qualitative
exploratory case study involving SMEs from four fields of public safety in Honolulu,
Hawaii. It outlined an effective research design, as well as explained why a qualitative
approach would best serve this particular topic. It explained that the data was collected
utilizing in depth interviews of several SMEs who had experience sharing threat-related
information between public safety organizations in Honolulu. It explained the role of the
researcher and how the topic of investigation was selected for this project. It also
reviewed the methodology of the process, ensuring that all guidelines established through
Walden’s institutional review board were followed. The process for recruitment of
participants, data collection, and data analysis was explained. Trustworthiness concerns
were integrated into the process to ensure that the study was ethically sound. Chapter 4
will describe the results of my research.
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Chapter 4: Results
The purpose of this qualitative exploratory case study was to explore the benefits
and challenges of sharing threat-related information between public safety agencies (law
enforcement, fire services, EMS, and public health) in Honolulu, Hawaii. I focused on
Honolulu for several reasons. Honolulu is a moderate-sized city and faces many of the
same challenges as other cities in the continental United States, including the need to
share information across agencies to manage emerging threat-related issues. However,
Honolulu is unique because unlike other cities it is remotely isolated, being
approximately 2,500 miles from the mainland. As a result, there is an increased need to
ensure interagency communication occurs to facilitate the region’s ability to manage an
attack (Carter & Rip, 2013).
The gap in the literature was that there is a lack of knowledge about how public
safety organizations communicate threat-related information at the local level. Because it
is essential that these agencies communicate threat-related information effectively, due to
their unique situation, an exploratory case study of Honolulu public safety agencies
served as an excellent opportunity for this research. Individuals who had at least 15 years
of experience sharing threat-related information between public safety organizations in
Honolulu participated in this study. The findings provided a unique understanding of how
public safety organizations that currently share threat-related information have
encountered challenges and how these challenges differ between organizations.
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I developed three RQs for this qualitative exploratory case study. The questions
were aimed at exploring the benefits and challenges that exist in sharing threat-related
information between public safety organizations in Honolulu.
RQ1. How are public safety agencies communicating threat-related information
between one another in Honolulu, Hawaii?
RQ2. What are the benefits and challenges of sharing threat-related information
between public safety agencies in Honolulu, Hawaii?
RQ3. What can be done to improve the sharing of threat-related information
between public safety agencies in Honolulu, Hawaii?
Field Test
To ensure the interview questions were suitable to explore the research questions
for this study, I performed a field test of the interview questions prior to the actual
interviews. To accomplish this, I went into the field and interviewed three individuals
who had “expert knowledge about the population and research topic to provide feedback
on the appropriateness of the questions being asked and how the questions are being
asked in relation to the study focus” (“Field Testing,” 2016, para. 4). These experts
helped me to refine the interview questions and develop appropriate follow-up prompts.
Conducting a field test also aided in establishing validity and reliability of the research
questions. By using this process, I was able to develop interview questions that were
closely linked to the research topic.
I e-mailed the Field Test to three SMEs in early January 2018. I received
responses from all three individuals within 30 days. All three SMEs agreed that the
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interview questions were appropriate in relation to the study focus and aligned well with
the research questions. Two of the SMEs submitted suggestions on how to expand on the
interview questions and continue the conversation on the topic. Field Test Participant 1
stated:
Many individual systems comprise the larger system. Threat actors may cross
through multiple systems in a given period of time. Each organization may
function as its own system. Problems within one system could be manifesting
within other systems as well. The sharing of threat information between systems
is needed to make others aware a threat may exist. Threat identification and
mitigation strategies identified by one system can be shared to assist neighboring
systems.
This observation helped me visualize the individual organizations as separate
systems within a larger public safety system. It also helped me understand how a violent
individual could interact with different agencies within the larger public safety system
and how, if that information was not shared, it could put other first responders at risk. For
example, an individual may have a hostile or violent interaction with local law
enforcement agencies on one occasion and several days later have an interaction with
paramedics. The paramedics may be drawn into a dangerous encounter with a known
violent individual with no prior warning from police. Therefore, it is vitally important
that the emergency medical services are aware of individuals who may pose a threat to
their responders so that they can take the appreciate precautions.
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Field Test Participant 3, who had many years of experience working in a federal
law enforcement agency informed me that ongoing law enforcement investigations would
be a significant factor in an organization’s ability to share information related to the case.
Field Test Participant 3 noted the tension between how “public safety agencies manage
public safety, while ensuring no compromises of ongoing open law enforcement cases.”
This concern was an important factor in my research and was addressed often by study
participants who were from the field of law enforcement. Although the responses from
the SMEs did not necessitate a change in the interview questions, they provided valuable
context on the complexities of sharing information between public safety agencies. Their
responses helped me to prepare for the interviews with the actual research study
participants a few months later. A detailed chart showing the linkage between the
research questions and the interview questions is available in Appendix C.
Demographics
I used purposeful sampling to select the participants. Individuals who had
extensive knowledge of sharing threat-related information between public safety agencies
in Honolulu were selected. These individuals had the depth of knowledge necessary to
clearly articulate how threat-related information is analyzed and shared between
organizations. It was important to include participants who had a deep knowledge of the
public safety environment in order to build “information-rich cases for study” (Patton,
2002, p. 230). Patton (2002) explained, “Studying information-rich cases yields insights
and in-depth understanding rather than empirical generalizations” (p. 230).
Table 1
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Participant Demographics
Participant
350
351
352
353
354
356
357
358
362
363
364
365
366

Gender

Ethnicity

Male
Male
Female
Male
Male
Male
Male
Female
Male
Male
Female
Male
Female

Hawaiian/Filipino/Portuguese
Caucasian
Asian
Asian
Caucasian
Caucasian
Caucasian
Asian
Caucasian
Caucasian
Asian
Part Hawaiian
Caucasian

Years in public safety
20 years
37 years
22 years
34 years
28 years
33 years
39 years
17 years
17 years
46 years
25 years
35 years
46 years

The study participants mirrored the population of the Hawaii State Fusion Center.
At the time of the study, officials at the Hawaii State Fusion Center stated the larger
population consisted of fewer than 50 SMEs who work within the local public safety
organizations, including law enforcement, fire services, EMS, and public health. It would
not have been feasible to interview every member of the entire population for this study.
For this research, I selected approximately three SMEs from each field of public safety,
which resulted in a total of 13 participants (Table 1). Two of the participants were SMEs
in more than one field of public safety, which enhanced their distinctive knowledge of
public safety in Hawaii.
Eleven participants chose to conduct the interview via teleconference, one
participant preferred to submit the responses to the interview questions via a written
document rather than take part in an interview, and one chose to conduct the interview at
the individual’s private residence. The interview process took place over a 5-month
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period. Each interview lasted approximately one hour or less, resulting in 92 pages of
transcribed data (Table 2).
Table 2
Interview Descriptive Statistics
Participant

Interview date

350
351
352
353
354
356
357
358
362
363
364
365

8/9/2018
8/30/2018
10/3/2018
9/18/2018
10/25/2018
9/14/2018
9/18/2018
10/3/2018
9/17/2018
10/4/2018
12/3/2018
1/21/2019

366

1/11/2019

Interview time

Sessions

44 minutes
54 minutes
58 minutes
50 minutes
25 minutes
59 minutes
31 minutes
34 minutes
68 minutes
26 minutes
30 minutes
Submitted
transcript
27 minutes

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Pages transcribed
9
7
11
9
4
12
6
6
13
6
3
2

1

4

All interviews took place outside of the participants’ work schedule. All
participants in the study had at least 15 years of experience sharing threat-related
information between public safety organizations in Honolulu. Several participants who
met the research study selection criteria were recently retired. This research proved to be
an excellent opportunity to capture extensive institutional knowledge from these retired
public safety SMEs before the knowledge was lost forever.
Data Collection
Approval to conduct this study was granted by Walden University’s Institutional
Review Board assigning the study number 06-14-18-0334016. Purposeful sampling was
used to identify SMEs within four fields of public safety in Honolulu, including
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individuals from law enforcement, fire services, EMS and public health. Individuals
which had a least 15 years of experience sharing information between organizations were
selected. The purpose of this qualitative exploratory case study was to explore the
benefits and challenges of sharing threat-related information between public safety
agencies (law enforcement, fire services, EMS, and public health) in Honolulu, Hawaii.
Each participant had a rich knowledge of their field of public safety and provided insight
into what how their organization perceived the benefits and challenges of sharing
information with other organizations.
Patton (2002) pointed out, “what would be ‘bias’ in statistical sampling, and
therefore a weakness, becomes intended focus in qualitative sampling, and therefore a
strength” (p.230). The strength of purposeful sampling in qualitative research focuses on
cases that are rich with information about the topic (Patton, 2002). This process allows a
thorough understanding of the information in the context of the participant’s
environment. Participants for the study were determined based on whether or not they
met the inclusion criteria. For this research, the data was collected from 13 in-depth
interviews and provided a clear understanding of the benefits and challenges of sharing
threat-related information. I reached saturation at the 11th participant, as no new data was
being discovered. However, I continued the interviews to include two more participants
to ensure that I did not find new and unique data in the coding process. Faulkner and
Trotter (2017) explained, “Data saturation refers to the point in the research process when
no new information is discovered in data analysis, and this redundancy signals to
researchers that data collection may cease” (para. 1).

93
The sample was a subset of SMEs from the larger population within four fields of
public safety in Honolulu, including law enforcement, EMS, fire services, and public
health. In many large cities, fire services and EMS are housed within the same
organization. In Honolulu they are separate organizations, thus they were acknowledged
as separate fields of public safety. Agencies with representatives who coordinate with the
state fusion center were included, because these are the organizations that are active
during large public safety events. The larger population currently consists of less than 50
SMEs who work within local public safety organizations. Approximately three SMEs
were selected from each field, which resulted in a total of 13 participants. It would not
have been practical to interview every member of the larger population for this study.
I began recruiting participants and scheduling interviews in August 2018. Due to
their busy schedules, it took approximately 5-months to schedule and complete the
interviews for 13 participants. Each participant was asked if they would like to conduct
the interview via teleconference, at their residence, or at a private meeting room at a
Hawaii public library. Eleven participants chose to conduct the interview via
teleconference, one participant preferred to submit the responses to the interview
questions via a written document rather than take part in an interview, and one chose to
conduct the interview at their private residence. All of the interviews took place outside
of the participants’ work schedule. Four of the interviews took place during the
participants’ lunch break. Questions were asked in a semi-structured, open-ended format
and each participant provided a substantial quantity of rich information. All of the
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interviews were recorded except the one participant who preferred to submit the
responses to the question via a written text document.
After each interview I transcribed the recorded information to text. I then emailed the transcription of the interview to each participant so that they could review it to
ensure that my understanding of their responses was in line with their thought process.
This process of member checking gave the participant the opportunity to comment on,
add to, and even change any portion of the data they provided during the interview. I felt
it was extremely important that the participants were allowed to answer in their own
distinct manner during the interview and then make changes, if needed, to ensure I was
capturing their thoughts accurately. Four of the participants made changes and additions
to their interview data during this process. These individuals reviewed the transcripts
carefully and added information, such as additional descriptions of an event, or clarifying
statements that helped to explain their point of view on a topic. This additional
information richly enhanced the data set. The data collection process took longer than I
originally anticipated and therefore pushed the timeline of the data collection and analysis
well into December of 2018.
Data Analysis
Data analysis for this study began by selecting 13 participants and interviewing
them individually. After each interview, I listened to the recorded conversations and
transcribed them into text and then uploaded all 13 files into NVivo qualitative analysis
software. All research data was securely stored on a password-protected laptop computer.
I carefully read through each transcript multiple times looking for common words that I
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thought had meaning. I began aggregating the words into separate categories and
assigned descriptive labels in the form of codes (Creswell, 2013). I also reviewed my
written notes to ensure that I was documenting exactly what the participant expressed to
me during the interview. I closely followed the coding process outlined by Creswell
(2014), which includes assembling “raw data (transcripts, fieldnotes), organizing and
preparing data for analysis, reading through all data, coding the data, interrelating
themes/description,” and finally “interpreting the meaning of themes/descriptions” (p.
197). I worked through all of the interview data and then coded each interview question
separately to ensure that the codes I found during the first process surfaced again during a
second pass. I sorted the data in NVivo by key words, looking for new and unique codes
that I had not discovered during my initial attempt. My intent was to develop a thorough
understanding of what the participants expressed during the interviews. The coding
protocol is described in Appendix D.
The coding process resulted in 92 first level codes and 31 second level codes
(Appendix E). Using a process of inductive analysis, I continued aggregating the
emerging phrases into categories. Creswell (2014) explained, “in the analysis of the data,
researchers need to ‘winnow’ the data (Guest, MacQueen, & Namey, 2012), a process of
focusing in on some of the data and disregarding other parts of it” (p. 195). I identified 12
primary categories: (a) information flow, (b) collaboration, (c) fusion center, (d)
confidential information, (e) agency culture, (f) different abilities, (g) policy, (h)
responder safety, (i) secure websites, (j) politics, (k) training and (l) electronic
communication.
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Once I felt confident that the patterns were consistent throughout, I began
identifying the links in the data by gathering similar codes into categories and similar
categories into themes. Patton (2002) explained that “inductive analysis involves
discovering patterns, themes, and categories in one’s data. Findings emerge out of the
data, through the analyst’s interactions with the data” (p.453). By inductively analyzing
the codes, categories, and themes, I developed four overarching themes: (a) Information
flow within and between public safety organizations, (b) A lack of on-going collaboration
between public safety organizations, (c) Agency participation with the state fusion center,
and (d) The complexity of sharing confidential information between public safety
organizations (Table 3). Creswell (2014), pointed out that the intent of qualitative
analysis is to interpret the meaning of the patterns in the data, “It involves segmenting
and taking apart the data (like peeling back the layers of an onion) as well as putting it
back together” (p.195).
Table 3
Table of Themes
Overarching
themes

Definitions

Information
flow within
and between
public safety
organizations

Participants stated that
information did not flow
smoothly within their
departments and
consequently out to other
organizations. Several of
the problems stemmed
from information being
shared only during
intermittent urgent
situations, rather than
establishing an ongoing

Categories
(emerging
themes)
Effective
information
flow,
Withholding
information

Codes
Information sharing
between state and
county, Co-locate
dispatch,
Communication,
Include decision
makers, Information
sharing in real-time,
Less information than
before, Right
information to the right
people, Sharing
information internally,

Aggregate
references
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information sharing
environment.

Threat information not
acted upon,
Withholding
information

A lack of
ongoing
collaboration
between public
safety
organizations

Participants felt that an
ongoing collaborative
environment allows
multiple agencies with
different perspectives to
view the threat
information and analyze
it from different points of
view.

Collaboration,
Everyone on
the same page

Agency
participation
with the state
fusion center

Participants stated that it
is important that their
agency participate with
the fusion center so that
threat-related information
was disseminated across
all public safety agencies
simultaneously.
Participants stated that it
is often difficult to share
information due to its
sensitive nature, or its
relation to an ongoing
law enforcement
investigation.

Fusion center,
Identifying
gaps and
threats

The
complexity of
sharing
confidential
information
between public
safety
organizations

Confidential
information,
Information
goes to the
wrong people

After action report,
Agencies are equally
invested, Coordinated
response, Coordination
of resources,
Engagement with the
visitor industry,
Everyone on the same
page, Common
operating picture,
Interoperability
Identifying gaps, Threat
Team Oahu, Validating
threats

70

56

Clearances, Leaks to the
news media,
Information goes to the
wrong people, Law
enforcement
confidential informants,
Need to know, People
must be vetted,
Understand when to
share confidential
information

48

Information flow within and between public safety organizations was the most
prominent overarching theme in the data. Many of the participants felt that information
did not flow smoothly within their departments and consequently out to other
organizations. Several of the problems stemmed from information being shared only
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during intermittent urgent situations, rather than establishing an ongoing information
sharing environment. Participant 364 explained:
I think that it is sometimes difficult to determine how much information to share,
or what is pertinent. Also, transparency is important. You may have the top
people in the organization that know what is going on, but it doesn’t filter down to
the workforce. The leadership may not feel that it is important to pass information
down the chain, or even across to other agencies. Even if they do pass information
down, they may not pass all of the information, or leave out important details.
They may filter what they want to pass down, which could be dangerous.
(Participant 364, personal communication, December 3, 2018).
Participant 352 pointed out:
I think if it's not done on a regular basis, it may not be properly received, or there
may not be a mechanism to receive and act on the information. So, we've got to
have something in place so that when the information is pushed, or shared, or
whatever, now I can receive it and I can deal with it, as opposed to what is this
about, why are you calling me, what am I supposed to do with this. (Participant
352, personal communication, October 3, 2018)?
Several of the participants stated that information sharing between public safety
organizations is a relatively new concept. Participant 353 explained:
Sharing of information between public safety organizations, or for that matter
within units within an organization is a newer phenomenon. I will tell you 30
years ago, people didn’t tell anyone about their investigation, they would not to
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tell other people within the police department, for example, or they wouldn’t tell
federal law-enforcement, or other state agencies. They just didn’t tell anyone
because it was a need to know situation. (Participant 353, personal
communication, September 18, 2018).
A lack of ongoing collaboration between public safety organizations was the
second overarching theme. An ongoing collaborative environment allows multiple
agencies with different perspectives to view the threat information and analyze it from
different points of view. Participant 358 explained, “The benefits are awareness. I just
had a meeting with an FBI colleague discussing some of these things. I believe that we
have different perspectives on the same information, so there could be some helpful sort
of awareness, so that we can address the issues that we tend to address. For them it is law
enforcement issues, for us it may be disease issues, disease threats. It’s how that
information is shared, and what particular information is shared” (personal
communication, October 3, 2018). Many of the participants stated it is vital that public
safety organizations collaborate with one another on a daily basis rather than just when an
emergency event brings them together. Participant 352 pointed out, “It's a really bad day
if you're meeting your fellow responder for the first time, as you enter a life-and-death
situation” (personal communication, October 3, 2018).
Agency participation with the state fusion center was the third overarching theme.
Many of the participants stated that it is important that their agency participate with the
fusion center so that threat-related information was disseminated across all public safety
agencies simultaneously. Participant 366 explained, “If we are sharing information, then
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everyone has the same information and it provides better protection for the public. If we
don’t share, then we just open ourselves up and any type of situation could happen. Only
a few agencies may have that information and if we want to be responsive, it is going to
take all of us to be responsive, not just one agency. Security is not one agency’s
responsibility, it is all of our responsibility” (personal communication, January 11, 2019).
The complexity of sharing confidential information between public safety
organizations was the fourth overarching theme in the data. Many participants stated that
it is often difficult to share information due to its sensitive nature, or its relation to an
ongoing law enforcement investigation. Participant 366 explained, “I think the challenges
are, number one, the interpretation of the information. Number two, how timely that
information is. If you are sharing information via Homeland Security Information
Network (HSIN), or the computer, or email, is everyone looking at the same information?
Also, the sensitivity of that information. While you may have a disclaimer on that
material and have a need to know, others may be sharing with people who do not have a
need to know” (personal communication, January 11, 2019).
By inductively analyzing the participants responses to the interview questions, I
linked the overarching themes to the study’s research questions (Table 4). RQ1 asks, how
are public safety agencies communicating threat-related information between one another
in Honolulu, Hawaii? The most prominent overarching theme in the data, information
flow within and between public safety organizations, linked to RQ1. Agencies in
Honolulu are communicating via information flow within and between organizations;
however, in some cases this flow of information was intermittent. Several problems
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stemmed from information being shared only during urgent situations. Establishing an
ongoing information sharing environment between organizations is necessary to ensure
that information is effectively shared in an all situations.
RQ2 asks, what are the benefits and challenges of sharing threat-related
information between public safety agencies in Honolulu, Hawaii? The second
overarching theme in the data linked to RQ2, indicating that there was a lack of an
ongoing collaborative environment between public safety agencies that allows multiple
agencies with different perspectives to view threat-related information and analyze it
from different points of view. Because agencies have different skills and expertise, it is
important that they collaborate on the analysis of threat-related information. The fourth
overarching theme in the data, the complexity of sharing confidential information
between public safety organizations, also linked to RQ2. Some threat-related information
contains highly protected, or law enforcement sensitive information and is difficult to
share between agencies. It is important that agencies develop a process, through ongoing
collaboration to share this sensitive information.
RQ3 asks, what can be done to improve the sharing of threat-related information
between public safety agencies in Honolulu, Hawaii? RQ3 linked to the third overarching
theme in the data, agency participation with the state fusion center. Ongoing agency
participation with the state fusion center is vitally important to allow threat-related
information to be analyzed by multiple agencies with different skills and expertise, and
then disseminated across all public safety agencies simultaneously.
Table 4

102
Table Linking Research Questions to Overarching Themes
Research questions

Overarching themes

RQ1. How are public safety
agencies communicating threatrelated information between one
another in Honolulu, Hawaii?

Information flow within and between public
safety organizations.

A lack of ongoing collaboration between public
RQ2. What are the benefits and
safety organizations.
challenges of sharing threat-related
information between public safety
The complexity of sharing confidential
agencies in Honolulu, Hawaii?
information between public safety organizations.
RQ3. What can be done to
improve the sharing of threatAgency participation with the State Fusion
related information between public
Center.
safety agencies in Honolulu,
Hawaii?
Discrepant cases were also included in the analysis. In the Study Results section, I
included contradictory perspectives on several topics. Different perspectives are
important to understand the complexities of sharing threat-related information in a real
world environment. Creswell (2009) explained, “researchers can also present information
that contradicts the general perspective of the theme. By presenting this contradictory
evidence, the account becomes more realistic and hence valid” (p.192).
Evidence of Trustworthiness
Credibility
Creswell (2009) pointed out that researchers using qualitative analysis should
carefully document their procedures, describing the multiple steps of the research to
demonstrate the reliability of the study. Throughout the data collection and analysis
process I carefully described every step involved in order to assure the reader that the

103
information was accurately collected and examined. I triangulated multiple sources of
data including participant interviews, field notes and supporting publicly available
documents to develop the themes in the data.
In order to enhance the validity of the research, the participants were selected
from various professions within four fields of public safety to allow for multiple
perspectives. Creswell (2009) explained, “if themes are established based on converging
several sources of data or perspectives from participants, then this process can be claimed
as adding to the validity of the study” (p.191).
Transferability
I attempted to describe the collection and analysis of the data for the study in a
rich descriptive manner to enhance the explanation of the process to the reader (Creswell,
2009). I first collected the research data through in-depth interviews, which were
recorded, and then transcribed the data to written text exactly as it was communicated to
me. I then e-mailed the transcription of the interview to each participant so that they
could review it to ensure that my understanding of their responses was in line with their
thought process, intentions, and understanding. This process of member checking gave
the participant the opportunity to comment on, add to, and even change any portion of the
data they provided during the interview. Several of the participants made changes and
valuable additions to their interview data during this process which richly enhanced the
data set.
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Dependability
In an effort to strengthen the validity of the study, I coded all of the data that I
received from the interview transcripts. I worked diligently to include all the viewpoints
of the participants throughout the study, including information that contradicted the
majority perspective (Creswell, 2009). This process allows counter perspectives to be
uncovered and considered as the reader moves through my description of the data
(Creswell, 2009). I utilized peer debriefing as another validity check in the study by
asking a public safety SME at the PhD level to review my analysis of the data and ask
questions about any aspect of the process (Creswell, 2009). This helped me to uncover
errors and/or weaknesses in the process that might catch the attention of the reader.
Confirmability
I established confirmability by applying reflexivity throughout the data collection
and analysis process. Reflexivity is described as the ability of the researcher to reflect on
themselves to examine the relationship between the researcher and the individual being
interviewed (Hsiung, 2010). Hsiung (2010) pointed out, “reflexivity is the process of
examining both oneself as researcher, and the research relationship” (para. 1).” The
researcher must examine their own preconceptions, and how this may affect the wording
of the interview questions (Hsiung, 2010). Before I finalized the research questions for
this study, I performed a field test to ensure the interview questions were as free from
bias as possible and suitable to explore the research questions (Appendix F). The field
test consisted of interviewing three individuals who had “expert knowledge about the
population and research topic to provide feedback on the appropriateness of the questions
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being asked and how the questions are being asked in relation to the study focus” (“Field
Testing,” 2016). I also utilized my first-hand knowledge, consisting of “technical
knowledge, research background, and personal experiences” in the field of public safety
to help uncover rich information revealed through the in-depth interview process
(Strauss, 1987; Maxwell, 2013, p. 45).
Study Results
In the following section I present each research study question along with
responses from the participants. In the Interpretation of Findings, I discuss the three most
prominent themes that emerged from the data for each specific question.
Interview Question 1
The question was, what are the benefits of sharing threat-related information
between public safety agencies in Honolulu, Hawaii? The following responses were
provided by the interview participants.
Participant 350 stated, “being able to communicate and then kind of validating if
something is really a threat” (personal communication, August 9, 2018).
Participant 351 stated, “why would we need to know what kind of chemical?
Well, a lot of reasons, one for the medical people to treat it, if it happens” (personal
communication, August 30, 2018).
Participant 352 stated, “I think a third thing that it will do is that it will broaden
the perspective of the group. Because in a way you're enhancing the collective wisdom
and different entities have different perspectives” (personal communication, October 3,
2018).
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Participant 353 stated, “the benefits are obviously keeping our community safe
and preventing terrorist attacks, whether domestic or foreign, or self-radicalized”
(personal communication, September 18, 2018).
Participant 354 stated, “I think with the sharing you get a bigger picture. Some
agencies may have a piece of the puzzle another agency doesn’t have, and then put it
altogether” (personal communication, October 25, 2018).
Participant 356 stated, “one agency doesn't have expertise in every single
potential threat to our community, there's no way we could understand or learn about this
information without threat sharing between the agencies and having an organized manner
to disseminate that information” (personal communication, September 14, 2018).
Participant 357 stated, “for the sharing of information in real time during
responses, and to maximize coordination and minimize the impact on the community
during those responses” (personal communication, September 18, 2018).
Participant 358 stated, “the benefits are awareness. I just had a meeting with an
FBI colleague discussing some of these things. I believe that we have different
perspectives on the same information, so there could be some helpful sort of awareness”
(personal communication, October 3, 2018).
Participant 362 stated, “the benefits are it keeps everyone on the same page. I
mean if one agency knows something criminal related, or law enforcement, or public
safety related and it's important that the other agencies ought to know also” (personal
communication, September 17, 2018).
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Participant 363 stated, “that's pretty easy, the benefits are everybody knows the
same information at the same time. The trouble is getting the trust and rapport good
enough that people at the higher-ups will actually share the threat information” (personal
communication, October 4, 2018).
Participant 364 stated, “I think that some of the benefits are it makes for a better
coordinated effort between agencies. I think that it also keeps everybody informed and on
the same page” (personal communication, December 3, 2018).
Participant 365 stated, “agencies will commit to more focused assessments and
risk analysis in their daily operations and at emergency incidents” (personal
communication, January 11, 2019).
Participant 366 stated, “first of all, we are too small for every agency to have their
own information network. It has got to be shared, so that we collectively are collaborating
on what needs to be done” (personal communication, January 11, 2019).
Interpretation of findings for Interview 1. Participant responses were analyzed
according to their perception of the benefits of sharing threat-related information between
public safety agencies in Honolulu. All 13 participants stated that collaboration was a
benefit of sharing information. The different abilities of each public safety agency and
information flow within and between agencies also ranked high in the responses to the
question. The chart in Figure 1 highlights the number of participants who mentioned
certain topics in their responses to Interview Question 1.

108

Question 1
Collaboration

13

Different Abilities

6

Information Flow

5

Responder Safety

3

Validating Threats

2

Fusion Center

2
0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

Figure 1. Comparison of topic frequency in participants’ responses to Interview Question
1.
The most prominent theme in the responses to Interview Question 1 focused on
collaboration. The participants stated that having all of the public safety agencies on the
same page was very important. It is also essential that these agencies establish an ongoing
collaborative relationship with one another before they arrived at the scene of a major
incident and must work together. Participant 366 touched on the theme collaboration by
explaining, “First of all, we are too small for every agency to have their own information
network. It has got to be shared so that we collectively are collaborating on what needs to
be done” (personal communication, January 11, 2019).
The second theme in the responses to this question was different abilities of each
public safety organization. Many participants offered the opinion that one agency cannot
know all of the threat-related information, and each agency views threat-related
information from a different perspective. Law enforcement perceives threat-related data
much differently than public health; however, each organization can provide valuable
feedback toward better protecting the public and their fellow responders. If all of the
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public safety agencies have access to the same information, it leads to a much more
coordinated response.
The third theme in the responses to this question was information flow. Several
participants stated that information flow is essential within organizations and also
between organizations. Often information may flow effectively within an organization
but is then blocked internally before it is shared with other organizations. Participant 350
explained, “some of the benefits right off the top is validating. Being able to actually
validate what are really actual threats” (personal communication, August 9, 2018).
Interview Question 2
The question was, how does sharing threat-related information between public
safety organizations help identify and prevent threats to the public? The following
responses were provided by the interview participants.
Participant 350 stated, “the agencies can identify gaps and aid each other by
bringing resources to bear in those gaps, in those areas that help deter, help detect, and
help respond to specific threats” (personal communication, August 9, 2018).
Participant 351 stated, “one thing is the awareness for the staff, and way back
when, and the cleaning staff, you know that make up the rooms. There were products for
law enforcement only, and it says what to look for, identifiers” (personal communication,
August 30, 2018). Participant 351 continued, “who’s in hotel rooms. You’ve got to make
it where we can share it with the hotel cleaning staff” (personal communication, August
30, 2018).
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Participant 352 stated, “it's a really bad day if you're meeting your fellow
responder for the first time, as you enter a life-and-death situation” (personal
communication, October 3, 2018).
Participant 353 stated, “it is important to share information because they may
have different pieces of the puzzle, the same puzzle” (personal communication,
September 18, 2018).
Participant 354 stated, “the Customs and Border Patrol intelligence officer
realized that in California they were getting ship containers that were coming from
Vietnam or Thailand that were filled with the wrong refrigerant that could possibly
explode” (personal communication, October 25, 2018). Participant 354 continued, “I
notified my department to see if we had any other containers coming into Honolulu, and
we were able to establish a big response and standby with police and fire at the docks
while they carefully unloaded these things” (personal communication, October 25, 2018).
Participant 356 stated, “I think it goes back to the old saying, you don't know
what you don't know. In our agency for instance, the drugs of abuse, the narcotics with
contamination of first responders and the need for mega doses of Naloxone” (personal
communication, September 14, 2018).
Participant 357 stated, “information being gathered by the law enforcement
community is critical to the safety of the responders, not only to the responders to that
particular incident, but also to developing the response protocol to protect the responders
from secondary events” (personal communication, September 18, 2018).
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Participant 358 stated, “obviously we deal with a lot of sensitive information so
we want to be aware of potential cyber threat concerns, because we don’t want any
compromise of our data which could impact public health” (personal communication,
October 3, 2018).
Participant 362 stated, “say, whoever gets the information, the organic
information does put it out to the news or something, do all of the law enforcement
agencies see that at the same time, no, because they are busy” (personal communication,
September 17, 2018).
Participant 363 stated, “so, it's important again, more eyes on the on the
precursors, more eyes on anybody that is being crazy out there. Talking crazy, acting
crazy, buying guns and other bad stuff” (personal communication, October 4, 2018).
Participant 363 also stated, “the people who can actually do something are those folks
who are out there like cops. Get the information back through HSIN through LEEP (FBI
Law Enforcement Enterprise Portal), get it back to the JTTF (FBI Joint Terrorism Task
Force)” (personal communication, October 4, 2018).
Participant 364 stated, “say that law enforcement is watching a certain person
because they believe that they are a threat and they have information from an employer
that this person is a loose cannon” (personal communication, December 3, 2018).
Participant continued, “then EMS responds to the house and sees weapons. If EMS had
known that beforehand, they could have informed law enforcement earlier and possibly
avoided a dangerous situation” (personal communication, December 3, 2018).
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Participant 365 stated, “emergency medical personnel are the first indicators of
the health of the community and can detect sharp increases in medical emergencies
stemming from possible chemical/biological threats” (personal communication, January
11, 2019).
Participant 366 stated, “if we are sharing information, then everyone has the same
information and it provides better protection for the public. If we don’t share, then we
just open ourselves up, and any type of situation could happen” (personal
communication, January 11, 2019).
Interpretation of findings for Interview Question 2. Participant responses were
analyzed according to their perception of how sharing of threat-related information
between public safety organizations helps to identify and prevent threats to the public.
Seven of the participants stated that collaboration and responder safety was an important
factor. Safety of the public also ranked high in the number of the responses to this
question. The chart in Figure 2 highlights the number of participants who mentioned
certain topics in their responses to Interview Question 2.
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Figure 2. Comparison of topic frequency in participants’ responses to Interview Question
2.
The most prominent theme in the responses to Interview Question 2 focused on
collaboration between public safety agencies. By sharing information, the agencies can
identify gaps and provide collaborative resources to protect the safety of the public.
Participant 351 indicated that the information must be pushed, not only to public safety
professionals, but also to individuals in the private sector such as hotel security and
cleaning staff who might have access to important threat-related information within the
hotels. Participant 352 stated that responders should work together collaboratively before
they are forced to meet during an actual incident.
The second theme in the responses to this question centered around responder
safety. One agency may have information that can add a piece of the puzzle held
primarily by another organization. Threat-related information not shared by one agency
may put other responders’ safety at risk, such as EMS when they enter a domestic
violence scene to render medical care. Participant 357 touched on this theme by pointing
out, “information being gathered by the law enforcement community is critical to the
safety of the responders, not only to the responders to that particular incident but also to
developing the response protocol to protect the responders from secondary events”
(personal communication, September 18, 2018).
The third theme in the responses to this question focused on safety of the public.
Participants were acutely aware that their actions, or inactions, affect the safety of the
public. As an example, cyber-attack information that results in breached data should be
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shared between agencies so that they can better protect their networks from unauthorized
intrusion. Participant 358 explained, “we deal with a lot of sensitive information, so we
want to be aware of potential cyber threat concerns, because we don’t want any
compromise of our data which could impact public health” (Personal communication,
October 3, 2018).
Interview Question 3
The question was, how does communication software play a role in the sharing of
threat-related information? The following responses were provided by the interview
participants.
Participant 350 stated, “in this day and age, the technological advances in
communication software, really what it does is it allows us to communicate in real-time,
overtly, covertly, across multiple agencies” (personal communication, August 9, 2018).
Participant 351 stated, “the office of homeland security finances HHVISA
(Hawaii Hotel Visitor Industry Security Association), HIORCA (Hawaii Organized
Crime Alliance) and Safe Keiki websites, so important, the buy-in” (personal
communication, August 30, 2018).
Participant 352 stated, “I think it helps to build a network and a mechanism, for
sharing that will remove that that margin for individual error” (personal communication,
October 3, 2018).
Participant 353 stated, “besides the Homeland Security Information Network
(HSIN), and FBI’s Law Enforcement Enterprise Portal (LEEP), I could also to a certain
respect include the Hawaii High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) and the

115
Western States Information Network (WSIN)” (personal communication, September 18,
2018). Participant 353 added. “I think they all play a major role in collecting information,
categorizing information, sharing information and then add to that notifying an agency if
there is a conflict. That’s typically the way deconfliction works” (personal
communication, September 18, 2018).
Participant 354: “I think one it allows all first responders in Honolulu to access
the HSIN stuff. Not only to see what is going on here in Hawaii, but in the bigger picture,
to get information from across the entire nation” (personal communication, October 25,
2018).
Participant 356 stated, “personal health care information, response capabilities,
response patterns. Not to the level of classified or top-secret or anything like that, but it
definitely is for official use only type of information where you just don't want that
widely disseminated” (personal communication, September 14, 2018).
Participant 357 stated, “right now, we are looking at implementing software
applications for an immediate notification of key city department heads. That was a
missing piece in our response protocols” (personal communication, September 18, 2018).
Participant 358 stated, “in terms of disease management, we have our own disease
management software for monitoring trends from our surveillance data, but in terms of
broadly, no” (personal communication, October 3, 2018).
Participant 362 stated, “there are several ways that communication software plays
a role. We currently use our intranet system exclusively for passing information up and
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down within the organization, but you are not always logged on” (personal
communication, September 17, 2018).
Participant 363 stated, “I think it is getting better because of community access to
HSIN. That's a really big deal, that's huge. Non-law enforcement people get in there and
we know who they are, and they become a trusted partner” (personal communication,
October 4, 2018).
Participant 364 stated, “if you put it in writing it can be a good reference. We can
avoid misinterpretation or a situation where we send out the wrong message. So, I think
that it is very important” (personal communication, December 3, 2018).
Participant 365 stated, “most public safety agencies using social media, websites,
and wireless emergency alerts are effective in providing information rapidly to the
public” (personal communication, January 11, 2019).
Participant 366 stated, “everyone has the same platform of information to work
from. Versus, if we picked up the telephone and we called someone, how did you hear it,
and how I hear it and how the next person hears it may be different” (personal
communication, January 11, 2019).
Interpretation of findings for Interview Question 3. Participant responses were
analyzed according to their perception of the role communication software plays in the
sharing of threat-related information. Eight of the participants stated that secure websites
played a significant role in the sharing of threat-related information. Information flow
and electronic communication also ranked high in the number of the responses to this
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question. The chart in Figure 3 highlights the number of participants who mentioned
certain topics in their responses to Interview Question 3.
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Figure 3. Comparison of topic frequency in participants’ responses to Interview Question
3.
The most prominent theme in the responses to Interview Question 3 pertained to
storing data on secure websites. Various online portals are utilized by public safety
organizations in Honolulu including, HSIN, LEEP, and WSIN, which allow law
enforcement and other public safety officials to share sensitive threat-related information
in a secure portal. Only vetted individuals who have completed background checks are
allowed to access these portals. One of the challenges is encouraging people to utilize
these assets and login to the portals to check for new and updated information. Participant
354 explains, “it allows all first responders in Honolulu to access the Homeland Security
Information Network (HSIN) stuff. Not only to see what is going on here in Hawaii, but
in the bigger picture, to get information from across the entire nation” (personal
communication, October 25, 2018).
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The second theme in the responses to this question pertained to utilizing
communication software within their own organizations and then passing pertinent threatrelated information out to other organizations so that all of the public safety organizations
have a common operating picture of the potential threats in their region. Participant 366
explained, “everyone has the same platform of information to work from. Versus, if we
picked up the telephone and we called someone, how did you hear it, and how I hear it
and how the next person hears it may be different” (personal communication, January 11,
2019).
The third theme in the responses to this question focused on disseminating threatrelated information to other organizations in real-time, utilizing electronic
communications software during critical events. Participant 364 commented on this
concept stating, “if you put it in writing it can be a good reference. We can avoid
misinterpretation or a situation where we send out the wrong message. Effective
communication can reach a larger number of people” (personal communication,
December 3, 2018).
Interview Question 4
The question was, what are the challenges of sharing threat-related information
between public safety agencies in Honolulu, Hawaii? The following responses were
provided by the interview participants.
Participant 350 stated, “I believe the classification of information is a challenge.
How we classify what information we have really depends on who's going to see it, or
how it's going to get shared” (personal communication, August 9, 2018)?
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Participant 351 stated, “for instance when CIU (Criminal Intelligence Unit) comes
to a partner's meeting, almost invariably, they never say a word, zero. I'm constantly told
by administrators of the police they are there just to absorb” (personal communication,
August 30, 2018). Participant 351 continued, “if they can't give us techniques and
procedures, there's something to look out for, then we don't need them in the partners
meeting because we are there to share information” (personal communication, August 30,
2018).
Participant 352 stated, “I think if it's not done on a regular basis, it may not be
properly received, or there may not be a mechanism to receive and act on the info”
(personal communication, October 3, 2018). Participant 352 continued, “I think it is a
challenge right now, because I think if you were to call EMS today, or even Fire, with
some sort of active threat info, would they know what to do with that information”
(personal communication, October 3, 2018)?
Participant 353 stated, “sometimes the providing agency of the information, the
investigators work hard, they work extensively, and maybe months of arduous work on
this investigation then when it is given to another agency” (personal communication,
September 18, 2018). Participant 353 went on to say, “the agency that provided
information would like to be acknowledged or receive some credit for it. Sometimes that
does not happen” (personal communication, September 18, 2018).
Participant 354 stated, “I think one of the challenges is if you share too much, or
someone leaks it out to the public or to the media, it could possibly ruin an ongoing
investigation” (personal communication, October 25, 2018).
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Participant 356 stated, “the biggest challenge is trust and making sure the
information is secure. Because in any agency, federal, state, or local governments, there's
always a few people who want to share things with the media and share things with their
friends” (personal communication, September 14, 2018).
Participant 357 stated, “I don’t see any major barriers at this point of time in
Honolulu. I think we have an excellent sharing of information amongst our public safety
agencies” (personal communication, September 18, 2018).
Participant 358 stated, “I think it’s knowing what it is they might, or might not, be
interested in” (personal communication, October 3, 2018). Participant 358 added, “let me
know if they [FBI] felt there was something that they needed to know, because I wouldn’t
necessarily know if there was something nefarious about a particular bunch of cases we
are investigating, or outbreak or whatever” (personal communication, October 3, 2018).
Participant 362 stated, “do they have a system set up to be able to share between
public safety agencies other than just a phone call between people that know each other”
(personal communication, September 17, 2018). Participant 362 added, “is there a
software system set up, is there a bridge built to be able to share threat information, other
than the news” (personal communication, September 17, 2018)?
Participant 363 stated, “the senior level guys, they get bonuses for having these
meetings and showing that they're sharing. They get out of the meeting and then they bad
mouth, oh I had to share, I had to, had to share” (personal communication, October 4,
2018). Participant 363 added, “it's a reluctance that they're losing their power, they're
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losing. They think, I don't have complete control over my information anymore. My
information. I've heard it at many meetings” (personal communication, October 4, 2018).
Participant 364 stated, “it may make it more of a competition between certain
agencies. Say, for example law enforcement wants to be the one to track down the bad
guy, or be a hero, so they may not share the information as necessary” (personal
communication, December 3, 2018).
Participant 365 stated, “Agencies need to evaluate and react appropriately to
threat-related information” (personal communication, January 11, 2019).
Participant 366 stated, “I think the challenges are, number one, the interpretation
of the information. Number two, how timely that information is. If you are sharing
information via HSIN, or the computer, or email, is everyone looking at the same
information” (personal communication, January 11, 2019). Participant 366 added, “while
you may have a disclaimer on that material and have a need to know, others may be
sharing with people who do not have a need to know” (personal communication, January
11, 2019).
Interpretation of findings for Interview Question 4. Participant responses were
analyzed according to their perception of the challenges of sharing threat-related
information between public safety agencies in Honolulu. Nine of the participants stated
that confidential information was a challenge of sharing of threat-related information.
Information flow and agency culture were other themes which ranked high in the
responses to this question. The chart in Figure 4 highlights the number of participants
who mentioned certain topics in their responses to Interview Question 4.
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Figure 4. Comparison of topic frequency in participants’ responses to Interview Question
4.
The most prominent theme in the responses to Interview Question 4 centered
around the complexity of sharing confidential and protected information between public
safety organizations. When information contains details that are confidential or sensitive
it can only be shared with people that have a legitimate need to know that information
(e.g. active police investigations). Also, classified national security information can only
be shared if the receiver has a national security clearance and is authorized to receive the
information. Therefore, sharing this type of information with all public safety
organizations is not possible. Confidentiality of information inherently inhibits the ability
to share information. Participant 356 stated, “the biggest challenge is trust and making
sure the information is secure. Because in any agency, federal, state, or local
governments, there's always a few people who want to share things with the media and
share things with their friends” (personal communication, September 14, 2018).
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The second theme in the responses to this question pertained to information flow
within and between organizations. It is important to build paths for information to flow
within agencies so that when it is received, it can be disseminated to the right people
within the organization. Participant 352 pointed out that information must be shared on a
regular basis for agencies to develop the processes to utilize it, or eventually the flow of
information will stop. Participant 352 explained, “I think if it's not done on a regular
basis, it may not be properly received, or there may not be a mechanism to receive and
act on the info” (personal communication, October 3, 2018).
The third theme in the responses to this question focused on agency culture. When
threat-related information is shared between agencies there is always a concern that the
information may be inadvertently shared to the wrong people or to the media. Participant
364 explained, “In some situations we may not know who the good guy is, and who the
bad guy is. If information is shared carelessly, someone may tip off the bad guys”
(personal communication, December 3, 2018).
Interview Question 5
The question was, please describe the top three barriers, at your organization, to
sharing threat-related information between public safety organizations. The following
responses were provided by the interview participants.
Participant 350 stated that national security clearances create a barrier. He
explained, “we kind of touched on it, but I think you know again it is the clearance”
(personal communication, August 9, 2018). Participant 350 added, “here in Honolulu we
have multiple military installations from every branch of service you know from the basic

124
military unit level all the way up to the combatant command level and so, there's a lot of
information flowing about threats” (personal communication, August 9, 2018)
Participant 351 stated, “HPD has a Crime Analysis Unit. We wanted to hook up
with them and share information. The last administration said no. So, it’s that lack of data
that we're getting, well that we're not getting” (personal communication, August 30,
2018).
Participant 352 stated, “law enforcement does a great job dealing with the
information coming in and sifting through it and deciding what's relevant and what's not.
There's no medical perspective or no healthcare perspective that is viewing that
intelligence or that data” (personal communication, October 3, 2018).
Participant 353 stated, “sharing of information between public safety
organizations or for that matter within units within an organization is a newer
phenomenon. I will tell you 30 years ago people didn’t tell anyone about their
investigation” (personal communication, September 18, 2018).
Participant 354 stated, “the only real barrier that I can think of was that the
HIDTA wanted to do drug raids on suspected houses that were producing illegal drugs.
They wanted a way to warn us [Firefighters/EMS] if we responded to that house”
(personal communication, October 25, 2018). Participant 354 added, “they had to be very
careful about not sharing the information so that it would not get back to the criminals”
(personal communication, October 25, 2018).
Participant 356 stated, “the second barrier is I think, that just not everyone
understands the importance of information sharing” (personal communication, September
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14, 2018). Participant 356 added, “people who've been in one lane for many years in their
agency and they are kind of in this tunnel and don't realize what's going on in the world
around them, actually affects your agency” (personal communication, September 14,
2018).
Participant 357 stated, “we [Honolulu county government] do have the public
safety response functions, we are much more attuned to planning and preplanning for
these events, but it does become very important to include functions of state government
in this as well” (personal communication, September 18, 2018). Participant 357 added,
“that is going to be a bigger challenge because they are not focused towards a public
safety function. At least in the state of Hawaii” (personal communication, September 18,
2018).
Participant 358 stated, “if we are going to be sharing data with entities who don’t
normally deal with protecting health information, personal information on a day-to-day
basis, how do we get assurance that they have appropriate training” (personal
communication, October 3, 2018).
Participant 362 stated, “lack of education or knowledge of the benefits of sharing
information. Another one would be lack of manpower or at least not allocating resources
that should be. The third one would be the political will” (personal communication,
September 17, 2018).
Participant 363 stated, “so that's all we're supposed to do is filter that stuff and
you have to be judicious on how you filter it, because what you filter out might be what
somebody else needs” (personal communication, October 4, 2018).
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Participant 364 stated, “you may have the top people in the organization that
know what is going on but it doesn’t filter down to the workforce” (personal
communication, December 3, 2018). Participant 364 added, “even if they do pass
information down, they may not pass all of the information or leave out important details.
They may filter what they want to pass down, which could be dangerous” (personal
communication, December 3, 2018).
Participant 365 stated, “one perceived barrier could be that dedicated resources
within a department specifically focused on the intelligence function. With personnel
staffing functions so difficult to procure, the intelligence function would be assigned as
an additional duty” (personal communication, January 11, 2019).
Participant 366 stated, “the different levels in which the DPS (Department of
Public Safety), the DLNR (Department of Land and Natural Resources), the AG
(Attorney General) and the HPD all relate to one another. They are not all on the same
level.” (personal communication, January 11, 2019). Participant 366 also added, “I think
that hurts us because I don’t think that we communicate enough together. How do we
bring everyone together? I don’t think we do that very well” (personal communication,
January 11, 2019).
Interpretation of findings for Interview Question 5. Participant responses were
analyzed according to their perception of the top three barriers at their respective
organizations to sharing threat-related information between public safety organizations.
Seven of the participants stated that information flow was a barrier when sharing threatrelated information. Different abilities and employee training were themes which also
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ranked in the top three responses to this question. The chart in Figure 5 highlights the
number of participants who mentioned certain topics in their responses to Interview
Question 5.
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Figure 5. Comparison of topic frequency in participants’ responses to Interview Question
5.
The most prominent theme in the responses to Interview Question 5 focused on
information flow within and between organizations. Often, the leadership of an
organization may be receiving information but does not chose to pass all of the
information down to the rest of the organization. Participant 364 pointed out:
It is often difficult for leadership to determine what information to share and how
much information to share. Because leadership is not continually working at the
operations level, they may not pass down information that is important to the
responders on the street, or they may only pass down a portion of the information
that was received. Whether they realize it or not, if all of the information received
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is not passed down, they are filtering it in one form or another. (Participant 364,
personal communication, December 3, 2018).
The second theme in the responses to this question focused on the different
abilities of each public safety organization. Each agency is proficient at what they do on a
daily basis; however, each excels at different skills. Law enforcement may be very good
at determining threats related to an active shooter situation, but not skilled at detecting
threats from a health or medical related emergency. Participant 352 pointed out, “If the
threat-related information is not viewed by subject matter experts in various fields of
public safety, such as medical or public health, critical information may be missed which
may pose an unintentional risk to the public” (personal communication, October 3, 2018).
The third theme in the responses to this question focused on employee training. In
order to share information effectively, organizations must invest in the appropriate
training for staff members who are designated to receive and transmit confidential or
sensitive data. Participant 358 explained, “If we are going to be sharing data with entities
who don’t normally deal with protecting health information, personal information on a
day-to-day basis, how do we get assurance that they have appropriate training” (personal
communication, October 3, 2018).
A discrepant response to this question focused on financial resources. A lack of
financial recourses could restrict an organizations ability to assign staff to participate in
information sharing environments. Participant (356) pointed out, “if we were unable to
fund someone's participation in something like the fusion center and we were also unable
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to fund someone to generate our own research, to disseminate our own information, that's
a barrier” (personal communication, September 14, 2018).
Interview Question 6
The question was, how does politics play a role in the sharing of threat-related
information between public safety organizations? The following responses were provided
by the interview participants.
Participant 350 stated, “I guess it's really dependent upon if we are nearing an
election season for politics; depending on who is running and gunning for positions. I
would say that sometimes the politics are from even within their own unions” (personal
communication, August 9, 2018).
Participant 351 stated: “So HPD's culture you know well, not to share, not to
release but to work things internally. That is the culture of HPD” (personal
communication, August 30, 2018).
Participant 352 stated, “one is that the director overseeing the department that
contains EMS is appointed by the mayor. So, every time you change the mayor you
probably are going to change that director and so you have a lack of continuity” (personal
communication, October 3, 2018). Participant 352 also added, “that director may have
little or no medical background and yet they're seen as being in a position that should be
the medical lead for the city. So, I think that's usually problematic and that's entirely
political” (personal communication, October 3, 2018).
Participant 353 stated, “the importance of the fusion center. Whether they are
firefighters or police officers, through the wish of the chief, if the chief wants those
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personnel back and staffed somewhere else then there is no one at the fusion center”
(personal communication, September 18, 2018). Participant 353 also added, “that’s a big
impact and that is a big policy decision that could play a role” (personal communication,
September 18, 2018).
Participant 354 stated, “one of the big ones would be funding” (personal
communication, October 25, 2018).
Participant 356 stated, “We were appointed and when you're appointed you have
to follow the orders of your elected official or you get fired. So, what I noticed in the
Health Department is they were very nervous about upsetting tourists” (personal
communication, September 14, 2018). Participant added, “I appreciated that and
understood that, but that was a political reality as a barrier. Not so much of the
information we released internally as information sharing, but what we released to the
public” (personal communication, September 14, 2018).
Participant 357 stated, “within state government, many of the state government
functions culturally do not see types of responses as being part of their mission or even
part of their responsibility and that is going to take a cultural shift” (personal
communication, September 18, 2018).
Participant 358 stated, “starting with the real politics. There are state legislators
and even congressional members who seem to think that they should be privy to
everything, no matter what. They get very irate when we politely decline and tell them
no” (personal communication, October 3, 2018).
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Participant 362 stated, “The people making decisions are not the people on the
ground, they are not getting the information from people on the ground to help them
guide their decisions at the top. That is the biggest problem. This is information sharing”
(personal communication, September 17, 2018).
Participant 363 stated, “that really affects the intelligence community the police,
fire, EMS, their budgets. I get more votes because I help the homeless or I do something
with the urban stuff. I don’t get more votes by having more cops on the street” (personal
communication, October 4, 2018).
Participant 364 stated, “people may have alternative motives such as, if we make
our organization look better, we will get more funding next year, purchase more
equipment and improve the organization” (personal communication, December 3, 2018).
Participant 365 stated, “In my experience amongst numerous administrations,
politics will enhance or diminish the importance of sharing threat-related information.
Politics can impact the procurement of vital equipment in information sharing and the
staffing of new positions” (personal communication, January 11, 2019).
Participant 366 stated, “Because of the geography and the political climate here I
think people feel they are protected. They do not feel that there is a great threat against
the state of Hawaii” (personal communication, January 11, 2019). Participant 366 added,
“it would be nice if everything could remain open as it did many years ago. But I think
we still put many people at risk by not implementing security measures” (personal
communication, January 11, 2019).
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Interpretation of findings for Interview Question 6. Participant responses were
analyzed according to their perception of how politics plays a role in the sharing of
threat-related information between public safety organizations. Nine of the participants
stated that politics played a significant role in the sharing of threat-related information.
Agency culture and information flow were themes which also ranked in the top three
responses to this question. The chart in Figure 6 highlights the number of participants
who mentioned certain topics in their responses to Interview Question 6.
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Figure 6. Comparison of topic frequency in participants’ responses to Interview Question
6.
The most prominent theme in the responses to Interview Question 6 focused on
politics. The participants indicated that the political environment at any given time could
affect the sharing of threat-related information. State or county political leadership may
request information that is sensitive, such as personally identifiable data or law
enforcement sensitive information that cannot be shared outside of individuals with a
legitimate need to know. Participant 358 explained, “starting with the real politics. There
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are state legislators and even congressional members who seem to think that they should
be privy to everything, no matter what. They get very irate when we politely decline and
tell them no” (personal communication, October 3, 2018).
Within each agency politics at the leadership level also plays a role in the sharing
of information. Participant 353 explained, “the importance of the fusion center. Whether
they are firefighters or police officers, through the wish of the chief, if the chief wants
those personnel back and staffed somewhere else then there is no one at the fusion
center” (personal communication, September 18, 2018). Participant 353 added, “that’s a
big impact and that is a big policy decision that could play a role” (personal
communication, September 18, 2018).
The second theme in the responses to this question was agency culture within an
organization. According to the participants, some public safety organizations are very
protective of their programs which leads to less sharing of information between agencies.
A perceived competition between agencies or even between agency sponsored public
safety campaigns can affect information sharing. Participant 354 stated:
Like what we are doing here with the see something say something [campaign]. I
remember going to the meetings and crime stoppers representatives were there,
and they were totally against it because they had a similar program and they
thought that it would interfere with their operation. They did not want us to push
the agenda of the see something say something and take away from their program.
So, I know that that was kind of a huge political. I guess the politics between the
organizations. (Participant 354, personal communication, October 25, 2018).
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Participants also described a reluctance to share due to entrenched agency culture.
Participant 351 stated:
So HPD's culture you know well, not to share, not to release but to work things
internally. That is the culture of HPD. I'll tell you exactly, so when we asked the
last administration for the highlights and for working with CIU (Criminal
Intelligence Unit). The assistant chief who oversaw that area said yes, this makes
sense of course. This person goes to the chief and it's blocked. I don't think it was
politics but a culture of close hold. (Participant 351, personal communication,
August 30, 2018).
The third theme in the responses to this question was information flow within and
between organizations. Several participants stated that information flow within their
agencies did not flow effectively from the administrative level down to operations level
and from the operations level back to the administrators. It is important that the
leadership of public safety organizations designate internal information flow as a priority
and take the steps necessary to make it an effective part of daily operations. Participant
362 explained, “The people making decisions are not the people on the ground, they are
not getting the information from people on the ground to help them guide their decisions
at the top. That is the biggest problem.” (personal communication, September 17, 2018).
Interview Question 7
The question was, what can be done to improve the sharing of threat-related
information between public safety agencies in Honolulu, Hawaii? The following
responses were provided by the interview participants.
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Participant 350 stated, “having technology to help us keep each other on the same
page and communicate, you know, that's always key. Communication is key” (personal
communication, August 9, 2018).
Participant 351 stated, “I'll tell you what the problem with HPD is. The problem
for getting somebody assigned to the fusion center like it used to be” (personal
communication, August 30, 2018).
Participant 352 stated, “involve non-law enforcement agencies in kind of lowerlevel more day-to-day threats. Sort of begin information sharing on some level and I
would start ramping it up from there and getting it a little more sophisticated. I think that
would help” (personal communication, October 3, 2018).
Participant 353 stated, “first it is what I mentioned earlier, maybe considered
overlap here is that the chief of police has to buy in on the importance of participating in
WSIN, HIDTA, participating in deconfliction requirements” (personal communication,
September 18, 2018).
Participant 354 stated, “I think we need to get more of the organizations buy in.
You saw what happened when we got our new fire chief. He pulled us out of the fusion
center and did not want to have anything to do with it” (personal communication,
October 25, 2018). Participant 354 also added, “to prove that it will be beneficial to
everyone. That is one way to include organizations like the fire department and EMS. I
think that it would be important to have a fire representative at the fusion center”
(personal communication, October 25, 2018).
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Participant 356 stated, “whether that be police, fire, EMS, or military, you have to
have someone who reports to the highest levels assigned to disseminate and receive
information” (personal communication, September 14, 2018).
Participant 357 stated, “between the federal and state levels and in particularly
between the joint chiefs of staff and the military and the military command and the
sharing of information with the state. I think that is an area that can be improved”
(personal communication, September 18, 2018).
Participant 358 stated, “agencies that are again not used to dealing with health
information or other private information it would be good if they had regular training in
place for key personnel and had protocol in place on how to handle sensitive
information” (personal communication, October 3, 2018).
Participant 362 stated, “better communication not only between agencies, but the
agencies should share the information that they are getting from within their
organizations by better communications from the boots on the ground to the
administrators” (personal communication, September 17, 2018).
Participant 363 stated, “unfortunately, until we get another big 9/11 event people
are not going to be freely sharing information” (personal communication, October 4,
2018). Participant 363 also added, “like I say until we get another big bang everybody is
withdrawing back into their stove pipes” (personal communication, October 4, 2018).
Participant 364 stated, “create a website that everyone in the department can go to
and access the same information. A shared drive or folder on the intranet for internal use,
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so that everyone has the same information. It can serve as a reference” (personal
communication, December 3, 2018).
Participant 365 stated, “for county fire departments, the State Fire Council
provides cooperation amongst the counties by state statutes. Funding each county with
one intelligence officer responsible for coordination, research, and monitoring of current
and emerging threats” (personal communication, January 11, 2019).
Participant 366 stated, “understanding that the state agencies don’t have the same
responsibilities as the Honolulu Police Department. But respecting what they do and the
training that they have and the responsibilities that they have I think would go a long
way” (personal communication, January 11, 2019).
Interpretation of findings for Interview Question 7. Participant responses were
analyzed according to their opinion of what could be done to improve the sharing
of threat-related information between public safety agencies in Honolulu. Five of
the participants stated that agency culture, information flow, and the state fusion
center were factors that may improve threat-related information sharing. The chart
in Figure 7 highlights the number of participants who mentioned certain topics in
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their responses to Interview Question 7.
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Figure 7. Comparison of topic frequency in participants’ responses to Interview Question
7.
The most prominent theme in the responses to Interview Question 7 was agency
culture within organizations. A topic that was mentioned several times in the responses
was buy-in by the leadership of the organizations. If the chief of a department (e.g.,
police, fire, or EMS) does not buy-in to an initiative or program it simply will not move
forward. Participant 356 explains, “I think first of all there has to be buy in from the
highest levels of the agency” (personal communication, September 14, 2018).
The second theme in the responses to in this question focused on the state fusion
center. Several participants stated the need to have representatives from all of the public
safety organizations assigned to the fusion center. Staff shortage, lack of funding, and
lack of buy-in were primary reasons why some organizations do not currently assign staff
to the state fusion center. Participant 350 pointed out, “Communication is key. As you
know the Hawaii State Fusion Center is really an entity that's kind of keeping this thing
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together and really helping things evolve in the sharing of information” (personal
communication, August 9, 2018).
The third theme in the responses to this question was information flow within and
between agencies. There was a concern by several participants that information was not
effectively flowing internally between the administration of the organizations and the
operational staff, or boots on the ground, as one participant put it. This was a common
theme throughout the study. Participant 362 explained, “better communication not only
between agencies, but the agencies should share the information that they are getting
from within their organizations by better communications from the boots on the ground
to the administrators” (personal communication, September 17, 2018). Participant 362
added, “because right now the communication is pretty much straight down or sideways.
Also, the communication that is coming down is not really needed you know, it is
administrative” (personal communication, September 17, 2018).
Participant 363 stated:
Unfortunately, until we get another big 9/11 event people are not going to be
freely sharing information. Right after 9/11 if you wanted something you got it.
At APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation) if we wanted to do something
related to the event you got it. You want to share information, good, share that
information. Like I say until we get another big bang everybody is withdrawing
back into their stove pipes. (Participant 363, personal communication, October 4,
2018).
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Interview Question 8
The question was, what role could agency policies, within your organization, play
in improving the sharing of threat-related information? The following responses were
provided by the interview participants.
Participant 350 stated, “now do I think there needs to be some level of guidance
and direction, absolutely because how do you gain manpower and how do you gain
funding” (personal communication, August 9, 2018)?
Participant 351 stated, “A fusion center can help coordinate that along with the
FBI, that's in policy” (personal communication, August 30, 2018).
Participant 352 stated, “I don't think just making a policy is going to solve it. You
really need to have the buy-in and the policy just is just a document for the steps that you
take to do something” (personal communication, October 3, 2018).
Participant 353 stated, “I worked for the Honolulu Police Department. I believe
the policies are critical. The reason I say that it is because it keeps our personnel safe”
(personal communication, September 18, 2018).
Participant 354 stated, “I think that it would be important to have a policy so that
if you saw certain things you would have to report it. Because we don’t have any policies
like that currently” (personal communication, October 25, 2018).
Participant 356 stated, “having it in writing I think kind of guarantees it. I guess
guarantees is to strong of a word, but it more enables a department to do the right thing”
(personal communication, September 14, 2018).
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Participant 357 stated, “I think where we could really make some significant gains
if we began to utilize some of the available resources in terms of alerting the public more.
So that they could be more prepared” (personal communication, September 18, 2018).
Participant 358 stated, “Within our organization based on our past experience, it
would probably be good to have ongoing discussions within the agency or organization to
determine how we might address these things in the future” (personal communication,
October 3, 2018).
Participant 362 stated, “They [HPD] can make it a policy that they are going to be
a part of the fusion center and share information” (personal communication, September
17, 2018). Participant 362 added, “they have different policies for SSD (Specialized
Services Division) and MED (Major Events Division) they all have policies so they could
assign someone to the fusion center or a group and make a policy that they will
participate” (personal communication, September 17, 2018).
Participant 363 stated, “policy on the big government side is knock down those
walls of information sharing between operations and intelligence. There is still that
division” (personal communication, October 4, 2018).
Participant 364 stated, “I think policies keep people accountable. Accountability
is a big one. No one can say I didn’t know, or I didn’t have access, or no one can point
the finger at anyone else” (personal communication, December 3, 2018).
Participant 365 stated, “Fire departments with organized top-down hierarchy are
reinforced to up-channel any threat-related information as soon as possible. Those
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subject matter experts work with leadership to provide a uniform/unified posture or
response” (personal communication, January 11, 2019).
Participant 366 stated, “to codify the SLEC (State Law Enforcement Council). I
think that is one thing. I think the other thing would be to have representation of all of
these agencies in the fusion center” (personal communication, January 11, 2019).
Interpretation of findings for Interview Question 8. Participant responses were
analyzed according to what role agency policies played in improving the sharing of
threat-related information between public safety organizations. Nine of the participants
stated that specific agency policies may improve threat-related information sharing. The
fusion center and information flow were themes which also ranked in the top three
responses to this question. The chart in Figure 8 highlights the number of participants
who mentioned certain topics in their responses to Interview Question 8.
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Figure 8. Comparison of topic frequency in participants’ responses to Interview Question
8.
The most prominent theme in the responses to Interview Question 8 centered
around agency policies. A majority of the participants agreed that agency policies were
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needed to enhance the sharing of threat-related information. Policies help keep
responders safe and ensure that individuals stay involved in the information sharing
process and are not allowed to regress to a pre 9/11 culture of holding information within
each organization. Participant 353 stated, “I worked for the Honolulu Police Department.
I believe the policies are critical. The reason I say that it is because it keeps our personnel
safe” (personal communication, September 18, 2018). Participant 353 also added, “there
are many things that we have no control of but there are things that we do have control of
and deconfliction and case activation procedures are critical to keeping our people safe”
(personal communication, September 18, 2018).
Participant 364 explained, “I think policies keep people accountable.
Accountability is a big one. No one can say I didn’t know, or I didn’t have access, or no
one can point the finger at anyone else” (personal communication, December 3, 2018).
The second most prominent theme in the responses to this question was public
safety participation in the state fusion center. Several of the participants stated that it is
vitally important for public safety organizations to assign a liaison to the fusion center.
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2018) defines state and major urban area
fusion centers as organizations that “operate as state and major urban area focal points for
the receipt, analysis, gathering, and sharing of threat-related information between federal;
state, local, tribal, territorial; and private sector partners” (para.1). Participant 366
explained:
I think the other thing would be to have representation of all of these agencies in
the Fusion Center, so that we could actually gain their confidence and they would
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feel like they are part of what’s going on when it comes to the security and the
protection of our community. Because right now I do not feel that outside of the
fusion center, even my own office, I do not feel that they understand all of the
threats that are out there. All of the areas that we need to be watching. You have
got to have that influence that brings it together, but right now I think everyone is
operating in their own little world and when they have to, then they support each
other. (Participant 366, personal communication, January 11, 2019).
The third most prominent theme in the responses to this question was information
flow within and between organizations. This was a theme highlighted multiple times in
this study. There was a concern by several participants that information was not
effectively flowing between segments within the organizations. Participant 363 stated,
“policy on the big government side is knock down those walls of information sharing
between operations and intelligence. There is still that division” (personal
communication, October 4, 2018). Participant 363 also added, “the agents find out the
information and say I don’t want to share that with the intelligence side because then it
doesn’t become my case, my information” (personal communication, October 4, 2018).
Interview Question 9
The question was, please describe any past lessons learned at your organization
that could improve the exchange of threat-related information between public safety
organizations. The following responses were provided by the interview participants.
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Participant 350 stated, “they're asking for help and their giving us information and
how we can help and how we did help. That's what's got to be encouraged” (personal
communication, August 9, 2018).
Participant 351 stated, “set your objectives, set your goals, set your objectives and
make your strategies” (personal communication, August 30, 2018).
Participant 352 stated, “I am for some cross training of medical people and maybe
even just simple cross training of some of the law-enforcement guys” (personal
communication, October 3, 2018). Participant 352 added, “they call it tactical EMS, and
they have tactical physicians or physicians that are on their EMS staff. Like through the
partnerships with the university or whatever and so they have a high degree of medical
expertise” (personal communication, October 3, 2018).
Participant 353 stated, “I was a commander of a narcotics vice division at one
time and I had a drug unit report to me that they conducted an undercover investigation
and they followed the procedures required for a critical event deconfliction” (personal
communication, September 18, 2018). Participant 353 added, “when they went to the
scene that they identified, they ran across their brother officers from HPD at the same
location also in plain clothes, which was a conflict” (personal communication, September
18, 2018).
Participant 354 stated:
I think the improvement on sharing information of stuff that you don’t really want
to get out to the public. The confidential information that may have to do with law
enforcement. Our agency just dropped all of that stuff. I think that it was a huge
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help when we were actually using it. Everyone had an opportunity to log into
HSIN and check out the information. The last two years before I retired and no
one was using it, so I think a lot of the information sharing has stopped at least
within my department. You know our department used to send out threat-related
stuff as far as being exposed to something, like when we are responding to calls
and stuff. But they stopped sending that kind of stuff out and put it into an area
like a doc you share, so that you would have to go look it up. Guys stop going
there because they had to actually look it up and it was more of a hassle. So, as far
as the fire department is concerned, I think information sharing has gotten much
worse since APEC in 2011. Information sharing has really gotten worse as far as
dangers and things like that. (Participant 354, personal communication, October
25, 2018).
Participant 356 stated:
Again, I touched on some of these in the earlier discussions but number one,
working with the health department. They did not have I thought an active role in
the fusion center and so their information coming in was not good and their
receiving information was not good. So, again this sensitivity to tourism and
having to kind of clear everything with them before we put it into memos to the
other city agencies was an issue. But again, I learned to kind of work with them
and we learned a system to kind of keep them happy and to keep their executive
branch happy. So, we could share biological threat information and again not
necessarily biological terrorism, but just naturally occurring diseases such as flu
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and other things to make our first responders aware. (Participant 356, personal
communication, September 14, 2018).
Participant 357 stated:
The biggest lesson is the need for immediate sharing between the leadership of
the organizations that are responding. I think a really good one was again that
nuclear attack warning that we had. When that alert came out falsely within three
minutes our police chief knew that it was a false alert. That was because HPD
dispatch was extremely proactive in terms of reaching out to PACOM (U.S.
Pacific Command) to try to validate whether we actually had an incoming missile.
They found out that it was not true. So, that information flowed out to the police
officers in the field who had begun to go through communities making PA
announcements, but it did not flow to the leadership of the fire department or the
emergency services department. So, as a consequence, because we were unaware
that one of our key partners had validated that it was a false alert and because we
had not heard anything from the governor, we shut down our EMS service for 16
minutes which was protocol in that circumstance. So that could have been
avoided. So that was a big lesson learned. Thus, the effort to bring these key
decision-makers to a single text platform to share that kind of information.
(Participant 357, personal communication, September 18, 2018).
Participant 358 stated:
If the legislation actually gave me the staff that I needed it would help.
Unfortunately, this unrealistic expectation that we can monitor for the diseases,
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investigate them, stamp them out and then also establish all the protocols and
agreements and to deal with all the administrative stuff at the same time. That’s
the challenge for us. That would be the most ideal if we had staff that could work
on those things. That would be helpful. It still doesn’t obviate the need to reach
out to partners and have ongoing discussions. (Participant 358, personal
communication, October 3, 2018).
Participant 362 stated, “when my organization supported the fusion center by
putting someone in it, we were doing great things. Information was getting shared,
information from databases inside the police department was getting shared with other
agencies” (personal communication, September 17, 2018).
Participant 363 stated:
My first one was APEC. Everyone was sitting on that main floor. Everyone saw
the same information on the LEO (FBI Law Enforcement Online) board at the
same time. They were all sitting in a big room together. We had a little
intelligence cell off to the side doing classified stuff. When we found information
that we could share we popped it over onto the LEO board. Once we lost that
facility, that cohesiveness then we lost the ability to share quickly with
everybody. Everybody went back to their agency and said oh that was nice. We
saved the world from unattended packages. But that was the best information
sharing that I have ever seen. That was a good lesson learned. It was expensive
but everyone was sleeping better at night because everyone on these islands knew
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the same information at the same time. (Participant 363, personal communication,
October 4, 2018).
Participant 364 stated, “in 2011, I know that we worked with the 93rd CST a lot. I
think that we had a really good relationship with them. We also had a good relationship
with the fusion center. At that time information flowed very smoothly” (personal
communication, December 3, 2018).
Participant 365 stated, “even with all of the lessons learned from 9/11 and the
changes made, at many times there is no sense of urgency” (personal communication,
January 11, 2019).
Participant 366 stated:
I think that the last half of the year all the events that we have had in the state. I
think has helped bring folks together, but we don’t have enough resources to have
it on a continual basis and I think we saw that in December. I don’t know what we
can do about that. Because we are not going to increase their resources, so how do
we increase the support or how do we make sure that we have good support for
everything versus just a few. (Participant 366, personal communication, January
11, 2019).
Interpretation of findings for Interview Question 9. Participant responses were
analyzed according to past lessons learned at their organization that could improve the
exchange of threat-related information between public safety organizations. Eight of the
participants stated that improved information flow within and between organizations
could improve information sharing. Collaboration between organizations and the
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challenges involved in sharing confidential information also ranked in the top three
responses to this question. The chart in Figure 9 highlights the number of participants
who mentioned certain topics in their responses to Interview Question 9.
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Figure 9. Comparison of topic frequency in participants’ responses to Interview Question
9.
The most prominent theme in the responses to Interview Question 9 was
information flow within and between organizations. Eight of the participants stated that
information flow within organizations and between organizations is vital; however, many
believe that information flow has declined since the attacks of 9/11. Participant 362
stated:
Here is the biggest thing, when my organization supported the fusion center by
putting someone in it, we were doing great things. Information was getting
shared, information from databases inside the police department was getting
shared with other agencies. Other agencies information was getting shared with
the police department. This was nationwide and even worldwide. We caught
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people because we were sharing information. Now here’s the lesson, our police
department does not support the fusion center by putting someone there and that
communication has been cut off. (Participant 362, personal communication,
September 17, 2018).
Participant 354 explained:
I think the improvement on sharing information of stuff that you don’t really want
to get out to the public. The confidential information that may have to do with law
enforcement. Our agency just dropped all of that stuff. I think that it was a huge
help when we were actually using it. Everyone had an opportunity to log into
HSIN and check out the information. The last two years before I retired and no
one was using it, so I think a lot of the information sharing has stopped at least
within my department. (Participant 354, personal communication, October 25,
2018).
The second theme in the responses to this question was collaboration. Six of the
participants stated that collaboration was very important in the sharing of information.
Not only collaboration when an event happens, but ongoing collaboration between
organizations on a daily basis. The sharing of information between agencies builds a
common operational picture of the current threat environment. Several participants
believe some of the collaborative environment between agencies has declined since the
attacks of 9/11. Participant 363 pointed out that while working at the APEC event in
2011, “Everyone was sitting on that main floor. Everyone saw the same information on
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the LEO (FBI Law Enforcement Online) board at the same time. They were all sitting in
a big room together” (personal communication, October 4, 2018).
The third theme in the responses to this question centered around the complexity
of sharing confidential and protected information between public safety organizations.
Several participants indicated that confidential information inherently slows information
flow because only those individuals with a need to know can receive the information.
Often, only the leadership of organizations received the highly confidential or sensitive
information. It takes specially trained analysts additional time to filter out the confidential
content before it can be shared between agencies, if it can be shared at all. Participant 357
pointed out, “The biggest lesson is the need for immediate sharing between the leadership
of the organizations that are responding” (personal communication, September 18, 2018).
A discrepant case in the responses to this question focused on critical event
deconfliction of law enforcement active operations to ensure the safety of responders.
When undercover officers initiate field operations it is important that those operations are
deconflicted to ensure that another law enforcement agency is not targeting the same
suspect at the same time. Deconfliction is extremely important for police officer safety
but would not typically be utilized by other public safety organizations. Participant 353
described deconfliction:
I was a commander of a narcotics vice division at one time and I had a drug unit
report to me that they conducted an undercover investigation and they followed
the procedures required for a critical event deconfliction. However, when they
went to the scene that they identified they ran across their brother officers from
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HPD at the same location also in plain clothes, which was a conflict. If I
remember correctly, the plan to make a drug buy wasn’t successful because they
saw other police officers there. They recognized other police officers there in
plain clothes, so the operation was called to a halt and the supervisor there put a
hold on the investigation and pulled out. (Participant 353, personal
communication, September 18, 2018).
Interview Question 10
The question was, what is your perception of the current state of threat-related
information exchange between public safety agencies in Honolulu, Hawaii? The
following responses were provided by the interview participants.
Participant 350 stated:
I think it's really good. I really do think here in Honolulu we're doing a great job
and I say that because I witnessed it. Like I was kind of using an example of the
new techniques and tactics that we happen to use by getting police, fire, and EMS
together. To go to these just horrific events, should they ever happen, and I hope
they never happen, but to see them working together and training together for
what we hope never happens is a sign of healthy relationships. I think if you talk
about specifically sharing threat-related information and they’ve got to probably
be. I'd say probably at a 9 (on a rating scale from 1 to 10, with 1 representing low
and 10 representing a high level of information sharing) and the only reason it’s a
9 and not a 10 is that ‘threat’ is sometimes defined or perceived differently across
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those cultures you know, it's just different cultures as to what are threats.
(Participant 350, personal communication, August 9, 2018).
Participant 351 stated:
So externally when we get external products, we're able to disseminate them.
Exchange of internal information within the state then there’s a gap. We’re not
getting data. Is it improving? Well yes, it is improving. We are going to join with
WSIN. That is good. I would rate the current state of information exchange at a 3,
because if there is criminality involved it's going to get to whoever's got to
investigate the case. That's going to happen, but as far as the overall protection of
everybody it's not. (Participant 351, personal communication, August 30, 2018).
Participant 352 stated:
I think that the medical side, both EMS as well as hospitals are slowly starting to
see the importance of preparing for active threat response. I think the agencies are
a little less siloed than they used to be and I think the realization is there that this
is important but the action is not there yet. At the same time that they see it as
important and realize that we really should start doing something, that something
hasn't necessarily been defined yet or codified, and I think we still need that
mechanism for medical review of intelligence info. I think that's sort of a kind of
lynchpin, if you will, that will tie a lot of things together. I think the realizations
there just the action is slow in coming. So, I think there's good, really good
information exchange among the law enforcement side of the house. I think
there's poor information exchange between law enforcement and health. It's
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gradually getting better though. (Participant 352, personal communication,
October 3, 2018).
Participant 353 stated:
Since I am retired, I will say that before I retired I believe that it was good and on
a scale of 1 to 10, and this is anecdotal there is no scientific formula to what I
have to say, I think it would it would be high. I would say it is at least an 8,
maybe a 9. The reason I say that is because of the relationships I had and the
relationships I saw between agencies at the various levels. The meetings that we
had, the attendance at the HIDTA meetings and the attendance at the other
conferences, for example HSLEOA (Hawaii State Law Enforcement Officials
Association) conferences. I attend the FBI National Academy re-trainer every
year and the attendance is typically high. (Participant 353, personal
communication, September 18, 2018).
Participant 354 stated:
I think it is a lot less than it was during APEC in 2011. Gradually after APEC
things kind of died down and then once we pulled our personnel from the fusion
center, information I think it really went down. I tried to stay involved for a little
while and go to the FBI meetings and things like that. I also tried to push our
HAZMAT (hazardous material SMEs) guys to go, and I think they did for a
certain amount of time, but I’m not sure. So, I saw how much the information
sharing decreased. It is sad to think that something has to happen before they
realize that it is important and a help to everybody. There is no reason why we
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couldn’t have somebody partially going into the fusion center a few days a week
or something. I just can’t see what the real drawback is to that. (Participant 354,
personal communication, October 25, 2018).
Participant 356 stated:
I would give it a 7.5. I'll say an 8.0. I think there's always room for improvement.
So, here's what I base by my number on. Number one, if all agencies had an
appointed designee to the fusion center. That to me would make it have a higher
rating. If the fusion center did not have a permanent director and staff, that would
make my rating go lower, and if all agencies embraced the fusion center with
robust two-way information sharing that would make my rating go higher. If there
was funding, city, state, and federal for the fusion center that would make my
rating go higher. So, I leave it at a 7 to 8 range because I don't think we're quite
there with what I just said. But we're better I think than we were ten years ago.
So, I think to get to a 10, to be the best you can be, you have to have all the
agencies participating and if somebody's not physically there, they at least have to
be available electronically to receive and give information. All agencies have to
contribute to share reports and to receive reports and there has to be adequate
funding. At least at one or two levels, but preferably three levels of government to
ensure an adequate and robust response capability and sharing capability.
(Participant 356, personal communication, September 14, 2018).
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Participant 357 stated, “about an 8 out of 10. I think I kind of covered where we
are going to move it up to a 9, or a 10, and how we are going to do it in our earlier
conversation” (personal communication, September 18, 2018).
Participant 358 stated:
I think if we are just talking purely public safety or law enforcement with public
health, I honestly think that it is fairly good. If you threw in the emergency
management agencies, I would say that it depends. If we are just talking lawenforcement and us, I think that it is pretty good. We have a low threshold to
reach out to our law enforcement partners whether we are talking about HPD, our
state level public safety division, or FBI. I think we have a very low threshold to
reach out to them and I think vice versa. I know there is certain information that
they do not share with us and honestly, as I told the FBI guys if you don’t think it
is pertinent to the public health and it is more of a national security issue then I
don’t mind not knowing. So, but I think we have good relationships with our law
enforcement partners. (Participant 358, personal communication, October 3,
2018).
Participant 362 stated:
I would say it is a 5. When a real threat is known in an agency, secret service, or
sheriffs, or police and they find out real credible information that is definitely a
public safety issue they will put it out to the different agencies. This also goes for
fire, EMS, and public health, if they deemed that those organizations should
know. So, only if, and these cases are few and far between. That is why I say it is

158
a 5 at best. It could go up dramatically just by putting someone in the fusion
center and more than one person. One is none, two is one. Three is better. They
need an HPD lieutenant or a sergeant and some analysts to be able to really get
involved and share information. With that they would have to write a policy or
change existing policies. They have an information sharing policy right now, you
don’t do it, and the only time you can send out a report is in the records division.
They could just change that. The unit at the fusion center is authorized to share
information within their training that kind of thing. And that way the policy
wouldn’t have to be written, it could just be tweaked. (Participant 362, personal
communication, September 17, 2018).
Participant 363 stated:
I would give it a 5. Because we went from the perfect example of APEC and we
quickly digressed right back to 50% or less of information being shared that
should be shared. So, I would give it a 5. If we can get back to that model where
you don’t have a need to know, you have a need to share, or something is going to
be missed and something is going to blow up. Once we have an event again the
politicians will leave the homeless alone and not worry about saving the whales
and say, oh, we’ve got to save the people. We will be in that mode for a about a
year or two and then back to saving the whales. (Participant 363, personal
communication, October 4, 2018).
Participant 364 stated:
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On a scale of 1 to 10, I would say the current amount of information sharing is a 1
or a 2. Our department keeps all of the information at the top. Everything is held
so secret and then one person finds out and it spreads almost like a rumor and then
everyone wants to know. (Participant 364, personal communication, December 3,
2018).
Participant 365 stated, “Public safety agencies take a much lazier approach to
threat-related information due to the remote location of Hawaii; the difficulty to get in
and out of the islands undetected; and with hardened high value targets” (personal
communication, January 11, 2019).
Participant 366 stated:
Well I think that it is good. I think that the fusion center does what it can. But I
think that our real issue is, does everyone look at this, does everyone read it, does
everyone take it to heart as to what is out there? Then again, I think there is
apathy in our political leadership. To me everyone is reactive. Right now, we get
a few requests, but most folks will be reactive if something happens, versus how
do we look at this now. With the improvements that we can all do and hopefully
have better day-to-day operations, versus waiting until something happens and
then everything has to come together at once. You don’t have any say. And so, I
think that’s our biggest problem. If I were to grade it 1 to 10, I would give the
fusion center probably about an 8. But I would give the public safety folks
probably about a 4 or 5. The same for our political leadership, a 4 or a 5. We can
only do so much at the fusion center. Everyone else has to help us and that is
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where I think that we are lacking. (Participant 366, personal communication,
January 11, 2019).
Interpretation of findings for Interview Question 10. Participant responses
were analyzed according to their perception of the current state of threat-related
information exchange between public safety agencies in Honolulu. Five of the
participants stated that public safety agency participation the fusion center was a factor
that may improve information sharing. Collaboration between organizations and different
abilities of public safety organizations also ranked in the top three responses to this
question. The chart in Figure 10 highlights the number of participants who mentioned
certain topics in their responses to Interview Question 10.
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Figure 10. Comparison of topic frequency in participants’ responses to Interview
Question 10.
The most prominent theme in the responses to Interview Question 10 focused on
the Hawaii State Fusion Center. Five participants stated that consistent agency
participation in the fusion center would improve threat-related information sharing. They
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indicated that information sharing on a daily basis in a designated facility such as fusion
center is important. It is also important that information that is shared is actually
reviewed and acted upon by the agencies. Participant 366 explained, “Well I think that it
is good. I think that the fusion center does what it can. But I think that our real issue is,
does everyone look at this, does everyone read it, does everyone take it to heart”
(personal communication, January 11, 2019).
Participant 362 stated, “it is a 5 at best. It could go up dramatically just by putting
someone in the fusion center, and more than one person. One is none, two is one. Three is
better” (personal communication, September 17, 2018).
Participant 363 stated, “I would give it a 5. Because we went from the perfect
example of APEC and we quickly digressed right back to 50% or less of information
being shared that should be shared. So, I would give it a 5” (Personal communication,
October 4, 2018).
Participant 356 stated:
I would give it a 7.5. I'll say an 8.0. I think there's always room for improvement.
So, here's what I base by my number on. Number one, if all agencies had an
appointed designee to the fusion center. That to me would make it have a higher
rating. If the fusion center did not have a permanent director and staff, that would
make my rating go lower, and if all agencies embraced the fusion center with
robust two-way information sharing, that would make my rating go higher.
(Participant 356, personal communication, September 14, 2018).
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The second theme in the responses to this question was the collaboration between
agencies. Many of the participants believed that there was collaboration between agencies
due to relationships between individuals in different organizations, but it was not
consistent and ongoing. Agencies seemed to collaborate when needed on a certain case or
event and then regress back into a non-sharing environment when the event was over.
Participant 353 stated:
Since I am retired, I will say that before I retired, I believe that it was good and on
a scale of 1 to 10, and this is anecdotal there is no scientific formula to what I
have to say, I think it would it would be high. I would say it is at least an 8,
maybe a 9. The reason I say that is because of the relationships I had and the
relationships I saw between agencies at the various levels. (Participant 353,
personal communication, September 18, 2018).
The third theme in the answers to this question centered around the different
abilities of public safety organizations. Several of the participants stated that different
public safety organizations have expertise in different areas of public safety. As an
example, the Honolulu Fire Department hazardous materials experts may be aware of a
threat or hazard (e.g. toxic chemical release) that law enforcement and/or EMS personnel
may be unaware of. Participant 358 explained:
I was recently meeting with the new point of contact for us with the FBI who
heads up their WMD (weapons of mass destruction) program. We were meeting
to just touch base. Generally, when you have a good relationship with law
enforcement and public safety, I think that it is important to have an ongoing
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discussion. Because there may be things that they are aware of that they don’t
realize to let us know about and visa-versa. I gave him a whole bunch of real-life
examples of where I may not know if there is anything that they might be
interested in. So, I said to him, look if you hear about something please don’t
hesitate to reach out to me and ask me, have we considered this, or is there any
potential for law enforcement issues or security issues that they need to be aware
of. (Participant 358, personal communication, October 3, 2018).
Nine participants ranked what they believed to be the current state of threatrelated information sharing between public safety organizations in Honolulu. This
ranking was based on a rating scale of 1 to 10, with 1 representing low and 10
representing a high level of information sharing. This was very interesting because
several of the participants were firm in their rankings in the lower ranges between 1 and
3, and other participants believed information sharing between agencies was actually very
good by ranking in the 8 to 9 range. The average of the nine participant’s rankings was
5.9.
Summary
Chapter 4 highlighted multiple aspects of public safety organizations in Honolulu
sharing threat-related information. All participants agreed that information sharing
between public safety organizations has improved since the attacks of 9/11; however,
many of the participants felt that there is more work that needs to be done. This research
uncovered four overarching themes.
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The first overarching theme in the data focused on the flow of information within
and between agencies. Several participants stated that information did not flow smoothly
within their departments and consequently out to other organizations. The problem
seemed to be intensified by information being shared only during intermittent urgent
situations rather than establishing an ongoing information sharing environment. A lack of
ongoing collaboration between public safety organizations was the second overarching
theme in the data. An ongoing collaborative environment allows multiple agencies with
different perspectives to view the threat information and analyze it from different points
of view in real-time. Agency participation with the state fusion center was the third
overarching theme. Many of the participants stated that it is important that their agency
participate in the state fusion center, so that threat-related information can be
disseminated across all public safety agencies simultaneously. The complexity of sharing
confidential and protected information between public safety organizations was the fourth
overarching theme. Often, threat-related data contains confidential personal identifiable
information (PII), and/or protected health information (PHI), or sensitive information
pertaining to ongoing law-enforcement investigations and therefore can be difficult to
share.
Chapter 5 will discuss ramifications of the data collected and recommendations to
improve the sharing of threat-related information between public safety agencies in
Honolulu. It includes sections on interpretations of the findings, limitations and
delimitations of the study, recommendations, implications, and a concise conclusion.
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations
The purpose of this qualitative exploratory case study was to explore the benefits
and challenges of sharing threat-related information between public safety agencies (law
enforcement, fire, EMS, and public health) in Honolulu, Hawaii. I focused on Honolulu
for several reasons. It is a moderate-sized city and faces many of the same challenges as
other cities in the continental United States, including the need to share information
across agencies to manage emerging threat-related issues. However, Honolulu is unique
because of its isolation, being approximately 2,500 miles from the mainland. As a result,
there is an increased need to ensure interagency communication is occurring to facilitate
the region’s ability to manage a large-scale public safety event without immediate
assistance from other states.
The gap in the literature is that researchers do not know how public safety
organizations communicate threat-related information at the local level. Because it is
essential that agencies communicate threat-related information effectively, due to their
unique situation, an exploratory case study of Honolulu public safety agencies served as
an excellent opportunity for this research. The findings provided a unique understanding
of how public safety organizations that currently share threat-related information have
encountered challenges and how these challenges may differ between organizations. I
determined that a qualitative research design was the best method to answer this study’s
research questions. I collected data through interviews with SMEs, either currently active
or recently retired from four different fields of public safety in Honolulu. The primary
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source of data was gathered from conversational style discussions with participants
utilizing open-ended questions.
Interpretation of Findings
The findings of this study clearly identified several important themes related to
sharing threat-related information between public safety organizations in Honolulu,
Hawaii. The findings also confirmed my rationale for using the conceptual framework of
general systems theory (“General Systems Theory,” 2014) in that the theory effectively
described how information is exchanged between public safety organizations to protect
the population from attacks. The theory also provided a conceptual platform to explore
the specific research questions of this study.
General system theory is often described as “the trans disciplinary study of the
abstract organization of phenomena, independent of their substance, type, or spatial or
temporal scale of existence” (“Communication Theories,” 2019, p. 32). Systems are
essentially a set of objects, or variables “that affect one another within an environment
and form a larger pattern that is different from any of the parts” (“Communication
Theories,” 2019, p. 32). Because elements in systems are constantly interacting with one
another, when one part of a system changes it results in a change somewhere else within
the system (“Communication Theories,” 2019, p. 32).
In the literature review for this study, the article entitled “Surveillance and
Resilience in Theory and Practice” by Raab et al. (2015) indicated that “a system may not
only react to environmental effects by changing its internal properties or organization, but
also act on and change its environment, bringing about a new relationship or a new
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equilibrium” (p. 26). A general systems framework is effective at illuminating complex
collaborative relationships between public safety organizations in rapidly changing
environments.
In the article entitled “Practical Challenges of Systems Thinking and Modeling in
Public Health,” William et al., (2006) explained that utilizing a systems perspective along
with incorporating systems modeling in public health could eventually lead to better and
more effective public health organizations across the nation. William et al., stated
“ambitious attempts are under way to focus practitioners on improving overall system
performance” (p. 540). Systems theory is useful when studying the organizational
changes and development of a community’s public safety system because it allows the
researcher to explore the interconnection between individual agencies or subsystems.
When public safety organizations within the same region share relevant threat
information with one another, it prompts other agencies within that region to prepare for
or possibly counter the threat (Carter et al., 2017). Government public safety agencies
work together as a system to protect the public (“Public Safety,” 2011). Therefore, if
miscommunication of threat-related information occurs in one agency within a system, it
can lead to poor operational decisions being made in another agency within the system,
and potentially lead to a failure of the system to protect the public.
A careful review of the literature helped me determine the relevant challenges of
sharing threat-related information. Public safety agencies across the United States extract
threat-related information from the Internet and other openly available sources (Chermak
et al., 2013). The challenge is how to effectively share this information between public
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safety agencies (Carter & Rip, 2013). Currently, there is not a clear understanding of the
benefits and challenges of information sharing between local public safety agencies,
based on my review of the literature. There appears to be extensive data about how
federal agencies exchange threat-related information (e.g., Bharosa, Lee, & Janssen,
2010; Carter et al., 2017; Vacca, 2019), yet there is a lack of information about how local
public safety agencies share this same type of data.
Public safety systems are complex, involving large numbers of highly trained
professionals interacting with multiple organizations and the general public on a
continual basis. Kozuch and Sienkiewicz-Malyjurek (2015) point out that “the process of
information sharing in complex systems is multi-dimensional, asymmetrical and
dynamic” (p. 727). It involves numerous organizations within local public safety systems
communicating effectively on multiple levels to deliver accurate information to the first
responders when needed. Many public safety organizations across the United States share
information through emergency management agencies and other associations, such as
state fusion centers, which were specifically developed to improve coordination and
information exchange (Stone, 2015). This information exchange occurs in various forms
depending on the organizations involved and the interagency communication structure of
the local municipalities.
In theory, local public safety agencies have excellent interagency communication
and respond effectively when a public safety event happens. Yet, it is not known if this is
the case because minimal research has been done in this area (Chermak et al., 2013).
Threat-related information sharing between local agencies is proving to be much more
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difficult than it once appeared. What scholars do not know from the current literature are
the challenges local public safety agencies face when sharing threat-related information
between one another for the purpose of providing public safety. This lack of knowledge
is problematic because local agencies hold the primary responsibility of responding to
violent public safety threats. Scholars do not fully understand the benefits and challenges
of collaboration among these agencies due to “relatively minimal scholarly attention” to
this issue (Carter et al., 2017, p. 1).
There is reliable information in the literature about the sharing of information between federal and local agencies, but there is a lack of knowledge of information sharing
between local agencies. Local public safety agencies are on the front lines of the struggle
against terrorism and targeted violence and are literally the nation’s first layer of defense.
It is not just threat-related information sharing between law enforcement agencies that is
important; we need to see this communication across all public safety agencies including
fire services, EMS, and public health. This study identified four important themes related
to sharing threat-related information between public safety organizations in Honolulu,
Hawaii: 1) information flow within and between public safety organizations, 2)
collaboration between public safety organizations, 3) participation with the state fusion
center, and 4) the complexity of sharing confidential and protected information between
public safety organizations.
The most prominent theme focused on information flow within and between
public safety organizations. Data from this study’s literature review reveled that
information flow within public safety organizations is a complex process. Kozuch and
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Sienkiewicz-Malyjurek (2015) pointed out, “The process of information sharing in
complex systems is multi-dimensional, asymmetrical and dynamic” (p.727). It involves
numerous organizations within local public safety systems communicating effectively on
multiple levels to deliver accurate information to the first responders when needed.
Participants from several Honolulu public safety organizations were concerned that
information did not flow smoothly within their departments and subsequently out to other
organizations. Although most participants acknowledged that when urgent events
occurred, information flow ramped up between public safety organizations to address the
event. Once the event was concluded however, information flow subsided back to a less
than ideal level.
What appears to be missing is a constant and ongoing exchange of threat-related
information, which was independent of urgent threat events. Several study participants
were concerned that much of the information may not flow effectively from the
administrative level to the operations level. Also, a concern was that the information was
filtered as it moved down through the organization and across to other agencies. This
filtering of information may potentially leave out important details other organizations
could use to identify threats to the public.
The study participants were concerned that if information is not shared on a
continual basis, threat-related information may become siloed within an organization.
After an urgent event happens, unfortunately it is too late to analyze threat-related
information that might have been used to prevent the event at the outset. Data from this
study’s literature review demonstrated that predictive analysis may assist in defusing
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events before they occur. Taylor and Russell (2011) explained, “The strategic integration
of intelligence, with an emphasis on predictive analysis derived from the discovery of
hard facts, information, patterns, and good crime analysis defines intelligence-led
policing” (p. 185). Relying solidly on information technology, intelligence lead policing
may help combat crime by significantly increasing intelligence decision-making
(Bharosa, Lee, and Janssen, 2010). Agencies in Honolulu are currently communicating
via an information flow within and between organizations; however, this flow of
information is intermittent. Establishing an ongoing information sharing environment
between organizations is necessary to ensure that information is effectively shared in an
all situations.
The second important theme identified in the study focused on collaboration
between public safety organizations. When organizations collaborate on a regular basis it
allows information to be shared and viewed from different perspectives in real-time. This
allows organizations a common operating picture of emerging threats. Participants stated
that a significant benefit of sharing information is this continuous awareness of threats to
the public. Some participants believed that there was collaboration between agencies due
to relationships between individuals in different organizations, but it was not consistent
and ongoing. Agencies seemed to collaborate when needed on a certain case or event, and
then regress back into a non-sharing environment when the event was over. Several
participants stated that ongoing collaboration was vitally important to public safety but
was often overlooked due to personnel shortages and the daily race to keep up with
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operational workloads. Because agencies have different skills and expertise it is
important that they actively collaborate on the analysis of threat-related information.
The third important theme was participation with the state fusion center. State
fusion centers’ principal mission across the nation is to share information between law
enforcement and public safety organizations at the federal, state, and local level. All
participants were aware of the state fusion center, but not all organizations assigned
personnel to the fusion center. Data from this study’s literature review confirmed that
participation with state fusion centers nationwide is increasing. Taylor and Russell (2011)
argued since the attacks of 911 there are now hundreds of government and private
organizations involved in homeland security and intelligence collection activities. They
pointed out that before the attacks, sharing of intelligence between public safety agencies
was severely lacking (p. 184). Currently, public safety agencies throughout the nation are
beginning to participate in the nationwide network of fusion centers in an effort to better
protect the public.
Some Honolulu public safety organizations have a long history of holding
information within the agency. Long-held organizational cultural beliefs that law
enforcement information should stay within law enforcement agencies is difficult to
change. Participant 353 explained:
Sharing of information between public safety organizations, or for that matter
within units within an organization is a newer phenomenon. I will tell you 30
years ago people didn’t tell anyone about their investigations, they would not to
tell other people within the police department for example, or they wouldn’t tell
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federal law enforcement or other state agencies. They just didn’t tell anyone
because it was a need to know situation. (Participant 353, personal
communication, September 18, 2018).
Ongoing agency participation with the state fusion center is vitally important in
order to allow threat-related information to be analyzed by multiple agencies with
different skills and then disseminated across all public safety agencies simultaneously.
The final theme in this study was the complexity of sharing confidential and
protected information between public safety organizations. Often, threat-related data
contains very confidential PII and/or PHI, or information pertaining to ongoing lawenforcement investigations. Data from this study’s literature review demonstrated that
health and medical issues are extremely important to the safety of the public and many
public safety organizations integrate medical analysts into their analytical staff to assist in
the sharing of health-related information (Carter and Rip, 2012). However, this type of
information can be difficult to share to other parties. Federal regulations such as the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) and the Family
Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FIRPA) come into play, which can impede
information sharing. Ongoing law enforcement investigations containing sensitive
criminal data may also impede the process of sharing threat-related information between
organizations. Threat-related information often contains highly protected, or law
enforcement sensitive information, and is difficult to share between agencies. It is
important that agencies develop a policy-based process, through ongoing collaboration, to
share this sensitive information.

174
There is a chance that poor information flow, poor collaboration, and inadequate
participation in fusion centers could possibly allow another catastrophic man-made
terrorist event to occur. This type of catastrophe would likely temporarily improve
interagency threat-related information sharing due to an increase in national security
concerns by all public safety professionals involved. Nonetheless, eventually, the country
would lapse back into mediocrity and the cycle would continue. The eventual retirement
of public safety officials with decision-making authority would be replaced by those that
do not see prevention as important as those that were involved in the last catastrophic
event. Other concerns and issues in organizations, such as organizational growth, fiscal
budgets, hiring new employees, etc., will become the priorities pushing aside the priority
of information gathering and sharing, collaboration, and fusion center participation.
The results of this study will create positive social change by identifying the benefits and challenges of sharing threat-related information between local public safety agencies. As public safety organizations throughout the nation develop their ability to share
threat-related information, they should review lessons learned from organizations examined in this study that have faced this important and complex undertaking. Horrific events
such as the Boston marathon bombing (Hu et al, 2014), the Paris attacks (“BBC News,”
2105) and the assault on the Las Vegas Harvest Music Festival (Bui et al., 2017) are a
stark reminder that individuals with aspirations of violence can strike without warning.
With targeted violent attacks on the rise globally, it is even more critical to effectively
share threat-related information between public safety organizations.
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Limitations of the Study
Several limitations were identified in the study. All of the participants worked in
public safety organizations and routinely dealt with sensitive information in one form or
the other. This may consist of law enforcement sensitive information pertaining to
ongoing criminal cases. It could also include PII and/or PHI, such as health status,
prescription medications, or other health-related data. Therefore, it was important that the
participants ensured the information they shared during the interviews did not include any
form of sensitive data related to an individual or an agency. Another limitation to the
study was the lack of review of internal agency documentation. I had access to publicly
available documents but was not allowed access to internal agency policy documents.
Delimitations of the Study
A delimitation for this study focused on the sample selection. SMEs from four
public safety organizations located in Honolulu, Hawaii, were selected. Patton (2002)
pointed out that qualitative research sample size “depends on what you want to know, the
purpose of the inquiry, what’s at stake, what will be useful, what will have credibility,
and what can be done with available time and resources” (p.244). This study purposely
did not collect information from across the entire nation, as the enormous dataset would
be unmanageable.
The intent and design of this study was to capture the experiences of SMEs in
public safety organizations within a particular region. Individuals who had at least 15
years of experience sharing threat-related information between public safety
organizations in Honolulu were selected as participants. Some individuals that had
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recently retired were included as long as they met the research study selection criteria.
This research was an opportunity to capture extensive institutional knowledge from these
retired public safety SMEs before the knowledge was lost forever. Further, research for
this study was collected from a limited number of participants in Honolulu, Hawaii.
Different perspectives and factors could have been received from the interview if
additional participants were included from other regions of the country. Consequently,
different experiences may have been disclosed.
Recommendations
This focus of this study was on public safety organizations in Honolulu, Hawaii.
Honolulu is a mid-sized modern metropolitan city. It faces many of the same challenges
as other cities in the continental U.S., including the need to share information across
agencies to deal with emerging threat-related issues. However, Honolulu is unique
because unlike other cities it is remotely isolated, being approximately 2,500 miles from
the mainland. As a result, there is an increased need to ensure interagency
communication is occurring to facilitate the regions ability to deal with a large-scale
public safety event without immediate assistance from other states. Understanding how
threat information is shared in Honolulu is critical because of its isolation. The findings
of this study will help to fill a gap in literature by determining the benefits and challenges
of sharing threat-related information between public safety organizations in Honolulu,
Hawaii.
Currently, there is plenty of data in the literature about how threat-related
information sharing at the federal level has improved since the terror attacks of 9/11
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(Bharosa, Lee, & Janssen, 2010; Carter et al., 2017; Vacca, 2019). What is not clear are
the challenges local public safety agencies face when sharing threat-related information
between one another. This is problematic because local agencies hold the primary
responsibility of responding to public safety threats. We do not fully understand the
benefits and challenges of collaboration among these agencies due to “relatively minimal
scholarly attention” to this issue (Carter et al., 2017, p. 1). This study helped to uncover
the information sharing challenges public safety organizations face in Honolulu, Hawaii;
however, there is much more work to be done throughout the rest of the nation.
It is recommended that other mid-size cities throughout the nation conduct similar
research to uncover the benefits and challenges of sharing threat-related information
between public safety organizations within their regions. Research at the local level is
also needed to uncover the benefits and challenges of sharing information between public
and private organizations within their regions. Once there is a significant data set
available for comprehensive analysis, researchers could offer recommendations on how
to improve threat-related information sharing at the local level nationwide.
Implications
Publishing the results of this study via Walden University and ProQuest, as well
as sharing the research with Honolulu public safety organizations, may stimulate critical
discussion of the necessity for optimal information sharing environments. Positive social
change may occur through the identification of the benefits and challenges of sharing
threat-related information between local public safety organizations. As public safety
organizations throughout the nation develop their ability to share threat-related
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information, they should review lessons learned from organizations examined in this
study that have faced this important and complex undertaking.
Attacks such as the Boston marathon bombing (Hu et al, 2014), and the assault on
the Las Vegas Harvest Music Festival (Bui et al., 2017) are a clear reminder that
individuals with aspirations of violence can strike without warning. With targeted violent
attacks on the rise globally (Hesterman, 2019) it is even more critical to effectively share
threat-related information between public safety organizations. All public safety agencies
must overcome the obstacles that keep them from sharing threat-related information
effectively in order to better protect the public from attacks.
I found that Honolulu Public Safety agencies are currently communicating
through information flow within and between organizations; however, this flow of
information is intermittent. Several problems stem from information being shared only
during urgent situations. Establishing an ongoing information sharing environment
between organizations is necessary to ensure that information is effectively shared in all
situations. Because public safety agencies have different skills and expertise, it is
important that they actively collaborate on the analysis of threat-related information.
I also found that threat-related information often contains highly protected, or law
enforcement sensitive information, and is difficult to share between agencies. It is
important that agencies develop a policy-based process, through ongoing agency
collaboration, to share this sensitive information. The implication is that ongoing agency
participation with the state fusion center is vitally important to allow threat-related
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information to be analyzed by multiple agencies with different skills and expertise, and
then disseminated across all public safety agencies simultaneously.
The 9/11 Commission, shortly after the terrorist attacks of September 11th
published recommendations to help protect the nation from another major terrorist attack.
Many of these recommendations focused directly on information sharing between public
safety agencies (“State & Major Urban,” 2014). Since the 9/11 attacks, federal, state, and
local governments have invested billions of dollars and countless work hours in an
attempt to protect the public from violent attacks. Threat-related information sharing at
the federal level has improved since the tragic events of 9/11; however, there is a lack of
information on how local public safety agencies share this same type of information.
Therefore, it is vitally important that more research is focused on this topic, because
rather than violent attacks on the public decreasing from year to year throughout the
nation, they are increasing at an alarming rate.
Conclusion
Horrendous attacks such as the Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School shooting
(Chuck, Johnson, & Siemaszkoin, 2018) in Parkland, Florida, clearly demonstrate that
individuals who strive to commit violence can strike anywhere without warning, whether
they are recruited and trained by extremist organizations or self-motivated. Local public
safety organizations must work together to adapt to this new asymmetrical threat
environment. Local threat-related information gathering and sharing capabilities must be
improved between the public safety organizations who are tasked with the responsibility
of keeping the public safe.
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The responsibility to keep the public free from violent attacks cannot be assigned
solely to federal agencies or even to local law enforcement organizations. It must be a
shared responsibility between multiple agencies. As one of the participants in this study
so articulately pointed out, “It is going to take all of us to be responsive, not just one
agency. Security is not one agency’s responsibility, it is all of our responsibility”
(Participant 366, personal communication, January 11, 2019).
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Appendix A: Invitation to Participate
Date: ___________
Dear: ___________
Thank you for your interest in my dissertation research, to identify and explore the
benefits and challenges of sharing threat-related information between public safety
agencies in Honolulu, Hawaii. The purpose of this letter is to go over some important
issues and to obtain your signature on the attached Informed Consent form.
I will be utilizing an exploratory qualitative process that will allow me to capture a
comprehensive description of your experience. I hope to answer the following:
RQ1. How are public safety agencies communicating threat-related information
between one another in Honolulu, Hawaii?
RQ2. What are the benefits and challenges of sharing threat-related information
between public safety agencies in Honolulu, Hawaii?
RQ3. What can be done to improve the sharing of threat-related information between public safety agencies in Honolulu, Hawaii?
Specifically, I am looking for your thoughts and feelings about the benefits and
challenges of sharing threat-related information between public safety agencies in
Honolulu and what can be done to improve information exchange between these
agencies.
All of the information you share with me will be stored in a secure manner. Any
demographic information that may connect you to the information will be removed. A
copy of your transcript will be e-mailed to you for review and you can make any
revisions you feel are necessary, prior to it being entered into the study.
I value your participation and contribution to my study and thank you for your
commitment of personal time. If you have any further questions or concerns feel free to
contact me at [telephone number redacted], or [e-mail address redacted].
Sincerely,
Cort M. Chambers
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Appendix B: Interview Protocol
Part I: Overview
Overview
1. Interviews recorded (with permission)
2. Interview conducted in a neutral setting
3. Interview time period 60 to 90 minutes
Interview Methodology
The methodology involved in this research study will include conversational style indepth interviews. Follow-up questions used to stimulate conversation, if needed. A semi
structured question design will be utilized. Interviews will include:
1. 10 predetermined questions
2. Identical questions for all participants
Location of Interview: To be determined
Date: To be determined
Start Time: Prearranged time
Finish Time: 60 to 90 minutes
Part II: Interview Components
1. Interview Components
a. Introduction
b. Consent and confidentiality agreement review
c. Interview
2. Purpose of the interview
The purpose of the research was to explore the benefits and challenges of sharing threatrelated information between public safety agencies (law enforcement, fire services, EMS,
and public health) in Honolulu, Hawaii
3. Permission to record interview
I would like to tape-record our discussion, with your permission. Only I will have access
to the recording. No responses will be ascribed to you by name. The research results will
describe in summary what is said during the conversation. The recording will be erased
after the dissertation is completed.
The interview will consist of open-ended questions intended to obtain your personal
experience and perceptions. The interview is scheduled to last 60 to 90 minutes. If you
agree to participate in this research process, please sign the informed consent agreement.
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Part III: Interview Questions
1. What are the benefits of sharing threat-related information between public safety
agencies in Honolulu, Hawaii?
2. How does sharing threat-related information between public safety organizations
help identify and prevent threats to the public?
3. How does communication software play a role in the sharing of threat-related
information?
4. What are the challenges of sharing threat-related information between public
safety agencies in Honolulu, Hawaii?
5. Please describe the top three barriers, at your organization, to sharing threatrelated information between public safety organizations.
6. How does politics play a role in the sharing of threat-related information between
public safety organizations?
7. What can be done to improve the sharing of threat-related information between
public safety agencies in Honolulu, Hawaii?
8. What role could agency policies, within your organization, play in improving the
sharing of threat-related information?
9. Please describe any past lessons learned at your organization that could improve
the exchange of threat-related information between public safety organizations.
10. What is your perception of the current state of threat-related information
exchange between public safety agencies in Honolulu, Hawaii?
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Appendix C: Chart Linking Research Questions to Interview Questions
Interview questions
1. What are the benefits of sharing threat-related
information between public safety agencies in
Honolulu, Hawaii?
2. How does sharing threat-related information
between public safety organizations help identify
and prevent threats to the public?
3. How does communication software play a role in
the sharing of threat-related information?
4. What are the challenges of sharing threat-related
information between public safety agencies in
Honolulu, Hawaii?
5. Please describe the top three barriers, at your
organization, to sharing threat-related information
between public safety organizations.
6. How does politics play a role in the sharing of
threat-related information between public safety
organizations?
7. What can be done to improve the sharing of
threat-related information between public safety
agencies in Honolulu, Hawaii?
8. What role could agency policies, within your
organization, play in improving the sharing of
threat-related information?
9. Please describe any past lessons learned at your
organization that could improve the exchange of
threat-related information between public safety
organizations.
10. What is your perception of the current state of
threat-related information exchange between
public safety agencies in Honolulu, Hawaii?

RQ1
RQ1

RQ2

RQ3

RQ1(a)
RQ1(b)
RQ2
RQ2(a)
RQ2(b)
RQ3
RQ3(a)
RQ3(b)

RQ3(c)
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Appendix D: Coding Protocol
A process of coding will be utilized to assist with the process of analyzing the
data. The key to coding is to allow themes to emerge from the data that makes sense to
the researcher. Creswell (2013) stated that researchers should develop a codebook for
each research study. To ensure that I have captured the essence of the of the interviews I
will use a coding strategy that consists of first reading through all of the transcripts to get
a deep understanding of what took place in the interviews. I will also thoroughly review
my written notes, making memos of important facts and details.
The next step will include classifying the data. Creswell (2013) pointed out
“coding involves aggregating text into small categories of information” and then
assigning an appropriate label (p. 184). I will then develop a short list of codes, or a
codebook, which will be expanded upon as I continue processing the data (Creswell,
2013). Lastly, I will separate all the codes into four or five overarching themes that will
assist me while writing my discussion and narrative of the data. I will utilize NVivo
computer software throughout the coding process.
Reference
Creswell, J. W. (2013) Qualitative inquiry and research design: Choosing among five
approaches (3rd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications.
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Appendix E: Code Book
Code name
Information flow
Between state and county
Co-locate dispatch

Communication
Include decision makers
Information sharing in real time
Less information than before
Right information to right people
Sharing information internally
Withholding information
Threat information not acted
upon
Collaboration
After action report
Agencies are equally invested
Coordinated response
Coordination of resources
Engagement with the visitor
industry
Everyone on the same page

Description

Sources

References

The consistent and effective
exchange of information
Information sharing between
state and county organizations
Locating the 911 dispatch
centers for all public safety
organizations in the same
location
Effective communication
between organizations
Include decision makers in the
decision-making process
Information sharing in realtime
Agencies are sharing less
information
Ensuring the right information
gets to the right people within
a public safety organization
Sharing information internally
within a public safety
organization
Threat-related information is
withheld/not shared for some
reason
Threat related information is
not acted upon by a public
safety organization
Working with another
organization cooperatively to
achieve a goal
Agencies complete after action
reports
Agencies are equally invested
Agencies coordinate response
to incidents
Agencies coordinate their
resources during a response
Agencies engage with the
Hawaii visitor industry
All agencies on the same page
(coordinated) during an
incident

13

97

4

8

1

2

4

7

2

9

7

13

4

6

8

19

6

13

6

14

6

10

13

70

1

1

5
6

6
9

4

7

1

1

11

30

(table continues)
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Code name

Description

Sources

References

Common operating picture

Common operating picture, all
agencies have the same
operating information in realtime during an incident
Agencies work together as one
Agencies are obligated to
share threat related
information
State agency - primary
purpose is analysis and sharing
of threat-related information
Identifying gaps related to
threat-related information
sharing
Threat Team Oahu
Determining if a potential
threat is valid
Information that is sensitive or
protected
Agencies have personnel that
have the proper national
security clearances to view
classified information

3

6

8
1

12
1

11

56

1

1

1
3

1
5

12

48

2

3

Confidential information leaks
to people outside public safety
Confidential information leaks
to the news media

7

15

4

9

Law enforcement confidential
informants
Individuals within public
safety organizations that have
a need to know
sensitive/confidential
information
Individuals within public
safety organizations should be
properly vetted to handle
sensitive/confidential
information
Individuals within public
safety organizations know
when to share confidential
information

1

2

3

8

5

5

3

5

Interoperability
Obligated to share
Fusion center
Identifying gaps
TTO
Validating threats
Confidential information
Clearances

Goes to the wrong people
Gets out to the news media

Law enforcement confidential
informants
Need to know

People must be vetted

Understand when to share
confidential information
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Code name
Agency culture
Allocation of funding
Buy in
Control over information
Wants the credit
Different abilities
Different jargon
Different knowledge base

Different perspectives

Medical perspective

Policy
Accountability
Discipline for not following
policy
FIRPA

Not enforcing policy

Description

(table continues)
Sources References

The culture within the
organization
Allocation of funding

11

45

1

1

Agency willingness to actively
participate
Attempting to control
information
Agency seeks credit for
accomplishments
Public safety agencies have
different skillsets and unique
areas of expertise
Public safety agencies use
different and unique jargon
within their organizations
Public Safety agencies hold
different and unique
knowledge base within their
organizations
Public Safety agencies have
different perspectives
depending on their field of
public safety
Individuals with medical
training can view situations
with a health/medical
perspective
Policy issues within a public
safety organization
Public safety organizations are
accountable for their actions
Public safety organizations
personnel are disciplined for
not following policy
Family Educational Rights and
Privacy Act (FERPA), Federal
law that protects the privacy of
student education records
Public safety organizations
that do not enforce their
personnel to follow the
organizations policy

7

17

7

12

5

8

11

38

1

2

5

8

5

10

7

17

11

29

2

2

1

1

1

1

2

3

(table continues)
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Code name
Responder safety
Police
Fire
EMS
Secure websites

HSIN
LEEP
Politics
Political will to share
information
Unions
Training
Cross training of personnel
Lack of training
Training together
Electronic communication
Email
Push notifications to the public
Virtual communication
Safety of the public
HIDTA
WSIN
Personnel shortage
Lack of finances

Description

Sources

References

The safety of a public safety
organizations responders
Police officer safety
Fire fighter safety
Paramedic safety
Websites that have enhanced
security features to ensure
only vetted individuals can
access
Homeland security
information network
Law enforcement enterprise
portal
Activities associated with
local governance
An organization’s political
will to share information
A labor union or trade union
Information sharing training
Training personnel across
agencies to perform duties
A lack of training pertaining to
information sharing
Agencies training together
Communication using
electronic devices
Information sharing through
email
Information is shared to a
wide audience via text
messages to the public
Webcasts/virtual meetings
The safety of the public
High intensity drug trafficking
area – A federal law
enforcement program
Western states information
network - A federal law
enforcement program
Lack of personnel
Lack of budget

10

28

5
4
4
10

11
7
13
24

3

3

1

1

9

21

3

3

3
5
1

5
20
2

3

6

1
8

1
18

1

2

3

4

2
7
3

2
15
12

2

6

8
8

11
11

(table continues)
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Code name
Deconfliction

Software
Cyber attack
Hacking
eGuardian
Misallocation of resources
Misallocation of human capital
Homeless
Meetings
Discussions
Social media
Misinformation
APEC

Single point of failure
Education
View threat info as LE

See something say something

Description

Sources

References

The attempt to reduce the
possibility of undercover law
enforcement personnel
accidently encountering each
other by sharing information
on their operational
movements
Digital programs used by a
computer
Digital software attack
gaining of unauthorized access
to a computer
Federal law enforcement web
portal
Resources are not put to the
best use
Human capital is not put to its
best use
Individuals who have no
permanent residence
Formal meetings between
public safety agencies
Informal discussions among
agency representatives
Websites that allow users to
participate in sharing social
information
Inaccurate information
Asian pacific economic
cooperation a regional
economic meeting involving
world leaders
An individual, or part of a
system, which if fails may
cause the entire system to fail
Training in information
sharing
An individual or organization
that views threat information
as a law enforcement
responsibility
National see something say
something campaign

3

10

5

9

2
1

2
1

1

1

5

9

3

5

2

7

2

6

2

3

3

5

2
3

2
5

2

4

2

3

3

3

3

3

(table continues)
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Code name
Non-law enforcement left out

SLEC
Lack of time
JTTF

Description

Sources

References

Agencies that are not
responsible for law
enforcement responsibilities
are not given threat-related
information
Hawaii state law enforcement
coalition
Not enough time to complete
operational tasks
Joint terrorism task force - A
federal law enforcement
program

1

2

1

2

1

1

1

1
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Appendix F: Field Test
Dear_____________
I would first like to sincerely thank you for participating in this doctoral field test.
I am currently in the process of completing dissertation research on the benefits and
challenges of sharing threat-related information between public safety agencies in
Honolulu, Hawaii.
The general overarching problem addressed in this study is the importance of
communication between public safety agencies as they deal with serious emerging threatrelated issues such as terrorism. It is unknown whether there are challenges or benefits to
sharing threat-related information between local public safety agencies in the United
States. The findings of this study will help to fill this gap in the literature by determining
the perceived benefits and challenges of sharing threat-related information between
public safety agencies in Honolulu, Hawaii.
Multiple factors affect the sharing of information between public safety organizations
including technical and political issues, as well as the lack of communication and
coordination between agencies. These problems will be addressed in this research by
examining how public safety agencies share threat-related information between one
another. The intention is to explore any possible issues that might reduce their ability to
prevent terror attacks.
The theoretical framework that I am using for this study is General Systems Theory.
For this research I hope to answer the following Research Questions:
RQ1. How are public safety agencies communicating threat-related information
between one another in Honolulu, Hawaii?
RQ2. What are the benefits and challenges of sharing threat-related information
between public safety agencies in Honolulu, Hawaii?
RQ3. What can be done to improve the sharing of threat-related information between public safety agencies in Honolulu, Hawaii?
I plan to ask the following Interview Questions to the participants:
1. What are the benefits of sharing threat-related information between public safety
agencies in Honolulu, Hawaii?
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2. How does sharing threat-related information between public safety organizations
help identify and prevent threats to the public?
3. How does communication software play a role in the sharing of threat-related information?
4. What are the challenges of sharing threat-related information between public
safety agencies in Honolulu, Hawaii?
5. Please describe the top three barriers, at your organization, to sharing threatrelated information between public safety organizations.
6. How does politics play a role in the sharing of threat-related information between
public safety organizations?
7. What can be done to improve the sharing of threat-related information between
public safety agencies in Honolulu, Hawaii?
8. What role could agency policies, within your organization, play in improving the
sharing of threat-related information?
9. Please describe any past lessons learned at your organization that could improve
the exchange of threat-related information between public safety organizations.
10. What is your perception of the current state of threat-related information exchange between public safety agencies in Honolulu, Hawaii?
By conducting this research, I hope to explore the benefits and challenges that exist in
sharing threat-related information between public safety organizations. Experienced
public safety officials will be interviewed utilizing open-ended questions.
Please record below any suggestions that you have regarding the purpose of this study,
the proposed research questions, proposed interview questions, or the process for
capturing data. Please add additional pages if needed.
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
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________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
Please return the form with your feedback in the enclosed postage paid envelope. If you
have any questions, please contact me at [telephone number redacted]. Your time and
input for this doctoral study are greatly appreciated!
Sincerely,
Cort M. Chambers

